Earl J. HessReseñas

Earl Hess might be the hardest working man in the field of American Civil War historiography, in as much as he seems to have a new monograph coming out every other year. In this book Hess continues to emphasize his thesis that late unpleasantness of 1861-1865 was not really the first modern war, by demonstrating all the ways that the artillery arms of the respective Confederate and Federal militaries were not that great an advance on their Napoleonic predecessors. Yes, there were some rifled cannon available, some of which were breach-loaders, but issues of fire control and unreliable fuses limited actual performance.

Frankly, Hess finds the most interesting difference is that the gunners of the American Civil War seemed to have been much more motivated than their Napoleonic predecessors, as they were generally willing to stand by their guns until the verge of being overrun, and than die by their guns. Hess suspects that the lesson that European observers should have been taking from the combat is not that the forces were so green, it's that so much was done with men basically dragged off the street with the addition of solid training in a viable doctrine, and with a willingness to learn lessons from experience.

It has to be admitted that this is a rather dry exercise, but if you need to learn about the nuts and bolts of artillery at this stage of history, this is the book you want to be dipping into.

Makes the reader think about Civil War battles in a different way. Emphasizes the role of tactics and drill to infantry movement, formation, and combat. Claims most units and commanders did fairly well with this considering their minimal preparation. Hess argues that the rifle was not revolutionary to Civil War tactics. It really did not increase the accuracy, firepower, or speed of fire. The rifle offered distance, but few officers, men, or units fired at that range. Chapters describe the different tactical moves through numerous case studies.

Military logistics is a field of study that has found popularity only in recent years, as The Information Age allows huge amounts of historical data to be analyzed in a fashion that has not been accessible to historians before. The topic has seen increasing popularity after World War II, the Allied victory in which is perceived to be a logistics miracle performed primarily by the United States. While most studies of military logistics focus on the 20th century, "Civil War Logistics: A Study of Military Transportation" reaches a bit further back in American military history to cover logistics in a pivotal conflict.

Authored by prolific Civil War historian Earl Hess and published by Louisiana State University Press in 2017,"Civil War Logistics" is a 368-page book divided into ten numbered pages, endnotes, and an index. As a field, logistics can be divided into distinct specialties: procurement, distribution, and transportation. Hess makes it clear in his title that this book only discusses transportation. Chapter 1 introduces the reader to logistics in military history going back to ancient times, while Chapter 2 lays out how the Federal and Confederate armies performed logistics according to mid-19th century concepts. Chapter 3 begins the examination of Civil War transportation systems with a view of river-based transportation--in essence, river steamers, the vast majority of which were paddle-wheelers. Hess initiates in this chapter the practice of first reviewing Union efforts in the field followed by Confederate efforts in the same method. Chapter 4 details Civil War use of the new railroad technology as a military logistics vehicle while demonstrating Union strengths and Confederate weaknesses in deploying this transportation mode. Chapter 5 is a look at coastal shipping as a military logistics tool and its role in Union operations; this mode of transportation had little impact for Confederate forces due to Union control of Confederate waters.

Chapter 6 covers what is known in modern military logistics as "the last tactical mile"--the horse-drawn wagon train. This mode of transportation was important to both sides in the war, and Hess treats the topic appropriately. Chapter 7 looks at three different and specialized transportation modes: pack horse and mule; cattle herds (really rations on the hoof); and foot power--after all each soldier carried a small supply depot on his person. Chapter 8 examines a specialized form of military logistics--the mass movement of troops. Hess focuses on the use of railroad for this logistics method by both sides, but there were also large troop movements by water during the war as well. Chapter 9 is about the countermeasures taken by Confederate forces against Union river transportation targets, while Chapter 10 shows how military force was used against railroads, wagon trains, and coastal shipping targets during the war.

Earl Hess has provided a welcome addition to the pool of Civil War scholarship in a field that seldom receives as much attention as it should.½

Definitive and magisterial. Details on every aspect of the attack for both sides, but presented in an intense and engaging narrative. Deals with everything from the top level generals planning to the individual soldier personal reminiscences and everything in between. The authoritative account.

Excellent revisionist but balanced review of Bragg’s Civil War Service.

On the whole, I have to admit that the author's books on the impact of field fortifications in the American Civil War can feel like too much of a good thing, but once you're done with one, you have to be impressed with the doggedness that Hess brought to the effort. I will add that this book has the virtue that it functions well as a survey of the whole Atlanta campaign as a military operation, and as a tribute to the military art of William T. Sherman.

Another typically excellent monograph by Earl Hess as he first examines Washington's superior expertise at organizing transportation over what Richmond mustered in comparison, before going on to consider the issue of anti-logistical warfare as conducted by the Confederate and Union armies.

Having previously spent some time debunking the impact of the rifled musket on the conduct of the American Civil War, in this monograph Hess takes up the challenge of defending the "fundamental adequacy of the linear system" of tactics used in the conflict and demonstrating how this system usually measured up to the test of the day of battle. The question then begged is if the Federal and Confederate units were generally proficient at the battalion and brigade level, why the lack of operational decision? Hess sees this partly as a result of the raw political determination of both sides, partly due to the sheer size of the armies that Richmond and Washington were able to raise and partly, admittedly, due to the basic American lack of experience with the higher levels of field command. Hess also comments on the tendency to make the military experience of the American Civil War more modern than it was; the real crucible of military modernity in his opinion is World War I (and even that gets exaggerated in his view). To get the most out of this book you should probably have read a couple general overviews of the war and have half a dozen or so battle histories under your belt.

Fighting for Atlanta is a fine narrative of the use of entrenchments during the Atlanta campaign. Major takeaways from the book: First, the use of entrenchments became ever more sophisticated as the campaign proceeded. Second, the Confederates used its entrenchments defensively, while the Union used the both defensively and offensively. On the offense, entrenchments could be held with a modest force, while the bulk of the troops could be used to try to flank the Confederates.

A major flaw in the book is the maps. While numerous, they are very crude, and some don’t even have a scale, making it quite difficult for the reader to follow the action. This is particularly so for the fighting around the city of Atlanta itself. The maps were presumably drawn by the author; a professional mapmaker would have helped immeasurably.

The “myth” in the subtitle of this book is that the rifle musket, which had a theoretical range vastly in excess of the smoothbores it replaced, actually resulted in infantry firing and hitting at that range. The reality was that it didn’t. Ranges at which units opened fire increased by perhaps 50%, but no more. There were a variety of reasons for this. The Civil War rifle musket had a very low muzzle velocity. As a result, bullets fired at long range traveled in a parabolic arc. Enemy troops in the middle of the arc were perfectly safe, with the rounds sailing over (often high over) their heads. At the far end of the arc, the danger zone was truncated as the bullets fell to earth at a steep angle. Hitting enemy troops at long range required skilled estimation of range, but Civil War infantrymen did not, with some exceptions, receive the requisite training.

These factors played into artillery and cavalry tactics as well. Artillery was said to have been forced onto the defense by the longer range of the rifle musket. Actually, this is mostly not true, as artillery tactics remained largely unchanged. In the case of cavalry, the author’s conclusions are a little unclear. A case could be made, however, that mounted charges made little sense in the American context because, much more so than Europe, charges were difficult because of terrain (heavy woods and, at least in the North, fenced fields). Add to this the vastly greater expense of cavalry over infantry, and the American choice becomes clear.

Part of the author's ongoing study of the use of fortifications during the American Civil War, Hess notes that these works almost emerged spontaneously, a response to Grant's emphasis on continuous contact and action to gain strategic and moral superiority over the Confederate forces. While it's arguable that Grant could not sustain the attrition he was inflicting on his own field force, this was probably the price that had to be paid to regain the strategic mastery that Lee had won and maintained in the eastern theater of the war to that point. What I'm not sure this book works as is a synopsis of Grant's Overland Campaign; you're still better off taking a deep breath and diving into Rhea's epic series for that.

By far the best description of the effort to supply troops during the American civil war. The book includes supplying by ship (coastal and riverboat), train, wagons, and pack mules.

In this effort to get into the mind and perceptions of the controversial Confederate soldier, while Hess finds a man who was probably more sinned against than sinner, and certainly not lacking in humanity, there is no denying that Bragg was also his own worst enemy. To a large degree it would seem that Bragg had two great lacks. One was a chronic lack of imagination that resulted in a rudimentary sense of operational art, that sense of what battles would contribute to winning a campaign in the end; however, it's not as though Bragg was the only Civil War general to be challenged on that quality. More serious was a bad lack of social intelligence that contributes to creating the sense that Bragg was no great judge of human quality and had little talent for building better relationships; while Leonidas Polk may have been the center of the corrosive feelings that predominated in the Army of Tennessee, the reality is that Bragg handled Polk's insubordination very poorly. To put it another way, and a feeling that I've had for awhile, the Confederacy would have been better served had Bragg been chief of staff or senior subordinate to a more charismatic field commander who could have harnessed the man's real talents to better impact.½

Another typically worthwhile study by Earl Hess as in the process of explaining how the battle in question was more of a near-run loss for Oliver Howard's command then generally remembered, and how it fits into the wider picture of Sherman's campaign to take Atlanta. Hess also uses this battle as a case study of command relations in the two forces. At the very least it's arguably the precipice from where John Bell Hood's reputation entered into free fall.

Hess has done his research. It seems to him that the increased lethality of the rifled muskets in the Civil War could come from two factors: 1) the use of the Percussion cap as a means of ignition, 2) the rifling of the barrels providing the more accurate shooting necessary. After an examination he comes to the finding that the elimination of the small gap between the striking of the flint and the explosion of the charge behind the bullet, and placing the percussion cap n the nipple raised the rate of fire, these acts reduced the loading time of the muzzle-loading weapons. Therefore they caused more casualties.
The rifling is a more difficult question. The introduction of the rifled musket by the British had led to a new course of training in musketry. After the new style of ftraining, the Royal Army fired at much longer ranges, and the training of the soldier in individual aimed fire led to a higher number of casualties among those they were shooting at. When you factor in the higher rate of fire, and the decreased number of misfires rsulting from the percussion cap, the Royal army increased its ability to hurt the enemy forces even more than the US Army did.
The US army had no deliberate training in musketry, and did not often open fire at greater ranges than they had while using the old smooth-bore flintlocks. Therefore, the US Army hadn't profited fully from their new rifles, and the increases they did have resulted from the percussion cap use, not from utilizing the rifled barrels of their new weapons.
It is a very well thought out piece of military analysis.

Well-researched and enjoyable look at my all-time favorite movie. In their introduction, the authors say their goal is somewhere in between academic analysis and popular gossip, and in general they find that middle ground. Those into the nitty-gritty of film production will appreciate the sheer amount of detail provided about the genesis of the story, the creation of sequences and shooting schedules, while those more interested in personalities will learn plenty about Gene Kelly, Donald O'Connor, Debbie Reynolds et al. The latter is the one area where the authors get a little repetitive. One gets the feeling they idolize Kelly (understandably) and thus have bones to pick both with Reynolds, for complaining about how hard it was to work under him, and with Stanley Donen, for trying to take too much credit away from his mentor and co-director. Mostly, though, one comes away from this book with an appreciation of how much work went into this movie, and renewed wonder at how easy the cast made it look.

A close analysis of one of the bloodier days of Sherman's campaign on Georgia in 1864, Hess puts this assault in context by suggesting that Sherman's generally careful conduct of the campaign was trumped by a felt need to keep the pressure on the Confederate Army of Tennessee and discourage the transfer of troops to reinforce Robert E. Lee in Virginia. Arguably Joseph E. Johnston's finest moment of the 1864 campaigning season, it was still not enough to justify his delaying strategy in Richmond and did not avert Johnston's removal in favor of John Bell Hood.

Besides the tactical and operational overview, Hess also spends a great deal of time on how fortifications affected the course of battle; an analysis facilitated by the relatively well-preserved condition of the battlefield today.

Earl J. Hess and Timothy B. Smith are my favorite currently writing ACW authors. As Smith's new book about Corinth costs 40 USD, while Hess' treatment of the Knoxville campaign is available for a more reasonable 27 USD, I ordered the latter one. Hess does not disappoint. This is another fine title about a muddy side-show of the American Civil War. The reason for the Knoxville campaign were political for the Union and personal for the Confederacy. Abraham Lincoln wanted to shield the Union loyalists of Eastern Tennessee from Southern repression and establish some sort of bipartisanship between Northerners and Southerners. The reason that made Eastern Tennessee averse to slavery, its inaccessible terrain, made it logistically challenging for the Federals as all supplies had to carried by wagon from Kentucky, as the only rail links from Virginia and Chattanooga were controlled by the Confederates.

For the Confederates, the control of the railroad linking Virginia and Chattanooga was only secondary after the twin defeats at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. The victory at Chickamauga restored some of the Confederate initiative. Bragg unfortunately used it to get rid of James Longstreet who certainly had ambitious to replace Bragg as army commander. Longstreet's troops and Wheeler's cavalry would be sorely missing at the battle for Chattanooga.

Longstreet was unsuitable by nature for the bold strike necessary to knock out Ambrose Burnside's forces at Knoxville. Longstreet's similar venture against Suffolk earlier in 1863 failed to capture the place. A better choice would have been Patrick Cleburne, but he only commanded a division. The Confederacy lacked the logistical resources to strike quickly, anyway. So Longstreet more or less limped towards Knoxville.

His Federal adversary was no stranger to mud marches either. The siege of Knoxville would be a tiny re-match for the battle of Fredericksburg where Ambrose Burnside commanded his soldiers to attack Longstreet's secure heights. At Knoxville, it was Burnside's turn to await Longstreet's attack on his lines. Waiting and delaying was Burnside's core competency. Stricken by diarrhea, he asked Lincoln to relieve him of command, time and again. Grant made sure that Burnside at least would stay put in Knoxville and not retreat. In the end, Burnside locked down an important number of Confederate soldiers who couldn't assist Bragg in his final battle. The "siege" of Knoxville was a sorry affair in dreadful weather whose only notable event was the botched attack on Fort Sanders. The campaign and the war was decided elsewhere. Keeping Longstreet at bay restored some of Burnside's reputation which his soldiers were to pay for in the Overland campaign and at Petersburg.

Hess has written an excellent account of this small campaign. The only detriments are that he does not try to drill down the numbers of soldiers engaged in the different engagements, offering only approximate total numbers per side, and the lack of a scale on many maps, turning them into mere sketches. A comparison of Longstreet at Suffolk and Knoxville, as well as Burnside at Knoxville and the Crater, is unfortunately also left to the reader. Overall, this will be the standard account of the campaign for many years.½

Singin’ In The Rain is one of Hollywood’s best loved films. The American Film Industry named it the Best Musical Film of all time. They also listed it as the fifth best film of any genre of all time, and it came the top 20 films of both their lists of romantic movies, and comedy movies. More importantly, it is loved by film fans all over the world, even almost 60 years after it was released.

This book tells the story of how the film was created, beginning right at the genesis of the project, when screenwriters Betty Comden and Adolph Green were asked to write a musical using MGMs back catalogue of Freed/Brown songs. All they knew was that it was to be called ‘Singin’ In The Rain’; they had no guidance regarding what the storyline should be about. The book describes the writing process, and then goes on to describe how all the main players in the cast came on board, providing short but detailed biographies of the main cast.

There are detailed descriptions of the various problems encountered by the cast and crew during filming, and also of the personal relationships between the people involved in the film. It also gives details of how the dances were worked out, how the sets were created, and how the characters were developed. (And finds time to debunk a few myths – for example, despite popular reports that milk was used instead of water for the title dance, this is not true.)

Finally the book describes the impact which the film had on the cast and crew, the critics, and the viewing public, and discusses its enduring appeal (giving details of life after the film for the main cast).

This book is jam-packed with details and facts, but it is all presented in a very readable and engaging style. It’s clear that the authors love their subject (and indeed, who doesn’t?!), and have carried out exhaustive research for this book.

Above all, it is a fitting tribute to a wonderful film, and is definitely recommended for fans of the film, or anyone interested in how movies were made. And I guarantee that when you’ve finished it, you will want to get the film out and watch it!

Excellent for fans of this movie or fans of classic musicals in general. Exhaustively researched and full of detail, but still readable.

The first book of a trilogy dealing with field fortifications in the Eastern theater of the American Civil War, Hess gives a close examination of the process by which the contending forces became habituated to the need for quick entrenchment, climaxing in this book with the abortive Mine Run campaign, where the Army of Norther Virginia was able to checkmate the Army of the Potomac with their entrenching ability. Other useful sections focus on the respective races to fortify the capitals of Richmond and Washington, not to mention the proper by-the-book reduction of Battery Wagner in Charleston. It might also be noted that this work is greatly enhanced by the author's examination of the surviving field works.

Very good perspective and a different look at the impact rifles actually had and why reality seems to be so different than what so many have believed for so lon.

Pettigrew's brigade was pitted against the Iron brigade on the first day at Gettysburg. While the Tar Heels had a clear numerical advantage, with the 26th NC alone approaching two-thirds of the total strength of the Iron brigade, the brigade took all the punishment the Yankees meted out. On the third day of Gettysburg, the brigade again paid a heavy price in the fateful attack on Cemetery Ridge. The brigade performed further sacrifices in covering Lee's retreat. The brigade as part of Heth's division became a mainstay of Lee's later campaigns.

Hess has written a marvel of a brigade history with just the right mix of biography of its leaders and men, a description of its organization and logistics as well as the events in camp, on the march and on the battle field. The addition of colorful vignettes about the 26th NC band and the original voices of its members create period flair and sympathy for the poor devils. "The bois sais they can whip five a peace." Which turned out to be wildly optimistic and soon turned into a defiant "they may over pour us, but they cant scear us." The boys paid a high price in blood, which makes it completely unnecessary for Hess to bloat the casualty numbers with the men captured. POWs may be casualties from an organizational point of view, but may not destroy unit morale (as the separation is temporary). This is just a minor distraction of an otherwise exemplary work.½

In the face of real excellance I have very little to say, simply that Hess covers just about every angle of this significant unit of which you might ask. Of particular interest was how the experiences of the band of the 26th North Carolina on one hand, and what these draftees of Quaker faith went through on the other, were documented; thus giving one a new perspective for a change. About my only complaint is that I would have liked to have seen more about the relationships the assorted brigade commanders had with their regimental leaders, but perhaps that material is thin on the ground; I can't doubt that if the author had located relevant material it would have been incorporated in this study.½

This landmark book is an excellent treatment of an often neglected decisive American Civil War battle near Bentonville, AR (of Walmart fame), which knocked Arkansas out of the war. The Confederates should never have undertaken the campaign - their forces might have made the difference at Shiloh.

The Union commander, Samuel Curtis, displayed excellent generalship, steely nerves and a good grasp of logistics. He was fortunate in having excellent brigade commanders, though burdened with the second in command Franz Sigel. It is an irony of history that the incompetent politician-general Sigel was transferred to the Eastern Theater to play an expanded and catastrophic role in further campaigns while the quiet, professional soldier Curtis languished in the marginal theater.

Shea and Hess have written a compelling and beautifully illustrated study of the battle.½