This is a very critical look at the Allied campaign in the Fall of 1944, between the break out from Normandy and the start of the Ardennes Offensive. It is the thesis of the author that the Allies missed several opportunities to deal the German army a crushing blow, and cross the Rhine by the end of 1944.

He does not fault the original plan of Eisenhower. In fact, the author maintains that if this plan (a main trust in the North trough Belgium, and a secondary one in Alsace) had been followed, the war would have been shortened, and the German counteroffensive would have been much weaker, if had been able to launch at all.

The reasons for this failure are many: overoptimism after the German collapse in France, leading to a neglect of logistics, and generals rushing off to pet projects (Montgomery and Patton), interpersonal jealousies and plain incompetence (Bradley, Hodges) and a failure to get a grip on events (Eisenhower). Except for Devers and Patch, no Allied generals really come out well out of this campaign. Ironically, the thrust by US 7th Army was the only one where Eisenhower chose to excerise command. By shutting it down, the author argues, a chance to cross the Rhine early was lost.

The book itself could have done with better editing. The author's style leaves somewhat to be desired (I'm not sure you can 'lack something in abundance'), and he has an irritating habit of referring to people with their nicknames (Ike, Monty, Beetle...). Also, there are plenty of small inaccuracies in geography. Beveland is systematically referred to as 'Breveland', Antwerp wasn't then, and still isn't a city of 2,5 million, etc. These things do not detract from the author's main argument, they merely annoy the reader. ( )