Thomas J. Christensen

This excellent analysis of how the Sino-American relationship defied a realist interpretation in the early Cold War. The two countries were not basing their actions directly on their national interests but were using the tensions with the other country to mobilize domestic support to get the populace to make sacrifices for their agenda.

For Truman, China (and the Soviet Union) was an important part of scaring Americans into higher taxes to pay for the Marshall Plan and then containment of the USSR. Although containment was supposed to avoid direct conflict, it required preparedness on many different fronts, which was extremely expensive. Truman had to sell the idea of a forward defense to a population that was isolationist by nature. Although the Korean War caught Truman off guard, he used the war to solidify his program.

One of the best aspects of this book is Christensen's use of Chinese sources to show how Truman's policies and rhetoric had unintended consequences by pushing Mao into a more confrontational posture. Truman wanted manageable tensions, not war (even a limited one), but miscalculated. Nevertheless, when the war came, he took advantage of it to show the Communist menace.

Mao took a similar path in 1958, when he began shelling Quemoy. He did this as part of the launch of the Great Leap Forward. Even though he did not realize how costly it would eventually be, he knew that he needed something he could use to mobilize the Chinese people. So he came up with an irrational shelling campaign that only provoked the US and alienate the Soviets. But against realist analysis, his major rationale was domestic, not promoting China's interest internationally.

This is a great book with great sources, but it is a little dated, especially on the GLF. Christensen was writing before new sources came out of China about the GLF, so he is missing some of the new details of its implementation and how China was trying to challenge the USSR for leadership in the Communist camp. Despite that, this remains an excellent work that I highly recommend to specialists interested in the Sino-American relationship and the correlation between domestic and international issues.… (más)