John A. Adams (2) (1949–)

I oscillated back and forth on whether to give this book three or only two and a half stars and mostly handed out the higher mark on the basis that if you want to read a military life of "Jakey" Devers this is pretty much it. Some Amazon reviewers have wondered whether there was enough primary source material to do a full biography of this man but there seems to be enough. My suspicion is that the author wanted to write a folksy, exemplary tale of a man he obviously admires but is probably glossing over Devers' personal faults, which seem to be a tendency to act first and ask questions later (which Devers consciously argued was a virtue) , an implied sarcastic mentality (Joe Stilwell was Devers' first mentor) and perhaps not wearing his ambition all that lightly. Eisenhower's suspicion was also that Devers was being carried operationally by men like Lucien Truscott and "Sandy" Patch. There does seem to be no argument though that Devers was a fine organizer, a good manager of technology and was mostly successful in managing affairs with the Free French military hierarchy.… (más)

This is an analysis of the strategic mistakes in the Pacific of WWII, if one ran a completely Mahanic war. The author has read the staff plan for ORANGE (the war against Japan, and been rigorous about applying it. He argues that once the defence of Australia and new Zealand had been secured by the Guadalcanal fighting, there was no reason for further adventures to the Northeast in New Guinea and the Philippines. MacArthur is pilloried and with good reasons.
If FDR saw that MacArthur's return to the Philippines was good PR, it was non-the-less, a great big butcher's bill for a PR effort.

Both American and Japanese families would have suffered a great deal less if the lessons of the Gilbert and Marshall islands had been properly digested. There was also no need for some of the intermediate island invasions in the Central Pacific Approach.

Adams, who has a background in civil aviation, believes that an approach from Kwajalein towards the Marianas would have secured the final sortie of the IJN to stave off the loss of Saipan and would have led to the "decisive Battle" that the IJN was looking for, after blowing their best chance, the "Battle of the Eastern Solomons" in 1942. As it happens, the IJN did sortie to the "Battle of the Philippine Sea" for precisely that reason. If the USN had more aggressively handled that fight, the IJN would have been completely removed as even a decoy force.

After that, there only would remain the seizure of a base near Japan from which to deploy the Submarine, bombing and mining war. Okinawa, and,possibly only part of it, would provide the appropriate facilities. The logistical capacity to do this was in the hands of the USN by September of 1944, and enough of the island could probably have been secured by November. While whether or not Japan could have been induced to surrender before the application of the atomic weapons is not easy to predict, given this scenario, the much shorter American casualty lists up to that point in the war are a definite plus. A good book for the Pacific analyst.… (más)

This is a very critical look at the Allied campaign in the Fall of 1944, between the break out from Normandy and the start of the Ardennes Offensive. It is the thesis of the author that the Allies missed several opportunities to deal the German army a crushing blow, and cross the Rhine by the end of 1944.

He does not fault the original plan of Eisenhower. In fact, the author maintains that if this plan (a main trust in the North trough Belgium, and a secondary one in Alsace) had been followed, the war would have been shortened, and the German counteroffensive would have been much weaker, if had been able to launch at all.

The reasons for this failure are many: overoptimism after the German collapse in France, leading to a neglect of logistics, and generals rushing off to pet projects (Montgomery and Patton), interpersonal jealousies and plain incompetence (Bradley, Hodges) and a failure to get a grip on events (Eisenhower). Except for Devers and Patch, no Allied generals really come out well out of this campaign. Ironically, the thrust by US 7th Army was the only one where Eisenhower chose to excerise command. By shutting it down, the author argues, a chance to cross the Rhine early was lost.

The book itself could have done with better editing. The author's style leaves somewhat to be desired (I'm not sure you can 'lack something in abundance'), and he has an irritating habit of referring to people with their nicknames (Ike, Monty, Beetle...). Also, there are plenty of small inaccuracies in geography. Beveland is systematically referred to as 'Breveland', Antwerp wasn't then, and still isn't a city of 2,5 million, etc. These things do not detract from the author's main argument, they merely annoy the reader.… (más)