Before I started this work, I really had no sense who Holger Afflerbach was, then, when looking over the bibliography, it turns out that about a page and a half of it lists Dr. Afflerbach's own contributions to the field; meaning that this book is the digest of a career.

Next, the title does nicely sum up one of Afflerbach's main points, that though the war could have ended to the benefit of all parties anytime after 1914, the two alliance systems could always find some development that would allow them to justify continuing the war. This is until the German ruling complex (government is too respectful a word for this lot) found ways to provoke American participation in the war, and the German military lost its bet that its great 1918 offensive would be a winner.

That's the thing, and perhaps the real core of this book, the reality that the German ruling complex collectively did not know themselves, nor did they know their enemy, apart from the simple bean count. This is not really news, but Afflerbach really drives home how much the German war effort was driven by pious hopes and misplaced optimism, not to mention that there was no real leveling with the German public, so it was a total shock when the roof caved in come 1918. This misplaced sense of hope is also what leads to the image of the Great War being a premeditated German war of conquest, as something had to be won to justify the sacrifices, and thus save a cranky political and social system.

Where I'm a little dubious in places is that though Afflerbach puts blame for enabling the war firmly on the back of Berlin, he also attempts to place blame for the long duration of the war on London and Paris, as they pursued maximalist gains. Afflerbach may insist that he is simply assigning responsibility where it belongs, at points though it does come close to blaming the victim. Still, this is the time when it was possible to believe that war was a viable tool of statecraft, and knocking down simplistic notions of military victory is another issue that Afflerbach is dealing with.

Finally, when accounting for the damage left in the wake of World War I, Afflerbach suggests that the greatest loss might have been Russia falling away from being part of the European family of nations. The impact of that branching of history continues to be a gift that keeps on giving. ( )

Well written WWI book Provides a great deal of info on the behind the scenes activity mostly on the Imperial German side. Some of the author conclusions may be questioned due to the antagonism on both sides. Recommend. ( )

A good book, but the title is a bit misleading. The author shows how the grand strategic and political decisions were made that led ultmately to Germany's defeat and collapse. Although the title suggests that the issue sometimes hung in the balance, considering the strong institutional pressure for a for a military solution, and the personalities of the people involved, it is highly unlikely that a compromise solution could have been arrived at. Even if such an offer had been made, it would have to be accepted by the war-party of the Entente. To the author the gravest German mistake was the complete mishandling of the relations with the US, and he certainly has a point there. ( )