John J. HennessyReseñas

The First Battle of Manassas is a brief (209 page) but well-written book that ascribes Union defeat to the fact that Irvin McDowell, the Union commander, “did not know what victory would look like on July 21, 1861, and neither did most men on the field....” The time between noon and 2 pm, when Northern troops failed to advance against the improvised Confederate defense on Henry Hill, were not a lull, but rather a “revelation — the first real recognition that the war would require more than bluster and posturing.” The Confederates, meanwhile, exploited their opportunity, “consistently [converting] time gained into more men and stronger positions.”

The book starts out too quickly, essentially beginning with Union troops setting out from Washington in search of the Confederate army. Other than that, it has no major faults. I read the “revised edition”, a paperback published in 2015. It remedied a major flaw in the first, hardback edition, a lack of maps. In this edition, the maps are numerous and clear, with only one minor error (on p.87, the regiments labelled as “3rd ME” and “2nd CT” should be the 3rd Connecticut and the 2nd Maine).

In Return to Bull Run, John J. Hennessy does an excellent job of describing how the Union was whipped at Second Manassas. A “well-oiled performance of the Confederate army” under Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet “contrasted sharply with the disorganized toil of Pope’s Army of Virginia.” “The Union army at Second Manassas toiled under poor or average leadership at every level of the high command,“ but “the primary architect of the calamity was John Pope.” Once Jackson marched around Pope’s right flank and into his rear, Pope tried to pin him down and destroy him in a “series of misguided lunges.” “He failed to recognize the possibilities offered by blocking the Bull Run Mountain gaps. He failed to gauge the skills of his opponents. He presumed always that the Confederates would do precisely as he expected. Then, when they did not (as on August 28 and 29), he sought to cast the blame on others, notably [Fifth Corps commander Fitz John] Porter.”

Once battle was joined, Pope “utterly failed in the basic responsibilities of commanding an army on the battlefield. Insufficient attention to the army’s logistics left his army wilted and dispirited. Inadequate reconnaissance left him with a wishful, wholly inaccurate view of the battlefield. Failure to put the attacks of August 29 into a larger tactical context, by making concurrent diversions or at least providing additional support, doomed each [Union] assault to failure.” In the end, he had to go.

The Second Bull Run battle was the low point of the attempt to build a competent Union Army in the East. It pointed out the degree to which George McClellan had been useful in creating a useful army. Pope's conglomeration was badly used and Henessey gets a bit lost in the details, but has the right idea of this battle.½

An outstanding account of the American Civil War's first major battle. I could find little wrong with this book. The maps are well done and while I would have liked one or two more, the book does not suffer for their lack. Recommended.

Published in 1989, Hennessy’s account of First Manassas or First Bull Run is an excellent description of the first--and critical--battle in the US Civil War.

Written in standard format, the book is divided into 10 chapters covering the battle in fairly logical chunks of time that correspond to specific aspects (approach, the fight for Matthews Hill, the extended struggle for Henry Hill). Each chapter has a map of troop movements.

There is a wealth of detail in Hennessy’s book, that not only includes military descriptions but selections from the orders, letters and memoirs of participants. First manassas was a much more complicated battle than is usually described in general histories, and while nowhere near so bloody an engagement as later battles (“merely” 3000+ casualties of all kinds), it really was the first in what could be termed modern warfare. It also pointed up the weaknesses (particularly of the Union command) and strengths of both sides. For the first time, we meet some of those who would go on to be major players: Stonewall Jackson, Sherman, Burnsides, Joe Johnston, James Longstreet, and others. There is an excellent summary and analysis of the battle and its consequences in the last chapter.

While it is an excellent book and well worth reading, it has the same failing that just about every other standard format book does: a lack of maps. In fact, the single map of the turning point of the battle--the see-saw fight for Henry Hill--has a totally inadequate map for understanding the struggle over the Union artillery on the hill. In addition there are some errors in troop movements in the opening phases of hte battle that are confusing; the text does not correspond with the maps.

I read this book after reading Gottfried’s The maps of First Bull Run, which is excellent for those who wish to truly understand the troop movements. While Hennessy’s book has more detail, its single map of the Henry Hill segment of the battle really cripples understanding. Ideally, one would read The Maps of First Bull Run and then Hennessy’s book. However, The First Battle of Manassas is worthwhile enough to stand on its own.

Recommended for those who want a more detailed understanding of an important battle.

Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas This is a very well written narrative history of one of the significant battles in Virginia in the second year of the Civil War. I read the book because I was not very familiar with the details of this campaign.
This is the first book I have read written by this author. His writing style makes for an enjoyable read. The narration moves at a good pace in straight forward non-academic language. He has no discernible bias for either side as he describes the military struggle between the parties.
The author previously served as a historian at the Manassas National Battlefield. His knowledge of the battlefield and how the topography of the site influenced the course of the battle gives an added dimension to his narration of the events.
He makes excellent use of primary sources. There are many short segments of moment to moment descriptions of various events as they happen throughout the battle that allow the participants to relate the events in their own words. The author also provides personal details of the main participants.
The book had 15 maps that closely followed the battle narration and were a real help to me in following the action.
The campaign begins with Lee outnumbered and the Union general John Pope receiving additional troops. Lee takes the initiative and attacks Pope's army by splitting up his forces and having Stonewall Jackson's army attack the Union supply base at Manassas, Virginia. This also cuts the railroad that is the supply line to Pope's army. The base has acres and acres of everything a soldier could ever need or want. When it is captured the soldiers of Jackson's army go on a binge, looting through the supplies. The image of the Confederate soldiers, half of whom have no shoes, looting through millions of dollars of army supplies is one I will remember.
Pope turns his army and moves to attack Jackson. Even though the Union army is much larger Pope is a poor general and Jackson's army holds their position inflicting heavy casualties. On the dust jacket of the book is a painting that shows Confederate soldiers throwing rocks at the Federals. As it happened Jackson's soldiers did at one time run low on ammunition and in desperation actually throw rocks at the Union soldiers.
While Pope is attacking Jackson the other portion of Lee's army marches to join Jackson. Pope doesn't believe the reports of other Confederate troops in the area and continues his attacks on Jackson. Longstreet at the head of the other Confederate troops attacks Pope from the flank and comes close to destroying the Army of Virginia. The Union soldiers manage to retreat but suffer many unnecessary casualties because of poor leadership. There are quotations from Union soldiers in the book that show they understood that their generals were getting them killed.
The improvements in military technology and the low level of medical care contributed to a high level of deaths and serious casualties in the Civil War. The standard rifle bullet was .53 caliber, bigger than a .45 or 9mm. Amputation was the only known treatment for many of the wounds inflicted by this bullet. The courage of the soldiers as they charge into volleys of rifle fire is awe inspiring. There were 25,000 casualties out of a total of approximately 125,000 soldiers involved in the fighting. The Union casualties were much higher but they had more troops. Each side suffered about 20% casualties. Some units in the thick of the fighting suffered 50% casualties. This was one of the last wars where the generals led the charge and officers suffered a high rate of casualties.
After the battle ends with a victory for the Confederates the Union side engages in the blame game. Pope was fired and McClellan put back in charge. Pope had one of his generals court-martialed which became a story that went on for many years.
The last chapter has some very good analysis about the campaign and the final battle. The author points out some critical mistakes and examples of good performance on both sides. It is clear that John Pope was not competent and became overwhelmed by events as the battle went on. This campaign climaxed a three month period where Lee turned the military situation in favor of the Confederates.
Now I know a lot more about what happened during the 21 days covered by the book and the long term effects of those events. I really enjoyed this book and for those interested in this topic I can highly recommend it.

HB/DJ