Geoffrey L. Rossano

Over the years, while reading about the history of military aviation, the entity referred to as the "Northern Bombing Group" has flitted through accounts like a ghost. I was thus delighted to discover this monograph dealing with the unit and the rationale for its creation; that is, the United States Navy decided that the best way to combat the U-Boat menace of the Great War was by engaging in round-the-clock strategic bombing of German submarine bases, with the unit in question being the chosen instrument of action. However, there were "minor" problems such as creating an organization and a doctrine from scratch, overcoming inter-service rivalry (the men leading the U.S. Army air arm appear to have been jealous of their prerogatives from Day One), and the ultimately intractable issue of securing sufficient capable aircraft to even attempt the mission. Regarding the last point the Italian Caproni bombers chosen to be the backbone of unit were a chronic disappointment in terms of availability and capability.

As for what this episode really proved the authors argue that it demonstrated that the leadership of U.S. Navy were more air-minded at an earlier stage than they are generally given credit for. It did represent the real birth of combat aviation for the United States Marine Corps. Finally, there was a cadre of men who learned about the realities of the exercise of air power, most notably Robert Lovett, whose experiences with helping to create this unit informed his later service as the responsible civilian official for overseeing the United States Army Air Force in the Second World War.… (más)