Martin van CreveldReseñas

This is definitely the most interesting book about WW2 I’ve read. The setting is brilliant, and horrible, all at once. Hitler’s own thoughts on his life, as imagined by the author.

It is tough to read the (fictional) self-justification of a person responsible for so much death and misery, and that is also what is remarkable about this book. The author makes Hitler’s mind intelligible.

Rather than picturing him as the monstrous, unknowable evil, a kind of inhuman boogeyman, as Hitler is often portrayed, the author has managed to create a believable inner narrative, that explains the behaviour of the world’s most infamous dictator.

And that is an important perspective. While Hitler may or may not have gone insane at the end, most of the vile evils carried out by him and his party were not acts of madness, but rather calculated, well-planned actions.

War and genocide were not invented by the nazis, they were just frightfully efficient at it. It has happened many times before, and if we do not learn from history, understand what drives people to such extremes, it will happen again and again. A good place to start would be this book. Highly recommended.

Wenn man sich vorstellen kann nachts, mitten im Wald, von einem wilden Tier getötet zu werden, dann ist man mittendrin in jenen Gefühlen, die unsere Vorfahren hatten, die einfach überfallen wurden, jahrhundertelang, von marodierenden Banden oder Soldaten, die zu versorgen waren. Frieden ist ein relativ neuer Zustand, den wir seit 70 Jahren erleben dürfen. Wir glauben keine Feinde mehr zu haben, jeder sei unser Freund und Kulturen addieren sich automatisch zum Weltbürger. Weit gefehlt, wenn man die aktuellen Kriege betrachtet und den Terror, der sich überall breit macht. Nichts und niemand ist gleich und der Drang, Ideologien anzuhängen, mit denen Denken ausgeschaltet wird, ist so große wie nie.

Wenn man die Versuche der aktuellen Verteidigungsministerin beobachtet, ihre Armee noch hilfloser als sowieso schon zu machen, dann kommt man nicht umhin, in diesem Buch zu blättern und die Gründe zu finden. Armeen können nicht geführt werden wie Unternehmen, sie folgen ganz anderen Gesetzen und benötigen Kämpfer, die tatsächlich einer Gefahr etwas entgegnen können. Die deutsche Wehr ist weit davon entfernt, die eigenen Grenzen oder gar Einfälle anderer abwehren zu können, aber man verlässt sich immer noch auf den großen Bruder, der schon zur Hilfe eilen wird. Wird er das noch tun? Man hat seine Zweifel heute und fühlt, dass die Abwehr verweichlicht und hanebüchen unfähig sein würde.

Die Erkenntnisse und das Erleben von Terror inkl. religiöser Inbrunst (der heutigen asynchronen Kriegsform entsprechend) kommen immer näher, wer schlau ist, lernt nicht nur durch eigenen Anschauungsunterricht im realen Leben, sondern so, wie man das von leseerfahrenen, analytischen Menschen eigentlich verlangen könnte. Martin von Creveld (israelischer Militärhistoriker und -theoretiker niederländischer Herkunft, emeritierter Professor für Geschichte an der Hebräischen Universität Jerusalem gilt als einer der weltweit führenden Wissenschaftler seines Fachs) offeriert Erkenntnisse pur, selbst erlebt und erlitten. Er verlor Freunde und Verwandte im Holocaust, im Krieg oder aufgrund islamischer Terroranschläge. Er hat als israelischer Staatsbürger unzählige Konflikte gesehen und kennt den Terror bzw. die richtigen Antworten darauf aus unmittelbarer Nähe. Ihn zu begreifen, erhellt und gibt Antworten auf richtige Reaktionsweisen auch für Europa/Amerika.

MvC legt mit dieser Analyse die Probleme des global wütenden Terrors offen, die mitten in den Kern des Problems zielen. Er beantwortet insb. die Frage, warum der Westen in diesem Zusammenhang so hilflos wurde bzw. was dagegen zu tun wäre. MvC gibt Einblicke in den pazifistischen (soften) Kult des Westens inkl. Kindererziehung ohne jegliche Vernunft: alle Anderen sind friedliche, bunte Freunde, denen man immer beide Wangen hinhält. Wir erleben eine Dekadenz junger Männer, ihre Infantilisierung und Feminisierung: jeder von uns kann dies täglich in Medien erleben. Dieser Verlust des Realen, die völlig Abnabelung jeglicher Gefahr ist mit die eigentlich dramatische Gefahr. Niemand kann aus der Geschichte oder auch der Jetztzeit davon ausgehen, dass es morgen keine Feinde mehr geben wird. Eine irrationale, völlig überzogene Ideologie herrscht bei uns, die am Ende des römischen Reiches eine ähnliche, suggestive Kraft hatte und zu den bekannten Ergebnissen führte.

Der Autor beschreibt den Abbau der westlichen Armeen zu reinen Friedenswächtern bzw. ganz normalen Unternehmen mit Corporate Mission Statements der Extraklasse inkl. Kitas und absurden Spielereien. Parallel dazu meint man im Westen, dass die Abschaffung von Kriegen und die Ächtung von Soldaten als Mördern selbstverständlich wäre, ja, Grenzen gäbe es sowieso keine mehr. MvC entwirrt dieses komplizierte, wuchernde Denkgestrüpp des Westens und insb. Deutschlands. Dabei nimmt er kein Blatt vor den Mund, wie auch, wenn man Israel und seine direkten Feinde erlebt, er spricht dabei auch die Problematik von Frauen in Armeen an, eine kontroverse, harte Sichtweise.

Was ergibt sich daraus für die aktuelle Generation bei uns? Sie ist völlig weichgespült, ohne jenes Gen, das nötig wäre zum Verteidigen des Eigenen. Diese Weicheier-Generation denkt, Gewalt sei nur ein Konstrukt der Vergangenheit. Nun kommt aber Gewalt in unseren Alltag durch Terror und Massenzuwanderung. Und wie reagieren wir? Wir weichen aus, flüchten uns in liberale Ausreden, schieben Verantwortung weg. Martin van Creveld mahnt: Wenn wir wollen, dass der Westen nicht das Schicksal aller Imperien ereilen soll, müssen wir umdenken. Wir müssen die Herausforderung annehmen, die unsere Zeit uns aufbürdet. Wir müssen wieder wehrhaft sein. Nur so können aufklärerische Errungenschaften verteidigt und die Freiheit, die wir alle lieben, bewahrt werden. Etwas anderes zu tun wäre der Verlust jeglicher kultureller und politischer Vernunft.

Dass Israel wie kein anderes Land der Welt diese Wehrhaftigkeit lebt und besser darauf vorbereitet ist, Kriege zu gewinnen: Wer wüsste es nicht. Ich wäre heute glücklich, wenn die BW in Israel trainieren würde, z.B. in Städten, die Kämpfer auf jene Häuserfights vorbereitet, die Kriege von morgen ausmachen werden. Nur so wäre eine verweichlichte Generation bzw. ein Land aufzuwecken, das sich aktuell alle Bürgerkriegsszenarien ins eigene Land einlädt und keinerlei Mechanismen hat, um kriegerische Probleme zu lösen. Dabei hilft es wenig, alte Traditionen komplett zu beschneiden oder sonstige Aktionen durchzuführen, die nur das Gewissen beruhigen. Menschen in überbürokratisierten Staaten tendieren dazu, nur noch Rechte, aber keine Pflichten mehr wahrzunehmen.

Es wird mehr nötig sein, als die Wehrausgaben deutlich zu erhöhen. Der Terrorimus ist brutal und widerlich; für den Kampf gegen ihn wird nichts anderes gelten. Er wird auch lange dauern. (S. 188) Dass die Armee nicht zu einer Baby-Truppe degradiert werden darf, steht außer Frage und nach MvC macht man in Deutschland so ziemlich alles falsch aktuell. Dieses Buch ist ein dramatischer Weckruf. (Geschrieben im Jahr der Erstveröffentlichung des Buches in Deutschland)

Ein schöner (Alp_)Traum

Der Edle strebt nach Harmonie, nicht nach Gleichheit.
Der Gemeine strebt nach Gleichheit, nicht nach Harmonie. (Konfuzius)

Man sollte höchst vorsichtig sein, wenn Gleichheit in politischen Programmen postuliert wird. Denn die Natur hat Gleichheit nicht vorgesehen, sie ist insgesamt kontraproduktiv und höchst gefährlich.

Kein Wunder, dass Gleichheit mit Wahrheit, Gerechtigkeit und Freiheit auf dem Kriegsfuß steht, ja, diese wichtigen Werte unter Beschuss nimmt. Martin von Creveld (MvC) gelingt mit diesem Buch eine treffende, gut verständliche Ableitung der Triebkräfte von Gesellschaften. Weder Horden- noch Häuptlingsgesellschaften haben ihre Mitglieder jemals gleich behandelt, immer waren Hierarchien präsent - geradezu überlebenswichtig. Auch im alten Griechenland gab es Unterschiede und Sklaven immer präsent.

„Gleichheit - zumindest im Sinne von Platon, Nabis, Caligula, Rousseau, Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mao Zedong, Pol Pot und nicht wenigen Vertretern von political correctness und Diversität - ist nichts als ein Traum.“ Wer heute das Nebeneinander von allem und jedem als herrschende Ideologie postuliert und keine Gedanken an Dysfunktionen verschwendet, hat nichts begriffen und sollte keine politischen Ämter begleiten. Wenn er zudem noch Angst vor einem Weltuntergang oder Krankheiten schürt, erstellt er religiöse Mauern, die Menschen in Unfreiheit halten.

China fußt bis heute und geradezu beispielhaft Singapur auf dem Konfuzianismus. Sein Kern besteht darin, Ungleichheiten anzuerkennen und in innerer, natürlicher Harmonie mit Unterschieden zu leben. Offensichtlich nicht die schlechteste Wahl, es sei denn, man würde die Friedhofsruhe in Klöstern bevorzugen. Denn dort war Gleichheit im eigentlichen Sinne am stärksten präsent, aber nur, indem wichtige Lebensbausteine zugunsten der Heilserwartung im Jenseits aufgegeben wurden.

Die Gleichheit ist die Utopie der Empörten, sagte Emile de Girardin, und heute müssten wir über diese Aufregung hinaus zur natürlichen Vernunft gelangen. Ich sehe aber keine Chance mehr, die Empört-Euch-Rufe sind zu zahlreich und moralisch enthoben bzw. grün furchtsam. Wo Gleichheit herrscht, fällt und fehlt der Gewinn, sie überzieht das Denken und Handeln ins untätige Nichts.

Reading this volume on the heels of Jeremy Black's "Logistics: The Key to Victory" gave me a better perspective on military logistics than could be achieved in the later volume--I'll explain the why later in the review. Van Creveld's work is groundbreaking in three ways. First, he takes a long and unflinching look at a topic avoided by the vast majority of military historians. Second, he has the courage to revise decades and centuries-old thinking on military campaigns and leaders. Third, he applies statistical analysis (admittedly theoretical) to historical campaigns, which wither debunks conventional historical canon or alters the narrative.

Martin van Creveld is an Israeli military historian specializing in strategy, tactics, and logistics. Having received his PhD in History in 1971, he was still a young author when he penned "Supplying War", publishing the book with Cambridge University Press in 1977. This is a relatively slim book at 284 pages, including bibliography, endnotes, and index. There are only 8 chapters, each chapter containing four to seven titled subchapters. The 2004 second edition adds a postscript covering the 30 years between editions, including an analysis of the then new Revolution in Military Affairs. This review looks only at the first edition.

The book proceeds chronologically. Chapter 1 is introductory, discussing war as it developed in the Age of Gunpowder and Absolutism where plunder and magazines served as the bases for an organized army's logistics in the 17th and 18th century. Chapter 2 surveys the Napoleonic era, examining two specific campaigns--Austerlitz in 1805 and Russia in 1812--from a logistical perspective. Chapter 3 takes a look at Prussian Army logistics and the Etappen system of the mid-19th century, culminating in the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War. The impact (or lack thereof) of the use of railroads in military logistics is the focus here.

Chapter 4 takes on the logistics of World War I's von Schlieffen plan along with von Moltke's modifications, where we see the railroad/motorized supply system for the first time. Chapter 5 concentrates on Germany's World War II Operation Barbarossa, where the Wehrmacht's partially motorized logistics system proved wanting in the vastness of Russia's sprawling landscape. Chapter 8 continues van Creveld's analysis of the Wehrmacht's logistics, this time with Romme's North African campaigns of 1941/42. There being no use for horse-borne logistics and with limited railway infrastructure in the desert, the Afrika Korps had to completely rely upon motorized transport to meet its logistics needs. Chapter 7 is about the Allied invasion of Northwest Europe in 1944, examining how the totally motorized Anglo-American armies under Eisenhower approached the invasion of Germany, with logistical analysis of the apparently never-ending broad front/narrow front debate that railed the Allied commanders in September 1944. Chapter 8 wraps up the author's case using elements from the previous chapters.

This was an interesting and challenging read--van Creveld is a demanding professor who expects his students to be well-read in military history. The book abounds in name-dropping, and the author does not spend the time to explain who these personalities are--so the reader should be prepared before embarking on this read to gain the most benefit. In Chapter 8, van Creveld makes a number of points, one of the most significant being his prediction that armies of the late 20th century are limited in their offensive operations to about 40 miles a day consistently. Interestingly, the US Army's ground forces in 2003's Operation Iraqi Freedom could gain upwards of 60 miles a day; however, it took the better part of three weeks for the 3rd Division to move the roughly 400 miles between the Kuwaiti border berm and Baghdad, an average of perhaps 20 miles a day..

When compared with Black's work, "Supplying War" is still a hallmark work. I think Black got carried away in looking at all that van Creveld did not cover; after all, the earlier author admits that he limited his focus to come up with a readable volume. Black's book is well-nigh unreadable because it covers so much unfamiliar ground--the logistics in conflicts little-known in Western circles. Moreover, I find van Creveld's analysis more applicable to modern military logistics.

For a military historian, "Supplying War" is a must for the library.½

I could not agree with @jcbrunner more. This sat unread on my shelves for years, wish I had never picked it up again.

Only Martin Creveld could put together a worthy history of historical thought in less than 200 pages. Obviously the book can only hit the highlights but it really does a good job in a few pages. My only slight gripe is that he doesn't mention Boyd (although Lind followed Boyd).

In the Introduction the author clarifies that “logistics” refers to “the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied.” He examines how the problems of moving and supplying armies have been affected through time by changes in technology, organization, “and other relevant factors,” and how logistics in turn have influenced strategy.

Before even engaging in battle, Van Creveld asserts, a commander must make sure of his ability to supply his soldiers with the necessary calories to keep them useful as soldiers; to ensure there are available routes to carry them to the right place at the right time; that there are sufficient means of conveyance and support for whatever system was used, whether horse, wagons, or tanks, for example; and how logistic factors might limit an army’s operations, just to name a few important concerns. It is a critically important subject, yet one often overlooked in military histories.

Because the topic is so broad, the author concentrates on the period between 1805 and 1944 and focuses primarily on battles fought in the West. He begins however with an extensive introduction that covers the 17th and 18th centuries.

The book, which includes maps and extensive statistics, shows how important the “tyranny of logistics” is not only to strategy and tactics in battles, but to their outcomes.

It is so fascinating to read about how much logistical concerns affected generals ranging from Napoleon to Rommel, from Hitler to Eisenhower. There is literally never a dull moment in this book.

Remarkably prescient [more to come].

Drawing on a very wide range of unpublished and previously unexploited sources, Martin van Creveld examines the "nuts and bolts" of war. He considers the formidable problems of movement and supply, transportation and administration, often mentioned (but rarely explored) by the vast majority of books on military history. By concentrating on logistics rather than on the more traditional tactics and strategy, van Creveld is also able to offer an original reinterpretation of military history.

"To read the signs, our age also displays these symptoms. Partly because of the nuclear threat, partly because of the modern fascination with advanced technology per se, and partly for deeply rooted socio-ideological reasons, weapons are being turned into toys and convention war into an elaborate, but fundamentally pointless, game. While games can be nice while they last, in our age too there is a real danger that they will be upset by barbarians who, refusing to abide by the rules, pick up the playing-board and use it to smash the opponent's head. Let him who has ears to listen, listen: The call Lucifer ante portas already reverberates, and new forms of warfare are threatening to put an end to our delicate civilization"

In this seminal work, Creveld examines the role of technology in the conduct of warfare, from ancient times to the post-WWII, post-nuclear era. He emphasizes that while military technology itself has certainly played a major role, civilian technology or quasi-military technology (better roads, sanitation, etc.) has likely played a larger role in the conduct of warfare. The book is an excellent read for both students of history and people concerned with the balance of geopolitical power in the post-nuclear, but especially post-9/11, world. As Creveld says..."Even more than the guerilla, the terrorist is limisted to weapons which are small, light, and easily hidden from the authorities' eye. During the millenia before 1600 the dagger was by far the most popular of these weapons, as in the case of the Sicarii who are mentioned by Josephus and who were named after it. During the 17th century, the pistol and the bomb, the former easily acquired and the latter easily manufactured, joined the list of terrorist weapons. Even so, for another 300 years that list remained comparatively small. It was only during the 20th century that technological advances made available a whole series of small, but extremely powerful, devices"

He continues, when speaking about how to counter terrorism: "...several conditions, however, must be met for this [effective anti-terrorist operations] to be possible There must be no reluctance to employ the normal surveillance apparatus of the modern state [emphasis mine]." This itself raises a whole can of issues relating to state surveillance and liberty, which we as a society are still grappling with to this day, and which has no clear-cut answer.

An excellent, exciting, fun, read. His bibliography is well-annotated as well, and I want to dig more in depth into some of his sources.

This book is an easy and quick read that gives an excellent overview of Israel's history. Van Creveld is a cranky but proud Zionist who makes no attempt to hide his biases and expresses himself in a very non-PC way. Nontheless this is a worthwhile read for anyone interested in the complex and fascinating history of Zionism and Israel. Just don't expect subtlety or "even-handedness."

Nel corso della storia, Ie donne sono rimaste lantano dalla linea del fronte. Con poche eccezioni, il ruolo della donna in guerra è sempre stato solo di ausilio per I'uomo cui era affidato il compito di combattere. Ora, all'inizio di un nuovo secolo,Ie cose stanno cambiando. Per la prima volta nella storia Ie donne hanno ottenuto un posto a fianco dell'uomo sui campo di battaglia. NegliStati Uniti e in buona parte dell'Europa,Ie donne rappresentano circa il12 per cento delle forze armate.A differenza dalle loro madri, Ie donne oggi possone prestare servizio militare in marina, sui caccia-bombardieri, e possono manovrare i pezzi d'artiglieria. In tutti i paesi sviluppati, stanno progressivamente occupando posizioni a livello di reggimento che un tempo erano riservate esclusivamente agli uomini. E' in corso una rivoluzione celebrata dalle femministe di ogni nazione. L'autore, però ,osserva che I'afflusso delle donne nelle forze armate può essere un interessante esperimento sociale, ma dal punta divista militare costituisce un problema. Data la diversa costituzione fisica, Ie donne al fronte non possono offrire Ie stesse prestazioni dei maschi, e, soprattutto, sono più soggette a farsi male. Le donne che entrano a far parte dei reggimenti avanzati, hanno condizioni di accesso più facili, hanno compiti più leggeri e sono soggette ad una disciplina meno rigida. Se poi si aggungono tutte Ie cause legali per molestia sessuale e per sessismo,si crea un quadro di circostanze che ha awilito il morale delle unità miste ai minimi storici. Se dunque Ie donne entrano numerose nelle forze armate, ancor più numerosi sono gli uomini che ne escono. Martin van Creveld, con questa Iibro provocatorio e controverso, afferma che se la parita dei sessi è un valore desiderabile nella vita civile, il compito di fare la guerra deve esser lasciato agli uomini. Nelle forze armate i ruoli vengono attribuiti al genere maschile o femminile per ragioni ben precise, e la correttezza politica della parita non solo mette a rischio la sicurezza nazionale,ma rappresenta un pericolo anche per i soldati che sono chiamati a difenderci.

May have read previously.

Martin van Creveld has written outstanding military history books. His book on military logistics is a classic. Unfortunately, he has been struck by a severe case of cooties. He now sees himself in a task to combat the uppity womenfolk who take away the jobs of the manly men and demand equality. In this book, he informs his readers that the Swedish men "actually prefer to have sex with animals than with Swedish women — a practice sufficiently common to given rise to legislation aimed at banning it." He found this "fact" in Conservapedia and the Daily Mail, both right-wing projects with a precarious link to reality. At present, it seems easier to restore Don Quixote to sanity rather than turn back van Creveld to productive reality-based research.

He is deeply afraid of the manly men becoming a minority faced with an unholy alliance of women, gays and foreigners. His examination of the impossible quest for equality thus has the underlying mission to show that those uppity women should accept the wonderful world of inequality of yesterday: "In all historically known societies, women have always been subordinated to men." To sustain his reactionary views, he parades all conservative political thinkers.

Unfortunately, he fails to presents any economic ideas such as the tragedy of the commons or the free-rider problem. The principle of equality means to treat equal things equally and unequal things unequally. To sustain any equality, a border between these two zones is necessary. Many conservatives have well understood this point and the US political and legal system is hard at work dismantling the protective laws that preserve a sliver of equality in the United States. A true history of equality would be an interesting book to read. Unfortunately, Martin van Creveld is no longer the man to write it.½

Oorlogscultuur is zo'n boek waar je veel van verwacht, omdat de auteur een expert is op zijn of haar gebied. Want dat is Martin van Creveld. In vijf hoofdstukken gaat hij uitgebreid in op wat oorlogscultuur eigenlijk is, wat het inhoudt en welke uitingsvormen het kent. Geschiedenis en huidige uitingen van krijgshaftig gedrag lopen naadloos in elkaar over per thema. In soms zeer uitegebreide en gedetaileerde beschrijvingen, tot aan verschillende soorten knopen op uniformen aan toe, doorloop je het boek. Dat is ook meteen een van de grote nadelen; haar detaillering. Hierdoor raak je nog wel eens het spoor bijster. Een ander nadeel, dat zelfs op een gegeven moment gaat irriteren, is dat de schrijver overduidelijk zijn politieke mening over oa. feminisme en pacifisme uit. Uiteindelijk worden die gefileerd in de laatste hoofdstukken. Het ontgaat de lezer volledig waartoe dat dient en welke rol dat speeelt in OorlogsCultuur. De auteur lijkt te willen uitdrukken dat wat er in de geschiedenis is geweest nu eenmaal zo is en dat dat het recept is voor de toekomst en alle gedachten die daarme in strijd zijn, ongeldig zijn.

Martin van Creveld is een groot schrijver over conflicten en oorlog. Als je dit boek vergelijkt met zijn ander werk en het zelfde bijna visionaire gehalte van zijn expertise verwacht, kom je bedrogen uit.

Impressive and timely survey of how airpower shaped modern warfare, and also its limitations (against guerilla forces, say). It is incredibly tempting to think that airpower is a means of accomplishing objectives with a minimal effort, but in its present form, it cannot do everything on its own. Let us hope our modern generals take van Creveld's lessons to heart in Libya.

Att beskriva vad boken handlar om är med nödvändighet aningen omständligt: det är en översikt över diverse tänkares syn på krig och krigskonst; inte hur krigskonsten i sig har utvecklats genom tiderna, utan hur det intellektuella studiet av den har det. En metastudie över metastudier, om man så vill.

Förutom de gamla kinesiska manualerna, med deras delvis annorlunda syn på kriget som ett nödvändigt ont som måste bemästras, helst undvikas, så är det i huvudsak västliga tänkare som presenteras: från de gamla greker och härdade romerska författare som under medeltiden var allt som fanns i västliga Europa (den närmsta egna produktionen där var instruktionerna för hur en riddare skulle föra sig), en del bysantinska instruktionsböcker, ett par tidiga renässansteoretiker (som Machiavelli med hans till synes dödfödda idé om medborgarsoldater), sedan ett stort hopp fram till 1700-talets begynnande idéer och sedan det moderna ramverk som Clausewitz ställde upp.

Det är roande läsning, ty van Creveld kan skriva. Tydligen ingår boken i någon slags serie av böcker för de som tycker att krig är ett lämpligt ämne att ha böcker om på ditt kaffebord: stor är den, och det finns många bilder, inklusive sådana med färgade block och pilar och små namn inritade på en karta.

Översikten är troligen sund (med tanke på att den ende presenterade författaren jag läst är mäster Sun så kan jag inte uttala mig); och trots att den skrevs innan Al Qaida kapade plan och flög dem in i byggnader så har dess avslutning, där det meddelas att trots – eller på grund av – att atomvapen gjort krig mellan stormakter nästan omöjliga så är fortfarande sådana med smärre länder, och organisationer som inte har något territorium det. Krigets historia är inte all, och således knappast heller den för de militära tänkarna.

In dit boek verheldert Martin van Creveld hoe de razendsnelle technologische vooruitgang het aanzien van de oorlog in de 20e eeuw grondig heeft veranderd en de wil om oorlog te voeren juist heeft afgezwakt.
Meer: http://minervaria.wordpress.com/2012/01/24/de-evolutie-van-de-oorlog/

מצוין, מהספרים הטובים בנושא הצבאי בכלל ובנושא הפיקוד בכלל

הטוב שבחוקרים הצבאיים בארץ כותב על השתנות אופי הלחימה

Martin Van Creveld is one of the world's best writers about military technology. His account of the impact of communication technology on military leadership remains unsurpassed. His military expertise is marred by his Dr. Strangelove views on casualties and women. This book does not disappoint in its number of outrageous statements. While the cry for more Western casualties is echoed by many a chickenhawk (US specimens are invariably flabby), the desire to return to a pre-Tailhook airforce labels him as a dinosaur. One of the key influences of technology is that it reduces gender differences. Women may not carry as heavy loads as men but they can push buttons just as fast if not faster.

The book is divided into five parts. The first two parts give a traditional account of the rise of air power up to the end of the Second World War. Part III is devoted to the Cold War confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States of America that saw the development of intercontinental missiles, jets and helicopters. Playing in the big league was and is so expensive that one after the other powers dropped out of the game, until only the United States of America retains the means to project power to any place on the planet. "Missiles, satellites, and drones" (the title of the eleventh chapter) promise to relieve some of the financial stress - at the cost of allowing other players to re-enter the game. I wish van Creveld had elaborated more on the experience and potential of drones in modern warfare. Instead, he stops with the already classic account of the looming end of manned fighting aircrafts. The democratizing effect of technology will devalue today's fighter jets, these technological marvels, just like armored knights were slain by humble pikes, bows and guns. The big intellectual gap in this book is the lack of a definition what constitutes air power and its different forms. The author should have assembled his different statements about air power into a coherent framework. In my interpretation, air power can interdict and destroy, but has limited ability to hold and control. Organizationally, these would mean a relegation of the airforce into a support function. Pilots will be the 21st century's train stokers.

Part IV and V deal with the smaller wars (IV: Little Wars 1945-2010) and imperialistic engagements (V: War amongst the People 1945-2010). These parts suffer from their close linkage to the Cold War. While the US and the Soviets did not go to war directly, their pilots manned the aircrafts in their proxy wars. Instead of a consistent framework, the author presents a mix which is further complicated by the fact that many of the Little Wars were also wars amongst peoples. The author's focus on the United States of America and, to a lesser extent, Western powers leads to a silence about the wars among the poor. Africa and South America appear mostly in a colonial setting. The air element of the War on Drugs and the endless African civil wars might have been interesting topics for van Creveld's part V.

In sum, a readable introduction to the history of warfare in the air with a and from a US focus. It elegantly shows the costly futility in investing in manned aircraft but only hints at the power of the now quarter-century-old development of drones.½

As described by the reviewer below, this book deals with logistics at the strategic level and uses seven relatively modern campaigns (up to and including WW2) to chart the development of military logistics since the seventeenth century. Notable omissions include a discussion of how armies dealt with the issue prior to this period and the logistics of naval or air warfare.

A particularly interesting and unexpected aspect of this book is that it draws a number of conclusions about the campaigns and leaders covered that successfully challenge the prevailing wisdom in this area. For example, the failings of Rommel in North Africa are laid bare, as is the impracticability of the Schlieffen plan and the fact that the German railway system contributed little by way of advantage to the army in its defeat of France in 1870. The book also refutes the misnomer that Napoleon was ill-prepared for the disastrous advance on Russia in 1812. The new edition contains an interesting, if brief, discussion of modern military logistics and the increased profile recently associated with the subject.

In summary, this book is very readable and provides coverage of a subject much neglected by the popular literature. Supplying war also contains a wealth of information about seven key military campaigns viewed from a perspective that seeks to determine what outcomes were achievable, rather than simply intended.

There is an expression in the US military: “Amateurs talk tactics. Professionals talk logistics.” And this is made crystal clear in this book which explains in detail why so many great campaigns in history, such as the German invasion of the Soviet Union, faltered because of totally inadequate logistics planning. The author is the world authority on military logistics. Absolutely first rate.

Oneerbiedig (en kritisch beschrijft Martin van Creveld de opkomst en ondergang van de Israeli Defence Force (IDF).
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Een paar jaar geleden brak in militaire kringen een relletje uit over de kleur van de nieuwe baret voor de Koninklijke Landmacht. Die zou groen worden, maar dat was tegen het zere been van het Korps Commandotroepen. De groene baret was hun onderscheidingsteken en het kon niet dat zomaar iedere soldaat die op zou mogen zetten. Na een jaar kregen de commando’s hun zin. Lees verder....