The German Wehrmacht was the supreme fighting machine of the Second World War. A machine Hitler used to terrible and criminal effect. Martin van Creveld examines the organizational effectiveness of the Wehrmacht which inflicted twenty to thirty percent more casualties than its equalsized WWII opponents, even when outnumbered and outgunned. He compares it with the WWII US army (as the book was originally published as part of a series of examinations why the US lost the Vietnam War). The US army takes quite a beating: It was bureaucratic, overcentralized and inhuman - a stark contrast to the Wehrmacht.

Contrary to the classic Hollywood depiction of German soldiers, the actual Wehrmacht treasured decentralized initiative. Every soldier and officer was expected to think and act. Given wide responsibility, NCO and officers did not wait for orders but improvised despite their scarce resources. The second difference was the creation of esprit de corps and camaraderie. Wehrmacht soldiers hailed from the same region and remained together for the war. Promoted NCOs and officers returned to their unit in their new function. The third important difference was personnel selection. The Wehrmacht placed great importance on the personal judgement of supervisors. The leaders selected and trained their own men. In the US army, a support infrastructure was responsible for training and selection and effectively sorted the best men out of the combat services. The US infantry ended up with most of the dumb recruits and officers (with the resulting performance impact).

In light of the news from the Second Iraq War, this German re-edition of van Creveld's work does not inspire much confidence in organizational change in the now all volunteer US army. Filling up their recruitment quotas with criminals and unfits will not improve US effectiveness. Firing or retiring contrarian officers does not help develop initiative and imagination. Rules-driven processes crush thinking on the spot. A shame, the US army is no learning organization.

The lessons of this book are still relevant for military and other organizations. ( )