Falling somewhere between David Foster Wallace's The Pale King and Ian Fleming's Casino Royale, this memoir is a real world look at a CIA operative's life as part of the staff of a U.S. Embassy. Danger, intrigue and civil service bureaucratic infighting abound, making it an interesting window into the sausage making of foreign policy. ( )

Probably not for everybody, this first person history of the first years of the Congo's independence from Belgium enhanced my understanding of the events of the 1960s in a sprawling and often incomprehensible African nation. Devlin calls them like he sees them and so offers insightful appraisals of Mobutu, Lumumba, Kasavubu, and Tshombe among others. He is partisan, opinionated, and honest. Despite the title, this is not a book about the CIA but rather one man's history of an exciting time. ( )

Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo-Kinshasa).

Devlin is no stylist, but his account of his tenure as CIA Chief of Station, Congo (Kinshasa) will still hold your attention. Devlin was transferred to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in a period of great and swift turmoil. Later, his superior attests that he has a skillful, excellent operative in the post. As Devlin comments, what else could he say? That in fact, he had installed a relatively unexperienced chief at a station that was supposed to be a sleepy backwater?

Devlin's narrative style is methodical, a straightforward recounting of events with only superficial commentary or analysis. When he does comment, it is typically to add a piece of evidence to his contention that though he was ordered to assassinate Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, he did not do so. I can't evaluate the veracity of this claim, but note that whatever Devlin's protestations, he gives numerous unsurprising examples of collusion, cover-ups, and pragmatic lies on the part of all of the agencies involved. That there should therefore be a cover-up of a political assassination is not that great a stretch. However, Devlin says he finds the idea of assassination morally repugnant, and I have no reason to disbelieve him. That doesn't mean another U.S. or Belgian agent didn't do it.

I disagree with many of Devlin's political ideals, but appreciate his effort to articulate them. It says something about his ability to do so that I enjoyed reading this information-dense memoir. ( )

Gung-ho autobiographical note by a notorious CIA agent, fighting the Cold War in Africa. Devlin has always been regarded a key actor in the demise of Lumumba and rise of Mobutu during the early 1960s in the Congo. A year before he died, he wrote this book, also at the urge of Michela Wrong, who, he claims, ‘steered him in all the right directions’. I distrust some of the information Devlin divulges: we are dealing after all with a psych ops expert, someone who can sway public opinion. So his hint that Lumumba requested a call girl, when he lodged at State House in Washington DC at the summit of the Katanga secession crisis, seems to me a nice and innocuous way of painting an unfavourable image of Lumumba, certainly with puritan Americans. Yet the gung-ho way of writing, that is almost boyish at times, does provide us with an insight into the ‘game like’ mentality of key actors in the frontline of the Cold War. It is a comic book story, but then for real. There is a definite ‘good guys, bad guys’ morality, but there is also the explicit desire to ‘win’ the game.
The book clearly demonstrates the kind of shallow morality and contradictory analytical depth of CIA operatives at work. One clear example is the repeated (nauseating) reference to the domino theory of communist penetration of the African continent. If the heroes of the book fail, Africa will fall prey to the communists, is the message that is brought home time and again, without providing any depth to this so-called threat (what is so bad about that?). Also, it is repeatedly indicated that some African regimes have already fallen prey to it (Ghana, Egypt, Morocco, Mali) and act under the wings of the UN peace keeping force, without the ill spreading across the continent. The same kind of contradictions appear when Devlin is frantically trying to stall Parliament from reconvening: that would be disastrous. Yet, Devlin and his team portray themselves continuously as champions of democracy. ( )

With today's focus primarily on the "War on Terror", Iraq, Afghanistan and other troubled areas of the world, many have forgotten the tension that gripped the world, in every corner, during the cold war. Where every diplomatic or military move was factored into a "zero-sum" equation, where there was clear victor and loser. This mind-set is brought back front and center with Devlin's book on U.S. activities in the Congo during the 1960s. Fortunately, Devlin was able to tell this fascinating story prior to his death in 2008.
Probably of most interest to many is his retelling of the story of the CIA's involvement (or lack thereof) with Patrice Lumumba's death, of which much has been speculated and written about. Whether you choose to believe this recounting of events, which basically states that Lumumba was not assassinated through subterfuge, but killed by firing squad, Devlin's story is still compelling.
I found his view, through the lens of countering Soviet infiltration of Africa at every turn, fascinating. I had not realized that Frank Carlucci (a former Secretary of Defense) had served as a junior foreign service officer alongside Devlin, in the COngo, and was actually seriously injured in the line of duty.
Devlin's interaction with Mobutu, "Mad MIke" Hoare and other mercenaries, and countless others provide an important glimpse into Cold War-era intelligence operations, where believe it or not, Soviet engagement in the Congo, was perceived as threatening NATO's southern flank. A great story, and I wish he only lived to recount his time serving as chief of station in Laos, during the Vietnam conflict. Highly recommended! ( )