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This book consolidates emerging research on Aristotle's science and ethics in order to explore the extent to which the concepts, methods, and practices he developed for scientific inquiry and explanation are used to investigate moral phenomena. Each chapter shows, in a different way, that Aristotle's ethics is much more like a science than it is typically represented. The upshot of this is twofold. First, uncovering the links between Aristotle's science and ethics promises to open up new and innovative directions for research into his moral philosophy. Second, showing why Aristotle thinks ethics can never be fully assimilated to the model of science will help shed new light on his views about the limits of science. The volume thus promises to make a significant contribution to our understanding of the epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological foundations of Aristotle's ethics.… (más)
Given that it concentrates on a philosopher born 2,400 years ago, this volume breaks a surprising amount of new ground. In connecting Aristotle’s ethics and his science it opens up avenues long closed off by two ideas. The first is that ethics has practical rather than theoretical aims and, as such, is inexact. Moral phenomena are variable and content-dependent (Nicomachean Ethics [EN] 1094b14-16, 1103b27-1104a8). Added to this, ethical reasoning employs premises that hold only for the most part (EN 1094b11-29, 1103b34-1104a10), thereby not accommodating theoretical models of enquiry. The second idea is that ethics does not require theoretical knowledge; it is stated that the study of the soul, for example, should not be undertaken with ‘rigour’ (EN 1102a20-6).
The first idea has often been thought sufficient to prevent attempts to connect Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and its methodology to the ethics. The second means that the student of ethics need not know about natural science. Thus has Aristotle’s ethics been allowed almost complete autonomy from the rest of his philosophy. This book shows decisively why we ought not to continue this orthodoxy. Although Aristotle contrasts practical wisdom (phronêsis) and theoretical knowledge (epistêmê), the way in which practical reasoning is structured is greatly illuminated by lining it up with similar structures underpinning theoretical reasoning (see Part I). When it comes to methodology in the ethical works, close analysis shows the necessity of overturning the view that Aristotle employed a ‘dialectical’ method. The ethical works contain much that counts as theoretical knowledge – such as definitions of happiness (EN 1), virtue (EN 2.3-6), justice (EN 5), friendship, pleasure and the voluntary. Although not the ultimate aim of ethics, such theoretical knowledge is a crucial part of ethical inquiry for Aristotle and may well be necessary in order to know what we ought to aim for in our practical pursuits. Also, the fact that ethics employs only ‘for-the-most-part’ propositions is not an impediment to these being demonstrable first principles (see Part II). As for the separation of ethics from natural science, and in particular biology: this is unsustainable. A robust understanding of human nature and the soul is vitally important for understanding Aristotle’s positions in his ethical works (see Part III).
This book consolidates emerging research on Aristotle's science and ethics in order to explore the extent to which the concepts, methods, and practices he developed for scientific inquiry and explanation are used to investigate moral phenomena. Each chapter shows, in a different way, that Aristotle's ethics is much more like a science than it is typically represented. The upshot of this is twofold. First, uncovering the links between Aristotle's science and ethics promises to open up new and innovative directions for research into his moral philosophy. Second, showing why Aristotle thinks ethics can never be fully assimilated to the model of science will help shed new light on his views about the limits of science. The volume thus promises to make a significant contribution to our understanding of the epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological foundations of Aristotle's ethics.
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The first idea has often been thought sufficient to prevent attempts to connect Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and its methodology to the ethics. The second means that the student of ethics need not know about natural science. Thus has Aristotle’s ethics been allowed almost complete autonomy from the rest of his philosophy. This book shows decisively why we ought not to continue this orthodoxy. Although Aristotle contrasts practical wisdom (phronêsis) and theoretical knowledge (epistêmê), the way in which practical reasoning is structured is greatly illuminated by lining it up with similar structures underpinning theoretical reasoning (see Part I). When it comes to methodology in the ethical works, close analysis shows the necessity of overturning the view that Aristotle employed a ‘dialectical’ method. The ethical works contain much that counts as theoretical knowledge – such as definitions of happiness (EN 1), virtue (EN 2.3-6), justice (EN 5), friendship, pleasure and the voluntary. Although not the ultimate aim of ethics, such theoretical knowledge is a crucial part of ethical inquiry for Aristotle and may well be necessary in order to know what we ought to aim for in our practical pursuits. Also, the fact that ethics employs only ‘for-the-most-part’ propositions is not an impediment to these being demonstrable first principles (see Part II). As for the separation of ethics from natural science, and in particular biology: this is unsustainable. A robust understanding of human nature and the soul is vitally important for understanding Aristotle’s positions in his ethical works (see Part III).