U.S. public statements during the 1950's and 60's give the impression that policy makers saw international communism as a monolithic forced centered in Moscow. Gordon Chang argues very pursuasively that policy discussions focused on the conflicts between communist countries and how to exploit that. At first the United States hoped to pry China away from Moscow, but by the early 1960's, it was trying to pry Moscow from Beijing.

Titoism was the general term for the hope that communist leaders were nationalist first and would not suborndinate their national interests to Moscow. Only the most ardent right wing American politicians believed that Beijing would unconditionally take orders from Moscow. Most other policy makers believed that a split between the two was possible and likely. The debate was largely over how to encourage and exploit the potential split. Some wanted to embrace Beijing to entice it away from the Soviets. Others wanted to reject Beijing. Their rationale was that driving it into Soviet arms would exacerbate Soviet shortcomings and force Beijing to ultimately reject Beijing.

The policy of isolation won out, forcing the CCP to go to Moscow for aid. Chang is clear that the U.S. policy was not decisive, but he is unclear on how much of an influence it was. This vagueness is hardly shocking, since Chinese archives remain closed and internal debates are not available for analysis. It leads to speculation about the effectiveness of U.S. policies. Ultimately it produced the results that Washington desired. Chang's suggestion is that the White House and State Department understood their limited influence in the Sino-Soviet relationship and merely tried to add fuel to a smoldering fire.

Change does a good job of discussing the positions of various policy advocates. He discusses the different perceptions that led to each position and potentatial policies. Most interesting is the gradual shift from seeing the Soviets as the main enemy to seeing the Chinese as the greater threat. This reflected the Soviets abandonment of inevitable war with the West, while the Chinese continued to advocate it. Ultimately, Chang suggests, the Soviet shift towards detente not only brought it closer to the United States, but also alienated from the still revolutionary PRC.

Chang implies, but does not overtly state, that the United States position in the power triangle fundamentally shifted by the mid-1960's. Both the PRC and USSR saw each other as the main threat, making the U.S. a card to be played by each side. Washington was able to exploit that new position to improve relations with each side, thereby increasing its overall security.

Chang's work is an important analysis of U.S policy toward Sino-Soviet relations. By focusing on tri-lateral relations, Chang shows a more complex and realistic policy-making process. He is short on connections between policy and its effects and some of his details are questionable, but his argument is persuasive and provides an valuable perspective on Sino-Soviet-American relations. ( )