Another one in the “obscure wars” reading program – obscure despite the fact that they had a major influence on European history. Author Gervase Phillips starts out with somewhat proud apology for being a military historian, noting that the discipline has fallen out of favor on the grounds that the cultural, political and economic backgrounds to conflict are now held to be more important than the strategy and tactics – a belief he disagrees with. His initial chapters block out the general change in warfare from the 15th to 16th centuries – the development of the pike, arquebus and cannon brought about a renaissance of infantry. Phillips claims that rather than being on the borders of European military development the Scots and English were actually central to developing tactical innovations (especially since both sides used mercenaries, who transmitted military ideas back to the Continent.


Phillips notes that some authors claim there was no development in Scot tactics since the 14th century, since the Scots at Bannockburn and the Scots at Flodden were both armed with spears. However, the mode of employment was dramatically different. The Scot schiltrons at Bannockburn were defensive formations; a spear-armed square or hedgehog. Under Edward I the English had broken the schiltrons with a deluge of arrows and then used heavy cavalry to mop up. (The reason this didn’t work at Bannockburn was Edward II was nowhere near the general his father was and sent his heavy cavalry in first). By the 16th century, the employment of Scots infantry had essentially reversed; the pike column was now an offensive formation, copied off the success of Swiss and Landsknect infantry; a rapidly moving pike column was supposed to overwhelm opposing archers before they could get off too many arrows. Unfortunately for the Scots the English had been studying European warfare as well, and opposed the pike columns with a combined-arms force of archers, arquebusiers, billmen, and field artillery, with light and heavy cavalry waiting on the wings. Phillips notes that the English bill at the time was not a simple steel hook but more like a halberd, with an extended spear point (and thus could be used for thrusting as well as chopping) , and English archers were interspersed with billmen (and sometimes had bills of their own). The idea behind the massed pike column was that the opposing infantry would break – most people would when confronted with the prospect of a steel spearhead rearranging their innards. At Flodden, though, the English didn’t; that showed the disadvantage of the pike formation; once your opponent got inside the reach of the pike, you were out of luck. The billmen beat down or dodged around the pikes, closed, and settled accounts with their own weapons. Phillips is quite critical of James IV, who bravely lead at the front of the main pike column, was quickly killed, and was thus unable to give orders that might have salvaged things or enabled an orderly retreat rather than a rout.


Unfortunately for the English they then discovered problems of their own. Although they could win battles against Scots field armies, they couldn’t occupy the country. Scotland provided little in the way of food or forage in normal times and once opposing armies rampaged back and forth for a while there was nothing left. As a result the general tenor of things after under Henry VIII after Flodden would be a large English cavalry raid to loot, burn, and drive off cattle in an attempt to make the Scots surrender. The Scots didn’t cooperate; after the dust settled they would sort themselves out and raid into England in turn. When Somerset became Protector, he revamped this strategy; for one thing he had an actual goal (the union of Scotland and England by wedding Mary of Scotland to Edward VI of England, both children at the time) and he had a strategy for doing it (rather than destructive raids, win the “hearts and minds” of the Scots by occupying the borderlands and giving the inhabitants protection – Scots raiders weren’t terribly particular on where they collected loot). It seemed like a good idea and almost worked at first, but Somerset found that the Scottish countryside would barely support the people that lived there and didn’t have enough additional resources to feed and supply English garrisons (thus was further complicated that in order to have any hope of controlling the countryside the garrisons had to have large contingents of light horse, which added fodder to the necessary supplies). Frustrated, Somerset went back to the raid and burn strategy (since the original goal had been a wedding, among the Scots this was known as the “Rough Wooing”). After Mary was spirited away to the Continent and married to the Dauphin. Somerset obstinately kept at it even though there was now no strategic goal. English garrisons absorbed huge amounts of money for wages and victualing; although forts near the sea could usually be supplied by ship the ones in the interior had to depend on convoys and the Scots road system, which was axle-deep in mud most of the year. Somerset eventually had to withdraw to respond to peasant revolts in England (and to be attainted and beheaded).


Lots of interesting stuff here. I was surprised at the sophistication of the English combined arms system; the recognition that fortifications now had to stand up to cannon; the extensive use of mercenaries by both sides (often from countries that were nominally at war with England or Scotland); the development of arquebus tactics (including mounted arquebusiers) and the demonstration of the old but often ignored military maxim that amateurs study tactics but professionals study logistics. Well done; could, as usual, use some more maps (even though this book was published in 1999 the maps provided date from antiquarian studies in the 1890s; they’re adequate but barely). ( )