David S. LandesReseñas

900 LAN 1

I read Landes and Diamond in tandem: why are different societies so different. They should be read in tandem. Diamond offers biological and geographical reasons for the differences in civilizations and their rate of "evolution." Landes notes societal and cultural differences for the differences in civilizations and their rate of "evolution." Both are correct and both are wrong in certain areas.

A massive account of world political and economic history, from the title setting out to explain why some countries (mainly the West) became wealthy, while most of the tropical "third world" remained poor. The trouble with such attempts is that they often descend to post-facto rationalizing. Almost any factor can be seized to "explain" the differences, and counter-examples can be found for any single cause-and-effect hypothesis. So the book amounts to not much more than a chronicle of historical events, with some speculations on the role of religion, on national character, climate and natural resources, and so on. It is difficult even to account for differences between parts of the West: why did the "industrial revolution" develop most robustly in Britain, for example? The author, refreshingly, tend to eschew "political correctness", and calls out deficiencies in the ruling mores and values in society, and challenges attempts to always blame some other entity or force; the positive message being, presumably, that it will be possible for any country or region to pull itself up economically, if policy is oriented to long-term improvement rather than to immediate indulgence in conspicuous consumption.

This marvelous book weaves an informative narrative on the history of nations and how they achieved their current(1998) status in the world at large. Thus we hear a lot about the dominance of Japan with their Gemba Kaizen and just-in-time production methods. It also explores a great number of other countries and why they didn't lead the way, so to speak.

For instance, take China. China invented and developed so many things back in the olden days, but never made real use of them. So they developed paper and block printing, but where was the literacy back in 1100 AD or so? So they managed to find the uses of Gunpowder, but they didn't find a more efficient formula for cannons and guns. This was all explained by the government and how it stifled creativity and drive for anything. The emperor decided what was good and bad, and a number of toadies decided who got to see the emperor. Even back in the time of Europe's rise to dominance, they did nothing but languish in the past. The thing that broke this was clocks and watches. Everything else was considered foreign trash or old news.

Thus Europe led the way with improved ship building techniques and navigation and such. When they went places they desired knowledge and trade. They wanted dominance too, of course. This was fueled in many ways by how they did things in the mother country. Take Spain for another example. They founded the "New World" and conquered the greatest nations in the Americas. The Aztecs and the Incas had much in terms of gold and silver, but this was a huge detriment to Spain. Since they received all of that specie, they went and bankrupted themselves; several times. This might seem counter-intuitive, but it doesn't actually improve the state of the nation all that much. They rested on their laurels and didn't develop new ways of farming and manufacture. Thus, by the 1600s they were already woefully behind.

Anyway, this book was really good, but somewhat out of date. Still, since it discusses the history of economics, it can be learned from.

> RICHESSE ET PAUVRETÉ DES NATIONS, par David S. Landes. — L'inégalité entre nations riches - peu nombreuses - et nations pauvres – majoritaires – est un des problèmes les plus préoccupants de notre temps. David S. Landes, éminent historien de l’économie, a voulu faire de «l’histoire mondiale»: mettre l’accent sur les valeurs propres à chaque société comme facteur explicatif des performances économiques. De l’Europe de l’an mille à celle de la Révolution industrielle, en passant, entre autres, par la Chine et le monde islamique, nous suivons, en trente chapitres d’une étourdissante érudition, la lente et irrésistible division du monde entre pays riches et pays pauvres.
-- Cet ouvrage contribue à notre compréhension des inégalités socio-économiques qui ravagent notre monde globalisé. La thèse générale de Landes, à la fois simple et troublante, est que l’on doit comprendre les « valeurs » et les « idées » comme principal facteur du développement économique des sociétés. C’est « l’arrière-fond culturel » des sociétés qui favorisent le développement. Bref, selon Landes, Marx s’est trompé et Weber avait raison. Un livre ambitieux, fascinant et controversé. Et la lecture de l’ouvrage de Landes nous oblige également à poser des questions cruciales pour notre temps. Peut-on critiquer la culture d’autres peuples? Existe-t-il vraiment quelque chose comme une « recette » du développement? Et si la « culture » détermine le développement économique, comment favoriser celui-ci tout en respectant les différences culturelles?
--Pierre-Yves Néron, Montréal (ICI.Radio-Canada.ca)

Af en toe is het goed om de puntjes op de i te zetten en ronduit te zeggen waar het opstaat. Persoonlijk ben ik een enthousiast aanhanger van uitgesproken, ongezouten meningen, zelfs als ze erg polemisch verwoord zijn. David Landes beantwoordt voor 100% aan dat criterium: zonder omwegen formuleert hij zijn visies en inzichten, en als het nodig is dan geeft hij zelfs regelrechte billenkoek aan tegenstanders (vooral antropologen, multiculturalisten, dependentie-theorie-aanhangers en tiersmondisten moeten er aan geloven).
Het terrein waarop hij dat doet is dat van de globale geschiedenis en de cultuurgeschiedenis, en dan specifiek vanuit de vraagstelling: hoe komt het dat sommige landen zo rijk zijn geworden en andere arm blijven? En zijn verhaal is vrij simpel: door zijn intrinsieke kwaliteiten (vooral nieuwsgierigheid, openheid en leergierigheid) en door een doortastende, zelfs drieste aanpak is het Westen er in geslaagd rijk te worden en vervolgens de wereld te veroveren; de tijd van de grote westerse imperia mag dan voorbij zijn, het westers model is intussen ook door andere naties overgenomen, met bijna evenveel succes.
Dat is durven, in een tijd dat eurocentrisme alom verketterd wordt en het Westerse succesverhaal afgedaan wordt als een toevallig en in elk geval heel tijdelijk fenomeen, om niet te zeggen zelfs geschiedvervalsing. Landes roept die neiging tot hypercorrectie (“politieke correctheid” noemt hij dat) tot de orde: de feiten zijn wat ze zijn, het Westen heeft vooruitgang en welvaart gebracht voor de hele wereld en domineerde die wereld op een bepaald ogenblik ook politiek en militair, of je dat nu graag hebt of niet, en wat de vreselijke neveneffecten betreft (uitroeiing van Latijns-Amerikaanse indianen, de uitbuiting in de Industriële Revolutie, de verschrikkingen van sommige kolonisatieregimes, de verloedering van het milieu): daar bezondigde zich uiteindelijk iedereen aan, dus geen gemoraliseer!
Landes formuleert dus rake dingen, die volgens hem gewoon voortkomen uit wat we “gezond verstand” zouden noemen, maar hij vergeet zijn stellingen ook effectief te bewijzen. Het is alsof zijn verhaal moet volstaan (“de feiten zijn de feiten”), maar daardoor verzandt zijn betoog dikwijls in cirkelredeneringen (Japan was leergierig en daardoor heeft het land het gemaakt, leergierigheid is dus essentieel om te moderniseren en rijk te worden). Het is niet door te beschrijven dat een bepaalde regio succesvoller was, dat je meteen een verklaring hebt voor dat succes.
Op de keper beschouwd biedt Landes niet zoveel nieuwe inzichten aan, hij vertelt het klassieke, chronologisch opgebouwde verhaal van de economische opkomst van het westen met als cruciale episodes de kolonisatie van Amerika en de Industriële Revolutie. Landes neemt daar ook zijn tijd voor en gaat zelfs geregeld in op de petite histoire. Dat geeft zijn overzicht iets anekdotisch, waardoor zijn betoog wel eens de mist in gaat . Door de zware focus op Europa en de uitbreiding naar Amerika verwaarloost Landes de ontwikkelingen in andere werelddelen. Zo vaart hij fel uit tegen al wie beweert dat de Oost-Aziatische handel en economie zoveel groter was dan de Westerse, maar deugdelijk bewijs voor zijn stelling voert hij niet aan. Toch veegt hij heel de geschiedschrijving van de voorbije decennia van tafel waarin de enorme omvang en groei van de Oost-Aziatische (en in het bijzonder de Chinese) economie en handel tussen 1500 en 1800 is aangetoond. De moslimwereld doet Landes zelfs van de hand met ronduit verkeerde historische gegevens (na de 12de eeuw zou het daar alleen maar bergaf zijn gegaan, terwijl de moslimrijken tussen de 13de tot de 17de eeuw spectaculair groeiend en bijna de helft van de toenmalige wereld domineerden). In een later stadium besteedt hij wel meer aandacht aan andere regio’s, maar alleen om in te zoemen op hoe zij met de Westerse erfenis zijn omgegaan.
Nog een lacune (waar de grote William H. McNeill op wees in een recensie) is zijn exclusieve aandacht voor stedelijke economieën, en dus complete blindheid voor wat op het platteland en in de agrarische sector gebeurde (nochtans tot een halve eeuw geleden de plaats waar 4/5 van de mensheid leefde). En ook de grote demografische bewegingen (en hun band met de groei of afname van rijkdom) of de grote invloed van oorlogen blijven buiten beeld.
Het is goed dat Landes gewezen heeft op het onomstotelijke feit dat de Westerse wereld vanaf 1800/1850 tot 1950/2000 rijker werd dan de rest van de wereld en die wereld ook domineerde, maar dat hij daarmee de relevante ontwikkelingen elders gewoon negeert, is onvergeeflijk.
Toch 1 waardevolle les uit dit boek, en het is goed dat het van een econoom komt (want Landes is in de eerste plaats econoom): culturele factoren zijn minstens zo belangrijk als geografische, politieke of technologische (“culture can make all the difference”). Cultuur slaat hier zowel op innerlijke waarden en attitudes, als op formatieve culturele factoren als religie (met een opvallende simplifiëring van godsdiensten als protestantisme, katholicisme, islam enz.). Ook hier gaat Landes een beetje in de overdrijving, en verliest hij de complexe interactie tussen culturele en andere factoren uit het oog.
En nog een waardevol inzicht: niks is voor eeuwig. Wat in het ene tijdperk een voordeel is, is in het andere een nadeel; voorsprongen zijn altijd tijdelijk, en universele wetten, zeker in de economie zijn gewoonweg onzin. Vandaar zijn oproep tot pragmatisme: “The one lesson that emerges is the need to keep trying. No miracles. No perfection. No millennium. No apocalypse. We must cultivate a sceptical faith, avoid dogma, listen and watch well, try to clarify and define ends, the better to chose the means" (p 524)
Ondanks zijn gebreken is dit boek ronduit indrukwekkend, encyclopedisch van omvang en inhoud, en gestoeld op een enorme belezenheid en academische ervaring (je wordt letterlijk omvergeblazen door de opsomming van colloquia en academische contacten in de proloog).

I stopped reading it during the inventions chapter. The size of the book and amount of information and opinion were too much to bother...

"Oggi, la grande sfida e minaccia è il divario di ricchezza e salute che separa ricchi e poveri... è il più grande problema che il mondo del terzo millennio deve fronteggiare." Le diseguaglianze economiche oggi hanno raggiunto estremi senza precedenti, ed è interesse di tutti aiutare i poveri a diventare più ricchi, perché a lungo termine "la pace e la prosperità dipendono dal benessere degli altri". Non esiste una risposta semplice su come riuscirci, e Landes, da storico dell'economia, intende dare un contributo studiando l'origine storica della ricchezza e della povertà di popoli e nazioni, per tentare di comprenderne le cause.

Con questa prospettiva, Landes si lancia in un'ampia panoramica storica dello sviluppo economico. Iniziando dalla rinascita dell'Europa dopo l'anno 1000, ci porta attraverso le esplorazioni e le scoperte geografiche, la colonizzazione delle terre oltreoceaniche, la rivoluzione industriale, la dominazione britannica e lo sviluppo di altri paesi europei. Allarga poi lo scenario per esaminare l'esplosione produttiva nell'America del Nord e lo sviluppo più difficoltoso di quella del Sud, la lunga stagnazione cinese e l'impressionante modernizzazione giapponese, il declino dei popoli islamici, per giungere alla fine del colonialismo, al ridimensionamento dell'Europa, alla triste situazione dell'Africa, alla rinascita dell'Asia orientale e al risveglio della Cina.

L'analisi si concentra in gran parte sull'Europa, e a questo proposito Landes rifiuta esplicitamente le posizioni "politicamente corrette" che pongono tutti i popoli sullo stesso piano. Non che intenda esaltare acriticamente gli europei o sostenere una loro intrinseca superiorità (vedi le descrizioni della rapacità dei conquistadores o degli orrori dello schiavismo); ma "negli ultimi mille anni l'Europa è stata il primo motore dello sviluppo e della modernità" e questo è un fatto che non si può ignorare o negare.
L'Europa medievale e moderna fu avvantaggiata da diversi fattori. Un potere politico frammentato geograficamente, con una molteplicità di stati in competizione tra loro. Un potere, inoltre, frenato dall'ostilità verso il dispotismo e l'autocrazia, idea che risaliva a greci ed ebrei. La separazione tra chiesa e stato, tipica del cristianesimo, fu un limite al potere sia dei signori laici sia della chiesa stessa, e contribuì a limitare la presa della religione sulla società e sulla cultura, presa che può facilmente trasformarsi in repressione della libertà di pensiero e di ricerca. Il riconoscimento della proprietà privata, già presente presso romani, ebrei e germani. Lo sviluppo di una società civile autonoma dal potere politico, società in cui vi era spazio per l'iniziativa "dal basso" e un certo grado di libertà per le persone. Tutto questo risultava in un ambiente competitivo e dinamico, che rendeva possibili e anzi favoriva cambiamenti, innovazioni, miglioramenti. Negli imperi dispotici che dominavano altrove, una piccola élite aveva il monopolio del potere e delle armi, e i sudditi potevano solo servire ed essere sfruttati: "quale ragione di esistere avevano le persone normali, se non quella di accrescere il piacere dei loro dominatori?" In Europa non era così.
La divisione politica, inoltre, faceva sì che l'Europa non potesse essere conquistata "in un colpo solo", come invece accadde ad altri grandi imperi, che potevano crollare interamente dopo solo una o due sconfitte decisive.

Quali sono, allora, le condizioni per la prosperità che sembrano emergere da quest'analisi?
* Le "ineguaglianze della natura", le diversità di ambienti, di climi, di risorse, che possono facilitare od ostacolare la crescita delle società e dell'economia. Tuttavia queste sono solo un punto di partenza più che un fattore decisivo: si può "essere fortunati, ma la fortuna è solo un inizio".
* Un potere politico moderato e prevedibile, che lasci alle persone una sfera di libertà abbastanza ampia, non solo nell'economia ma anche nella cultura e nelle idee. Un potere concentrato, illimitato, arbitrario può letteralmente bloccare ogni sviluppo: così, ad esempio, l'Europa medievale e moderna, con il suo pluralismo politico e il suo ambiente competitivo, fu avvantaggiata rispetto agli imperi dispotici d'Asia e America.
* Il riconoscimento e la protezione della proprietà privata e dei contratti (se lo stato, o qualche potente, può appropriarsi a suo arbitrio delle proprietà di chiunque, le attività economiche private diventano impossibili).
* Fondamentale è la tecnologia, che fornisce i mezzi indispensabili per la produzione efficiente su larga scala, e che a sua volta per svilupparsi richiede libertà di ricerca e di discussione.
* Grandissima importanza hanno la cultura e i valori: è più portata alla crescita una società che apprezza l'iniziativa, l'impegno, il lavoro, il risparmio, l'investimento, che premia merito e creatività ed è aperta a novità e cambiamenti.

Tutte conclusioni che possono apparire poco originali, ma che Landes verifica con grande dottrina, e con molta vivacità, nelle analisi che compie. Il saggio è massiccio, e il materiale presentato, per il profano, è persino eccessivo. Ma mi è piaciuto vedere come esamina i fenomeni economici e sociali e li collega in una rete di relazioni di cause, effetti, influenze reciproche (ad esempio, gli effetti economici dell'invenzione degli occhiali da vista) e come confronta le situazioni economiche e sociali dei vari paesi e il loro svolgimento nel tempo (ad esempio, la vivacità europea e la stagnazione cinese nell'età moderna). Il problema che non si pone, in tutto questo, è la sostenibilità ambientale della crescita economica (ne accenna nell'introduzione: "la ricchezza comporta non solo consumo ma anche spreco, non solo produzione ma anche distruzione"; ma poi nel testo non lo tratta).

Questo è un libro di storia "su larga scala", che esamina fenomeni di ampio respiro e lunga durata e tenta di individuare delle tendenze o delle costanti. Non ho letto molti libri di questo tipo, ma uno è "Ascesa e declino delle grandi potenze" di Paul Kennedy, che è centrato sulla potenza geopolitica ma ha dei temi in comune con questo di Landes. Un altro è "Armi, acciaio e malattie" di Jared Diamond, che a differenza di Landes e Kennedy, per spiegare le differenze di sviluppo dà grande importanza alle differenze ambientali; a me pare che le ragioni di Diamond siano valide soprattutto per la preistoria e l'antichità, ma sempre meno per i periodi successivi, perché le società umane hanno la tendenza a divenire sempre più numerose, organizzate e complesse, con maggiori conoscenze, specie tecnologiche; si distaccano sempre più dalla natura e tendono a trasformare e dominare l'ambiente, più che esserne dominate. Sottolineo che si tratta di una tendenza, e non di un processo garantito o inesorabile; non c'è nulla di costante e di regolare in queste trasformazioni; è del tutto evidente che vi sono anche anche stagnazioni, regressi e crolli, e infatti situazioni di questo tipo sono esaminate da tutti questi tre autori (da Diamond in "Collasso") e naturalmente da molti altri.

Quando leggo libri di questo tipo, mi vien da osservare che alle radici della storia, accanto a elementi naturali come cambiamenti climatici o ambientali, e a eventi casuali, vi sono i bisogni gli impulsi e i desideri degli esseri umani, che si combinano e si aggregano in modi non prevedibili e non controllabili e danno luogo ai grandi mutamenti che animano la storia. Questo libro studia un aspetto di questi grandi mutamenti. La storia non sembra svolgersi secondo leggi conoscibili, né avere una direzione o un fine ultimo. Come l'evoluzione della vita, sembra essere il regno del contingente. Ma libri come questo identificano delle tendenze di carattere generale, e trovare queste tendenze è qualcosa che trovo confortante: significa che la storia, forse, non è un caos completamente privo di senso.

This is an anecdotal account of how some nations are much wealthier than others. Culture counts. European culture is better at producing wealth than African, Middle Eastern, or South American.

Landes says that some forms of state intervention (much as mercantilism) might work better at times than free trade. He has no theory to determine when those times occur.

He avers that bad government (e.g., all of Africa), is always bad for the overall economy.

A thought-provoking work.

(JAB)½

What keeps one coming back to the same book for years or even decades?

I can think of two books I’ve read and re-read for years; Sunset Song by Lewis Grassic Gibbon and Revolution in Time by David S. Landes. It’s this second book I’ve been thinking about again after reading a blog post about early mechanical clocks

“Frère Jacques, frère Jacques,
Dormez-vous? Dormez-vous
Sonnez les matines! Sonnez les matines!
Ding, daing, dong. Ding, daing, dong.”

I first stumbled across Revolution in Time around 1985 while exploring the nether regions of the Dundee University library. I found the opening of the book fascinating as it explained the need to measure time more precisely in late medieval Europe. Unlike Islam or Judaism, the Roman branch of Christianity (particularly the Benedictine rule) held offices at fixed times of day rather than during bands of time around sunrise, noon and sunset that can be assessed without a timekeeper. The monastic day or (Horarium) revolved around the eight canonical hours that would begin at midnight with the service of Matins followed by the morning office of Lauds at 3:00am.

While most of Europe in the middle ages lived an agrarian lifestyle regulated by the natural day, the Religious were subject to fixed times in each day and during the long dark winter nights. Given those conditions one can understand the anxiety about Brother John sleeping-in and not ringing the matins bell. They needed a reliable way to divide up the day.
It’s an interesting diversion to reflect on the fact that methods of telling the time elsewhere in the world don’t work well in Northern Europe. Water (clocks) freezes and sundials work best when one can be more confident of clear skies.

Revolution in Time tells a number of separate, but related, stories:
• The magnificent dead-end that was timekeeping in ancient China.
• The birth of mechanical timekeeping in medieval Europe.
• The race to fing the longitude and the story of John Harrison’s clocks.
• The history of the clock and watchmaking industry — for me, the least interesting part of the book.

I have travelled nearly 30 years with this book and will keep coming back to it because there is so much material to take in and Landes is a good story teller. Since first reading the book I’ve been lucky enough to visit some of the earliest clocks in Europe; theastronomical clock in Exeter CathedraL and the turret clock at Cotehele. It was fascinating to see that these are not precisely-engineered creations butmachines that have run for 500 or 600 years.

This is not just the story of instruments to measure time and break up the day into regular chunks. It’s the story that led to the industrial revolution and the modern world.

Reread for class.

Author's main thesis is that cultural values play an important role in whether or not a nation succeeds or fails. Some areas of his thesis are easy to ridicule, but there is a lot of meat behind the old recitations of Asians and math.

Impressive and very-well reasoned overview of historical forces (and a damning criticism of colonialism and totalitarianism), but the main omission is what to do in the near future about all this. Still a good book.

Told the Harrison deck watch story before Longitude became popular.

As a history of economics, this book was quite interesting, being a combination of over-views/analysis and specific details. No doubt the author's knowledge about the subject is vast. What made it hard for me to keep on reading and had me abandon the book before reaching the middle was the author's attitude of Mr Know-it-all. On various instances he rants about why other historians who came to a different conclusion got it wrong and why he – of course – got it right. Just a bit more modesty would have been appropriate.

Despite the title, this isn't a book about why, say Botswana is doing so much better than Zimbabwe these days due to such and such a policy or Germany versus Greece or practical advice on how the poor countries can turn things around and the rich countries help them. It's more descriptive than prescriptive. Rather it's a world economic history that deals with forces centuries, even millennium old. I appreciated that Landes wasn't afraid to be controversial; he takes dead aim at all forms of political correctness, multiculturalist cant, and such theories as those found in Said's Orientalism. Looking at other reviews, some complain Landes is too Eurocentric. Given the theme of the book, the wealth and poverty of nations, I can't blame him much. It's like that old joke about robbing banks--you go where the money is. Mind you, he seems to me to be not just Eurocentric but Anglocentric--although again, it does tie into his theory given Britain was arguably ground zero for the Industrial Revolution. And that is definitely at the center of his answer to the question posed in his subtitle concerning nations: why some are so rich and some so poor.

The book did leave me with questions. Landes begins with an analysis of geography. On the North/South axis, Landes believes the difference between tropical and temperate regions are crucial. But if that's so, why didn't North America develop a technologically sophisticated culture before contact with the West? Why then would the most impressive indigenous civilizations in the Americas rise out of jungles, such as the Mayans and the Incas? It's not a question asked in the book, which doesn't deal with the Americas until the era of exploration and colonization. Though to give Landes his due, Eurocentric doesn't mean triumphalist or apologist. If for whatever reason, you're ignorant of the atrocities committed by Europeans in the Americas or of the savagery of the Atlantic Slave Trade, Landes will certainly provide an education. (Especially when it comes to the Spanish Conquistadors. Landes is not kind to Catholicism or Islam, which he sees as stultifying upholders of dogma.) When Landes comes to examine the East/West axis, he sees as crucial the differences in property rights and development of markets. I'd be the last person to dismiss such factors out of hand, yet Landes' thesis as to the definitive factor that gave rise to the differences did raise both eyebrows:

Europe's great good fortune lay in the fall of Rome and the weakness and division that ensued. (So much for the lamentations of generations of classicists and Latin teachers.) The Roman dream of unity, authority, and order (the pax Romana) remained, indeed has persisted to the present.... [yet] fragmentation was the strongest brake on wilful, oppressive behavior. Political rivalry and the right of exit made all the difference.

Really? Because I do find it hard to believe the fall of Rome wasn't a tragedy for the West. Ancient Rome at its height is estimated to have had a population of one million. After its fall, no city, in Europe at least, would hit that threshold until London in 1811. Trade, literacy, urbanization all collapsed in the former Western Empire and arguably wouldn't fully recover for nearly a millennium. I do get Landes' point that authoritarian empires could do much to cripple technological and economic progress, but that still seemed a rather breathtaking claim. It is key to his theory however. Because if for Landes the key to the wealth of nations is the Industrial Revolution, the key to the Industrial Revolution is a culture of scientific inquiry and invention spurred on by a rivalry between nations, allowed room to breathe by a fragmented authority and fostered by a strong work ethic. (He sees this fragmented authority and work ethic as crucial in the rise of an industrial Japan as well.) In the end, geography isn't destiny, for according to Landes it's "not resources" that made the difference between nations but what "lay inside--culture, values, initiative." (And a constant related thread--the importance to growth and development of the "status and role of women" and the rights of minorities--Jews in history often being the canary in the coal mine.)

This work is erudite, entertaining, thought-provoking and written with style. (The kind of book that stretches vocabularies so have a dictionary handy.) The author is apparently an American, but he has a dry, at times acid, often deadpan humor I associate with the British. It's also hard not to respect a book that garners praise, as seen in the blurbs, from such celebrated yet ideologically diverse economists as John Kenneth Galbraith and Robert Solow. Landes himself, for all that he stresses the importance of property rights, is far from free market--he made frequent stabs, if not arguments, at free traders. I saw one reviewer that claimed this book was taught as an example of flawed historiography. Maybe so, but it's not evident to me. I appreciated that Landes often related the various controversies in the field, and there are extensive notes and bibliography. It seemed sound and told a great story. So many of the connections Landes made are fascinating; the breath of the technological and social details he presented and global scope he took in was impressive. It's a book well worth reading and thinking about.

good

lively, opinionated, terrific.

born New York 1924) is a professor emeritus of economics at Harvard University and retired professor of history at George Washington University.

Pros: broad; quantitative information; some critical and refreshing views; easy to read; academic

Cons: there is no overall theory of the analysis, which led to just one more ad-hoc (seemingly insightful) explanations to many phenomena; very hard to evaluate the explanation; didn't show strength of the evidence comparing with other explaintations

Difficult read, and much longer than it needed to be to get to the point. Refreshingly non-politically correct, contains many useful arguments against wimpy post-modern academic theories. P.466 makes some interesting parallels between fascism & socialism.

A monumental book on the influences and causes of the wealth and poverty of nations. Eye opening, well researched,well written. Read it now.

Not Read

Clocks and timekeeping

Economic history

Title Arm en rijk [nl]
Author Landes, David S.
Subject Economische geschiedenis Economische geschiedenis [nl]
Rijkdom Rijkdom [nl]
Armoede Armoede [nl]
Regionale verschillen Regionale verschillen [nl]
Geschiedenis (vorm) Geschiedenis (vorm) [nl]
economische geschiedenis economische geschiedenis [nl]
cultuurgeschiedenis cultuurgeschiedenis [nl]
330.9
904
905
31 Geschiedenis, levensbeschrijving [nl]
641
15.50 15.50 algemene wereldgeschiedenis; geschiedenis van grote gebiedsdelen, bevolkingsgroepen en beschavingsgebieden: algemeen algemene wereldgeschiedenis; geschiedenis van grote gebiedsdelen, bevolkingsgroepen en beschavingsgebieden: algemeen 15.50 general world history; history of great parts of the world, peoples, civilizations: general
Type book
Language dut
Publisher Het Spectrum
Part of Algemene Catalogus
Contributor Abeling, André
ISBN 902746961X
Identifier B0009926
Issued 2000
Edition 1e [aangevulde] dr
Is version of The wealth and poverty of nations : why some are so rich and some so poor. - New York [etc.] : Norton, 1998