Russell Frank WeigleyReseñas

As a foundational text for understanding not only American strategy, but basic concepts of national strategy itself, this book is unsurpassed. It’s one of the few I can truly call “epic.”

Beginning with George Washington’s “strategy of attrition” during the Revolutionary War, Weigley traces the scope of American strategic thought up to the closing days of the Vietnam War. Structurally, American strategy falls into several phases. Washington eventually gives way to Halleck, who is then replaced by Ulysses Grant. Grant’s approach to war – “a strategy of annihilation” – then serves as the United States’ guiding principle until well into the twentieth century.

As was the case in most arenas, nukes changed everything. The beginning of the Cold War was a return to Marshall and MacArthur’s styles from World War II, but that emphasis on conventional war didn’t last long. Deterrence soon became the word of the day, and the strategic legacies that the army had inherited from Washington, Greene, Grant, and a host of other thinkers fell completely by the wayside.

The modern U.S. Navy is, of course, born out of the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahanian naval thought went relatively unchanged until after World War II, but the dominance of battleships remained alive and well until relatively late in the war. The Air Force gets a similar ‘father figure’ in Billy Mitchell, and the struggle to become an independent branch of the armed services bears particular resonance now, with that very independence being questioned. The turf war between the navy and air force in the early days of the Cold War is very well-documented, with the emphasis on strategic bombers versus carrier aviation shown to be more important than a mere interservice spat.

Weigley’s writing is accessible in that rarest of ways – intelligible yet sophisticated. At times he explains fairly complex concepts, but manages to avoid getting too caught up in minutiae while still covering all the important details. Thinkers in every echelon of the military get a fair hearing, from the usual generals and Joint Chiefs down to the occasional major or even captain (Boyd: curiously absent). And while the overall relevance of The American Way of War is unquestionable, the rather abrupt stopping-point of 1973 is somewhat jarring, and one wishes that Weigley had continued to examine the evolution of American strategy.

For career strategists, The American Way of War might seem oversimplified, but for everyone else, it’s a perfect introduction to not just American doctrine, but national strategy as a concept. And perhaps most important, Weigley demonstrates just where we’ve come from, and how far we have – or haven’t – come since Washington and Valley Forge.

This is a comprehensive history of Philadelphia in an easy-to-read format. I found it useful and informative: it filled in a lot of history I feel I should know, as a Philadelphia native.

Covers the war in Europe from Normandy to the surrender in May 1945. After the breakout from Normandy, the allies didn't just mop up. This book gives some detail of the endless, endless killing by all armies during this time. It's less than a year, but when you finish the book, it seems a hundred have passed.

Quirky is as quirky does.

This book definitely has its oddities -- as when the author insists on identifying generals as being generals U.S.A. or U.S.V., i.e. as generals in the regular army or the "volunteer" army that would disband when the Civil War was over. There is some logic to making this point -- but Weigley never really explains how the whole U.S.A./U.S.V. system worked. (And it's worth understanding, since it explains, e.g., how George Custer could be a Civil War general but, a decade later, would die as an army colonel).

One of the other quirks is made explicit in the title: this is a military and political history. A great deal of time is devoted to the home-front shenanigans of the various parties and politicians. This would be a very good idea -- but, somehow, it doesn't come off very well. Knowing that there were a lot of governors who opposed Lincoln is important, but we never get a real feeling for why. The book doesn't explain enough about pre-war politics to really let us understand how they evolved during the war. As a result, the political sections tend to weigh the book down -- and, of course, they don't leave as much room for the military history, which generally moves much more quickly.

I don't mean to be entirely critical. There is good material here that doesn't show up in some of the more "standard" histories such as those by Catton and McPherson. But the flip side is, if you're reading a one-volume history, odds are that you don't want all the details. You want a good, easy-to-read, accurate, interesting history. By that standard, this volume falls rather short.½

The history of Philadelphia is presented over 750 pages, sometimes in more detail than desired but thoroughly. An attempt is made to present its many facets including economic, social, cultural, and political. The book was compiled in 1982 so obviously does not address the past thirty years. As a new resident of Philadelphia, it provided a good picture of the city through the centuries.½

Maybe the best book on the last two tears of WWII. The many maps are very helpful.

History of United States military strategy through the Vietnam War.

Russell F. Weigley's "History of the United States Army" is a commendable work on the administrative and logistical history of the Army. If you're looking for a campaign history, complete with narratives of battles, strategy, and tactics, this is not it. Weigley wholly sidesteps this arena of the Army's history in favor of a narration of the administration of the body. Beginning in the early 17th Century with an explanation of the militia roots from which the Army can trace its history, the story progresses through the French and Indian War, the Revolution, and all other conflicts through the 1960's, when this book was written. Included is analysis of Army policy, military interactions with the civilian populace, supply and administration, and the evolution of the command structure. For readers seeking a non-combat history of the United States Army, this should more than amply satisfy their desires.

Well written and useful look at the men who conducted the war in Europe.

Weigley’s The American Way of War offers a broad survey of American strategic thought, from the pre-Revolutionary era through the Vietnam War. As an organizing principle, Weigley suggests that of the two kinds of military strategies proposed by Hans Delbrück à la Clausewitz – a strategy of annihilation and a strategy of attrition – the strategy of annihilation, which seeks the “destruction of the enemy’s armed force and…the complete overthrow of the enemy,” has become the characteristically “American” way of waging war. It was only from the colonial era to the Civil War, when its military forces were relatively weak, that America engaged in wars of attrition. This changed in the Civil War – remaining constant through Vietnam – when more robust American military capabilities permitted a strategy of annihilation. While many other military historians have proposed various “national” ways of war (Germany is always a popular topic for such discussions), I am personally resistant to essentializing American national strategy, as it seems a nebulous, changeable concept that defies easy summary and may not remain constant over long periods of time. How might we define, for example, U.S. military strategy toward the Soviet Union during most of the Cold War? Even if Weigley’s thesis is not entirely accepted by the reader, The American Way of War still offers a thorough and thought-provoking analysis of U.S. military history.

If one is looking for a good general survey of U.S. military history, either to use when teaching a course or for general knowledge, I would suggest Alan Millett and Peter Maslowski’s For the Common Defense as a superior work to this one.

Review copyright 2009 J. Andrew Byers