Patrick Facon is the foremost French authority on the French Air Force, and in this book he examines the performance of L'Armée de l'Air during the 1940 campaign.

His treatment is generally sympathetic to the efforts of the French Air Force, although he does dispell some of the self serving myths of the air force as well. For instance he shows that the famous 1,000 victories are a fabrication, and he is at pains to show that the RAF did provide substantial support, even in June.

As the main causes of the French defeat in the air, Facon sees the organisational muddle and infighting between the army and airforces, and the industrial incapacity of France to provide enough operational modern aircraft. After the collapse of the front in May, the French HQ counted on the Air Force to halt the German advance, a task for which it was totally inadequate.

The author does assume the reader a basic knowledge of the campaign and the various controversies surrounding L'Armée de l'Air. If you don't know what the Plan Dyle was, or what Weygand was supposed to do, you'd better start elsewhere ( )