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Cargando... Psychobibi: Who is Israel's Prime Minister and Why Does He Want to Fail? (DeltaFourth Operations)por Matt Rees
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In PSYCHOBIBI: Who is Israel’s Prime Minister and Why Does He Want to Fail?, DF analyzes Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyah’s personality, his political career and how he functions.
His father, Benzion, moved to Palestine before the founding of the state of Israel where he was a very active anti-Zionist and opposed the leaders of the county-to-be. He was against the UN proposed State of Israel because he believed Israel should be comprised of all of historic Palestine, including the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights, and Jordan. He did not believe the Arabs were able to compromise. “It doesn’t matter what kind of resistance he meet, what price he pays. His existence is one of perpetual war.” He and his wife, Cela, were very harsh with the boys. Benzion “never lost the certainty that anyone who disagreed with him or his methods was an utter idiot.”
The family spent many years in the United States where their sons were educated..
After Yoni’s heroic and tragic death, Bibi assumed his mantle. While he was in the US, he called himself “Ben-Nitai” – Son of Nitai (his father’s pen name related to the vice president of the Sanhedrin). “Netanyahu” means “God has given.” Unfortunately for him, his father neither supported nor appreciated his efforts (he never had) and Bibi continued to fight for that positive recognition but he was not the son who was to lead Israel. His desire to please his father took priority over his need to be himself. After his father’s death, he has accomplished neither. He idolized his brother, who he thought would have been a great leader. Therefore, he could not be a good one because he might become great and somehow that would lessen his brother’s legacy in both his own and his father’s eyes.
He won his first election because of the bumbling campaign of Prime Minister Shimon Peres. His reputation as a hardliner; pushed by the media, defined him whether it was deserved or not. He made more concessions (handing over Hebron per the Oslo Accords, the Wye River Memorandum which gave more than thirteen percent of the West Bank to full or partial Palestinian control) than did Ehud Barak who gave nothing and was called a peacemaker. Many journalists, especially from outside Israel, quickly grew to despise him. Max Hastings of the British Evening Standard, who was to be his biographer, left and sent Christopher Hitchens to do a “hatchet job” showing that Bibi was a threat to world peace. Hitchens later said, “at the time he could not remember aver being given such a tendentious, one-sided commission.”
One of the main reasons Bibi was so mistrusted was because he tended to tell the person or group with whom he was speaking whatever he thought they wanted to hear. He believed that flexibility was necessary to maintain power. (I wish DF had gone into more detail about the psychological reasons he did this.) He understood that the media often looked for the sound bite or headline, not for the whole story and he gave it to them.
DF writes that at their first meeting, Bibi exhibited classic avoidance behavior. He set up barriers (a desk, an ashtray), between him and the reporter and refused to make eye contact.
Following a successful military service, Bibi held various jobs. In 1984, Moshe Arens named him UN ambassador, which introduced him to a lifestyle he came to relish as well as world recognition.
When he ran for the Israeli Prime Minister office, he selected an American public opinion expert, who understood neither Hebrew nor Israeli politics but provided poll results which Bibi used to determine his campaign positions. He kept that influence a secret. Using US techniques, he raised money indirectly (directly was against Israeli law) and, more important, contacts which deterred potential rivals.
He ignored the extreme rhetoric in his campaign against Yitzchok Rabin, which may have contributed to Rabin’s assassination.
According to DF, Bibi based his world approach on an American, realist model and opposed the theoretical nature of European thought and the way the Israeli-left didn’t adapt to the Middle East realities. Israeli leaders, like Europeans, consider “Americans parochial and naive...”
He explained that “Intellectual circles in Israel are European. I come from intellectual circles that are very clearly American.” Neither Israeli nor European intellectuals think America has an intellectual tradition. They consider American thought to be superficial and really nothing more than a justification for tacky salesmanship, ruthless business practices, and lack of concern for society in general.” (Sounds like the Tea Party.)
He negotiated in the style of his father, Ariel Sharon, and Yasser Arafat. From Arafat, Bibi learned to avoid discussing substantive issues which would require some concessions by bringing up old points. He opposed Ariel Sharon’s plan to close the Palestinian territories so that ordinary workers would lose their income and would put pressure on the Hamas bomb makers. Bibi thought the leaders didn’t care about the ordinary Palestinians and suggested removing their privileges, such as the VIP cards. They “cared about the peace process only in so far as they were its direct beneficiaries.”
He was frustrated with the way the media portrayed him and Israel. For example, he knew the complaints about poverty in Gaza, which raises a lot of sympathy in Europe, are inaccurate. If Hamas could shoot 10,000 rockets from Gaza into Israel in 2012, they could bring in food and supplies, if they wanted to do so.
PSYCHOBIBI tells a lot about Ariel Sharon, including the results of a very recent brain wave test and his massive weight gain, particularly after the death of his wife in 2000. It relates that while Bibi didn’t want him back in his cabinet, he found some minor duties to secure the backing of some of Sharon’s supporters. Unexpectedly, he was “the most predatory and highly focused mind in the Israeli Knesset...making his Infrastructure Ministry a focal point for building settlements on occupied land (Sharon was the first Israeli official to use the term “occupied) and grabbing...West Bank hilltops.” His move to power was stopped only by his crippling stroke in 2006.
When Bibi was out of office after 1999, he became a very wealthy consultant. When he returned, “it was his chance to do something that set him against the semi-socialist Zionist establishment–and against the work of his father’s generation.” He wasn’t “as absolutist as his father–either because politics is the art of what is possible or because of the presence of Psychobibi who wants subconsciously to disappoint his father.” He made many concessions, for which he received little or no credit from the rest of the world. In his second term, he aimed for compromise with the Palestinians: “If they give, they’ll get.” He didn’t believe in unilateral withdrawal, causing Sharon to respond that actions had to be unilateral since there was no partner. Bibi said “If you give unilaterally, take unilaterally.” “If they win some unilaterally, they lose some unilaterally.” This was his reasoning behind announcing the expansion of some settlements (long in the planning process) after the Palestinians got support from the UN for recognition and voting rights. To many, his timing was guaranteed to damage him and Israel.
As he tried to build coalitions after his election successes; he “tried to persuade everyone that they could be part of his government without sacrificing principles” even though they might be diametrically opposed to other factions. While he spoke about recognizing the rights of all Jews (non-Orthodox Jews play a very important role in Israeli support), he didn’t follow through and the ultra-Orthodox establishment, which opposed that, received even more money.
His personal life–multiple marriages and extra-marital affairs, a wife who raises a lot of bad publicity because of the way she treats people–is detailed.
During the 2013 election cycle, he denounced Naftali Bennett, his closest rival and former aide, in televised interviews just before Shabbat, knowing that Bennett would not be able to respond for more than 24 hours. (The stunt backfired and drew attention and sympathy to Bennett.)
DF quotes French President Nicolas Sarkozy telling Barack Obama he “‘cannot bear Netanyahu. He’s a liar.’ Obama responded: ‘You’re fed up with him, but I have to deal with him every day.’” DF observes that both of these men deal with lying by politicians in their own countries regularly and Bibi is probably no worse than they are. PSYCHOBIBI explains “The nature of elections is that the public chooses to be deluded by politicians. Why shouldn’t the politicians deceive themselves too? A politician must have the kind of ego that refuses to allow himself to see himself for who he is.”
DF points out “the Hebrew word for ‘to visit’ –‘levaker’ is the same as the word for ‘to criticize.’” Each Sunday, Bibi visits with his cabinet, and they don’t hold back in criticizing.
When he first became prime minister, he let his deceased, heroic brother Yoni continue to be his superior rather than to defy his father. When DF asked him about his in 2003, Bibi said, “In public life you shouldn’t press Rewind....or Fast Forward. You can press Eject, or you can press Play.” DJ states” without Rewind you can’t analyze anything. Bibi was offering the definition of repression.”
Bibi picked Avigdor Lieberman as a surrogate for Yoni. Lieberman was part of a violent anti-Arab group of Likud students while at the Hebrew University. “By swapping him for Yoni, he replaced the poetic legend that was his real brother with a manipulative, corrupting bully-boy surrogate with a reputation for physical violence and illicit, possibly criminal activity.”
His self-destructive behavior continues: He openly supported the losing candidate in the US presidential race and his future rival for the prime ministership is a former talkshow host smoothy. He spent more than two months forming a coalition, losing support and respect every day.
Delta Force predicts the pattern of self-destruction will continue. DF notes his vulnerability and insecurity, observing “Whatever Bibi does, he will never succeed in satisfying his father. And now that his father is dead, he still can’t satisfy himself.” ( )