The practice of ethical thought, as we know it, has to be based on the assumptions that human beings, as a species, are capable of harmony, both within themselves and with each other. If we suppose they are not, the whole practice collapses. There is no refutation of skepticism about this assumption. But the practice is worth going in for, there is no practicable alternative for us, so we have to take the assumption on board.

An eminently readable and well-reasoned book, On Virtue Ethics lays out a neo-Aristotelian ethical view that seeks to explain how virtue ethics can guide action, provide moral motivation, and accommodate a role for our moral emotions. She also explains how our characteristically rational nature can provide objective justification for a conception of certain character traits as virtues. While I greatly appreciate her clarity and keen insight, I found myself unconvinced by her naturalistic account of the virtues. It seems to me that our normative reasons are not grounded in our biological characteristics, and Hursthouse's argument to the contrary is less than convincing. However, her project is still admirable and worth serious engagement for anyone interested in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. ( )