What I said about Citino's book of the German army's war in 1943 and what the conduct of the war said about the German's officer corps' corporate culture applies, if anything, to a greater degree for this book. This is in that the first half of 1942 was largely about a German army that while apparently on the ropes at the end of 1941 picked itself up and got on with the business of generating the operational victories that would be the prerequisites of any possible strategic victory. That the German military after all it had been through and all its limitations still came within a tantalizing margin of delivering victory at Stalingrad, in the Caucasus region and in North Africa is why it fascinates to this day. A particular virtue of this book over its successor dealing with the events of 1943 are really excellent end notes that are themselves a fine survey of the state of play of the historiography of the war in Europe at the time of publication. ( )

In this interesting book, the author shows the frequency with which Prussian/German armies gained success from the 17th century onwards while being outnumbered, with poor supply and transport and inadequate intelligence regarding their opponents. He then goes on to suggest that the deficit was made up through intensive training, pushing responsibility down the command chain and an extreme aggressive attitude that would result in the enormous WW2 victories of 1939-1941.

Citino's thesis is that the whole situation changed in 1942. As he says, "What happened in the summer and fall campaigns of 1942 was something far more significant. In those brief six months and entire way of war that dated back centuries had come to an end. The German traditions of maneuver-based Gewegungskrieg, the notion that "war is an art, a free and creative activity," the belief in the independence of the subordinate commander within his own sphere of competency: each and every one of these bedrock beliefs had taken a pounding in the last six months, and in fact had revealed themselves to be no longer valid."

He describes the overwhelming material superiority of the allied armies in tanks, aircraft, guns, supplies, logistics, intelligence (Ultra) and not least manpower, and the strategic impossibility of the situation for the Germans.

This isn't really anything new, but he does write at some length about the remarkable German successes despite these handicaps, and in my opinion, undermines his whole idea when evaluating the last German offensives in southern Russia. As he says, "For all the ink spilled over its fundamental deficiencies, there was nothing wrong with Blue - its complexity, its size, its maneuver scheme - that a thousand or so extra tanks would not have fixed. But that was precisely the problem."

In other words the Germans could have attained their objectives with a still relatively small (relative to their opponents) increase in equipment and no one would be questioning their maneuver-based Gewegungskrieg? ( )

Good reading. If interested in WW 2 this is an excellent treratment of the long term flaws in the German way of war. ( )