This is the second book I've read by Hegel. He isn't really breaking new ground here. It really is just a greater elucidation of ideas he put forth in the Phenomenology; where he is fleshing it out and applying it in different ways. Again, you have him discoursing on the process of optimum consciousness. It seems that a lot of the ideas expressed here were formulated after the Phenomenology and the debate it (and Idealism in general) had sparked in Germany, had occurred. He refers regularly to contemporary philosophers, as well as to more antiquated ones.
One thing that I noticed early on in his refutation of philosophers like Jacobi, he seems to vacillate when dealing with the subject of immediation and mediation. He attempts to refute philosophers that emphasize immediate experience, but while doing this he apparently forgets an essential component of his philosophy that he expresses later in the book. As far as I could tell, Hegel attempts to put mediation ahead of immediation in this section -an idea so ridiculous it doesn't merit refutation. While attempting to play up the idea of mediation in order to refute his critics, he doesn't note the fact that there are specific nuances to the idea of mediation and immediation that should be taken into account. He seems to selectively forget that self mediation is really equal to immediation. There is no other form of immediation possible in life, really. What is surprising is the fact that later in this book he seems aware of the fact that self mediation and immediation are really equal in practice. To illustrate this for Christian readers of this review, one can look at Saint Paul's letter to the Galatians (specifically chapters 3 and 4). Paul illustrates the idea of mediation and immediation and it's subtle nuances in this book rather well. He compares the revelation and covenant given through Moses and that given by Christ. He notes that the revelation and covenant that passed through Moses came from God to the angels, and then to Moses and then to the people; so, the people of Israel were twice removed from God in this relationship; where as the revelation through Christ is a one to one immediate relationship. Although, Christ is an intermediator, and thus an example of mediation, because Christ Himself is divine, this mediate relationship is really immediate because it is self mediation and not mediation through an other as the revelation of Moses was. Hegel, in his attempt to refute his critics, seems to forget these nuances in this section. He is entirely aware of them as made manifest in later chapters, but because he is dealing with his critics, he selectively forgets them.
The ins and outs of his philosophy were already formulated in the Phenomenology. Largely, it deals with dichotomous aspects of being and the process of uniting them into consciousness; e.g. individuality/universality; subjectivity/objectivity, mediation/immediation etc etc. Through the Absolute Idea these dichotomies are reconciled and united after a process of ambivalent interplay. I don't know what the underlying German word was for the term here translated as "idea", but undoubtedly it's background is the Greek term "eidos" which plays an essential role in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. Not exactly sure as to what differentiates Hegel's use of "idea" in this work and his use of "geist" (spirit/mind) in the Phenomenology. The difference seems to be semantic as far as I can tell. I couldn't see what it was that distinguishes "idea" from "geist" in the two works. It seems that for all intents and purposes their role is largely the same, practically speaking.
My criticisms are largely the same as they were for the Phenomenology; namely, that Hegel overly conflates theological/philosophical distinctions. This is somewhat understandable when one notes that universality for Hegel seems to preclude all difference and distinction. This is certainly difficult to square with Christianity though, where distinction is not just formal, but substantially found in the Godhead itself as a Trinity. Indeed, one cannot rationalize how it is that the Son is distinct from the Father and both from the Holy Spirit, but it is a confession of faith that is not accorded only formal reality in theology. It's hardly surprising that Aristotle is the ancient philosopher that Hegel is in accord with the most. Aristotle overly conflates philosophical distinctions as well. I definitely found Aristotle's philosophy, as found in the Metaphysics, less than convincing. I find Hegel's philosophy also less than convincing in all of it's points. I did, however, like certain aspects and parts of this work. It was worth reading. I will continue reading Hegel through his Philosophy Of Nature and Philosophy of Mind and will then discontinue reading him for a while. ( )