Who won the Battle of Jutland in 1916? Did Admiral Jellicoe and the British Grand Fleet win because they chased the Germans back to port, or did the German High Seas Fleet under the command of Admiral Scheer win because they inflicted more causalities on their enemy? As a corollary, as Keith Yates points out in his book, Flawed Victory: Jutland, 1916, the Germans were smart enough to get their version out to the world first, thus scoring a huge propaganda victory and setting the subsequent tone of historical debate. The British Admiralty, on the contrary, totally botched their immediate post-battle public relations, taking three press releases to finally announce that they have won a decisive victory over the Germans. In a work that is generally favorable to Admiral Jellicoe, Yates argues that Jutland was a major British victory, and, in fact, one of the most important naval battles in history. It removed an important weapon from the German hands, secured the blockade, and caused the Germans to embark on a new naval policy, one that brought the United States into the war on the side of the Allies. My big take away from this book is that the German policy of naval expansion in the last two decades of the nineteenth- and first two decades of the twentieth- century was a really bad national policy choice. They could never catch up to the British, despite the fact that Germany did build a first rate fighting navy. It needlessly provoked the British and diverted resources and manpower into a weapon they could only use minimally when it was most needed. There were several minor sorties following Jutland, but most of the best officers and men joined the U-boat service. The rest grew increasingly sullen and restless as they whiled away their time at port. My other take aways from Flawed Victory are: • The British navy was obsessed with Admiral Horatio Nelson’s decisive victory over the French and Spanish at Trafalgar in 1805. Every officer and every engagement was measured by that impossible yardstick. There was an enormous letdown in the British Navy, government, and people after Jutland because the German fleet had not been totally annihilated. This led to a long and very acrimonious public relations battle as each admiral, officer, and politician weighed in with each really trying to sound more Nelsonian than the other. • The British did not manage their information very effectively. Admiral Beatty’s (British Cruiser commander) signalman made several significant mistakes over several engagements. Several of the signal ships did not pass messages along the line. Some messages were misinterpreted (sometimes due to smoke and sometimes due to lack of clarity). Finally, room 40, which was Naval intelligence unit that intercepted all the German naval communications, did not pass important information to Admiral Jellicoe during the battle. Room 40 intercepted signals indicating Admiral Scheer’s retreat route following Jutland, but did not relay that to Jellicoe. • The British had bigger guns and boats, but the Germans had the better training in gunnery, night fighting, and superior range finding equipment. • Jutland was a fitting parallel to the Somme, because they both ended with a stalemate.

From my blog: http://gregshistoryblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/recent-reads-yates-flawed-victory.h... ( )

This finely detailed account of the famous World War I naval battle is bracketed by a succinct series of introductory chapters that provide background, and an epilogue that cuts through the competing agendas to show how the inconclusive outcome was spun, twisted, and obscured by the key players and their cronies as the official Admiralty history was subverted by out-sized egos. ( )

Used - good condition