The 1982 Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, introduced the idea of an operational level of war encompassing the planning and conduct of campaigns and major operations. The introduction of the term "operational art" three years later was, in practice, the skillful management of the operational level of war. Identifiably separate levels of war defined the jurisdiction of the profession of arms and was, for a number of historical and cultural reasons, attractive to U.S. practitioners and plausible to its English-speaking allies. The authors argue that as warfare continues to diffuse across definitional and conceptual boundaries, the close orchestration of all instruments of national power becomes even more important, which cripples the current conception of campaigns and operations. The authors propose that responsibility for campaign design should "actually" return to the political-strategic leadership of nations supported by the entirety of the state bureaucracy. This would mark the return of the campaign to its historical sources. If the United States and its allies fail to make this change, they risk continuing to have a "way of battle" rather than a "way of war."