https://nwhyte.livejournal.com/2919884.html

this is an excellent read. There are two distinct strands of analysis, each done in satisfying detail: i) the inside baseball story of how Irish, British and EU officials dealt with the problems thrown up by Brexit, particularly those relating to Ireland; and ii) an examination of how different Irish economic sectors are affected by Brexit.

I learned much more from the second of these strands. I had no idea that the ducks farmed on the Monaghan/Tyrone border are so dominant in the Asian market. I had no idea of the Irishness of most Cheddar cheese, or that nobody outside the UK and Ireland buys Cheddar. I had no idea about the deep resentment of the Irish fishing industry over the Common Fisheries Policy. I had some idea of the complexities of the cross-border and croos-Irish Sea livestock trade, and of the intricate history of the Common Travel Area, but Connelly’s book enlightened me still further. Put simply, Brexit is a massively disrupting factor for the Irish economy, and the Irish government is right to demand more than magical thinking about the border from London before moving to discussion of the future trade relationship. (NB that what is required for now is not a complete solution, but an outline which goes further than the magical thinking on offer so far.)

However, I was more interested in the first strand, not least because I know several of the protagonists. I had been wondering if there was ever a serious possibility that Ireland might be tempted to align with the UK against the rest of the EU, to enable a better deal for the departing Brits. The answer is pretty clear: Dublin had gamed out the consequences of a Brexit vote long in advance (unlike London) and came to the conclusion that their negotiating power would be better aligned with the other 26 member states rather than the UK; the rest of the EU would be more likely to offer solidarity than the British. This was not without its challenges - the rest of the EU needed educating and convincing about the specifics of the Irish situation; some Irish officials did start to look at ways of managing the border, but were reined in by a government anxious not to surrender its negotiating capital; EU Commissioner Phil Hogan, though no longer an Irish government official, emerges as a key figure stiffening spines in both Dublin and Brussels.

The other reason that there was no prospect of Ireland aligning with the UK against the rest is that the British government at central level has absolutely no clue about either part of Ireland. (The DUP deal is less important here than the absence of an Executive in Northern Ireland.) The British Embassy in Dublin is mentioned precisely once, which indicates the value placed on the FCO by Whitehall today. One anecdote, already much-quoted but I’ll quote it again, is especially cringeworthy:

"In July [2016], an official in the Department of the Taoiseach received a curious email. It came from the diary secretary of David Davis, the Secretary of State for DexEU – aka ‘Minister for Brexit’. The email read: ‘The Secretary of State has told me he wants to meet Kenny. Please let us know if Kenny is available.’ A senior diplomat immediately wrote to a British official further up the Whitehall food chain. ‘The message was sent [back],’ recalls the diplomat, ‘(a), the Taoiseach is not Davis’s interlocutor and (b), you don’t refer to the Prime Minister of a country by his surname.’"

In recent weeks British commentators have been reacting with fury to their discovery that Ireland is an independent country which will pursue its own self-interest. So much for that special relationship. This is an excellent book, and fairly short too. ( )