This book is about a relatively little-known event in Eastern European history, the Polish-Soviet war of 1920. I previously reviewed Rising ‘44, another book about Poland by Norman Davies; the contrast between the two is interesting.

Poland sprang back to life after WWI, and some Poles had delusions of restoring the old Polish state of the 15th Century, which extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Since the Soviets were in a life-or-death struggle with the Whites, it seemed like a good idea at the time, and Polish armies struck eastward, occupying Kiev (of course, the Polish frontier of 1920 was a lot closer to Kiev than it is now). The Soviets responded by extracting the Konarmiya, the First Cavalry Army, from its fight with Wrangel, and sending it westward, forcing the Poles out of Kiev and back to the Vistula as fast as they had advanced. The Soviets had delusions themselves, preparing to march victorious through Poland to Germany, where they expected the workers to rise and the triumph of the proletariat to be sealed. Unfortunately for them, the Konarmiya demonstrated something that would be a reoccurring problem with the Soviet military - all teeth, no tail. The Soviets had to advance rapidly because they had no logistics train, and once they were stopped by the line of the Vistula, Marshal Pisudski was able to punch through and the flanks and the Konarmiya barely escaped encirclement. The battles of the Vistula included both a Polish motorized infantry/armored car penetration that Davies contends foreshadowed the Blitzkrieg, and the largest cavalry action of the 20th century, at Komarów. The Soviets negotiated a peace and the Polish border remained where it was (until 1939).

Davies makes the interesting contention that the Poles would have been better off if they had lost in 1920, or at least not won as dramatically. The victory over the Soviets gave the Poles the impression that their military forces were considerably stronger than they actually were, and that they could “go it alone” against both Russia and Germany without having to ally with one or the other. The success of Polish cavalry lead to more emphasis on that arm than it deserved, and the popularity of Pisudski prompted him to stage a military coup and lead to a “government of colonels” until 1939.

This book was written in 1972, and, as mentioned above, the contrast between it and Davies’ book on the Warsaw Rising is quite interesting. Davies is extremely circumspect in his treatment of the USSR and communist Poland here; he is a historian of eastern Europe and, in 1972, saying anything unpleasant about communism would have cut him off from his sources. By the time Rising ‘44 was written, the USSR was the XSSR, Davies had access to previously secret archives, and the wartime actions of the Soviet army and government do not get kid glove treatment. It would be interesting to see a second edition of White Eagle Red Star with new information.

Good maps and a nice selection of photographs. Not very well indexed, and the bibliography is, of course, obsolete. Still worth reading for an account of an interesting military campaign between the lines as a commentary on the practice of history in the days of the USSR. ( )

Norman Davies' White Eagle, Red Star is still the definitive work on the Polish-Soviet War and it shows: expertly researched and well-written, Davies covers every angle of the war, from the Polish side to the Soviets and the reactions to the Poles' victory in Western Europe and Germany. A little-known period of history is brought to life, and with it, the consequences of that Miracle on the Vistula for all of Europe. As A. J. P. Taylor wrote in the book's forward, this book "is a permanent contribution to historical knowledge and international understanding." ( )