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Cargando... Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Romepor Arthur M. Eckstein
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Inscríbete en LibraryThing para averiguar si este libro te gustará. Actualmente no hay Conversaciones sobre este libro. I can summarize the main argument of this book in one sentence: Rome did not rise to power because it was more warlike than the other Mediterranean states - others were just as eager to fight. The author hammers home this point again and again. It gets a bit repetitive in the end and I think the book often comes dangerously close to anachronism in applying modern theories of international relations to the ancient world. But I still think this was an interesting and well-written book. sin reseñas | añadir una reseña
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This ground-breaking study is the first to employ modern international relations theory to place Roman militarism and expansion of power within the broader Mediterranean context of interstate anarchy. Arthur M. Eckstein challenges claims that Rome was an exceptionally warlike and aggressive state-not merely in modern but in ancient terms-by arguing that intense militarism and aggressiveness were common among all Mediterranean polities from ca 750 B.C. onwards. In his wide-ranging and masterful narrative, Eckstein explains that international politics in the ancient Mediterranean world was, in political science terms, a multipolar anarchy: international law was minimal, and states struggled desperately for power and survival by means of warfare. Eventually, one state, the Republic of Rome, managed to create predominance and a sort of peace. Rome was certainly a militarized and aggressive state, but it was successful not because it was exceptional in its ruthlessness, Eckstein convincingly argues; rather, it was successful because of its exceptional ability to manage a large network of foreign allies, and to assimilate numerous foreigners within the polity itself. This book shows how these characteristics, in turn, gave Rome incomparably large resources for the grim struggle of states fostered by the Mediterranean anarchy-and hence they were key to Rome's unprecedented success. No se han encontrado descripciones de biblioteca. |
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Google Books — Cargando... GénerosSistema Decimal Melvil (DDC)937.02History and Geography Ancient World Italian Peninsula to 476 and adjacent territories to 476 Italian Peninsula to 476 and adjacent territories to 476 Republic 509-31 B.C.Clasificación de la Biblioteca del CongresoValoraciónPromedio:
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This is precisely the pattern that Eckstein shows prevailed in both classical and Hellenistic Greece and the Mediterranean. When he turns his attention to the early expansion of Rome in central Italy, Eckstein shows how lucky Rome was to survive, much less to expand, surrounded as it was by other militarized states. A discussion of Roman expansion in the western Mediterranean argues that Rome was no more bellicose or militarized than other states in the region.
If Rome was not exceptionally warlike, then how does Eckstein explain Rome’s expansion? Eckstein argues that Rome’s unique willingness to integrate former enemies into a flexible alliance system and even into citizenship allowed the Republic to assemble large resources and to sustain terrible defeats while ultimately prevailing. ( )