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Cargando... Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdampor Gar ALPEROVITZ
   Ninguno Actualmente no hay Conversaciones sobre este libro.  mdobe | Jan 13, 2018 |  sin reseñas | añadir una reseña
This book provides important new evidence to support the thesis that the primary reason for bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not to end the war in Japan, as was said at the time, but to 'make the Russians more manageable'.Drawing on recently released diaries and records of Truman, Eisenhower and others, Alperovitz re-evaluates the assumptions, hesitations and decisions that precipitated the use of atomic weapons and traces how possession of the bomb changed American strategy toward the Soviet Union at the Potsdam Conference and helped to set it on a course that contributed to the swift beginning of the Cold War.Most historians of the period now agree that diplomatic considerations related to the Soviet Union played a major role in the decision to use the bomb. Atomic Diplomacy pioneered this new understanding. Today we still live in Hiroshima's shadow; this path breaking work is timely and urgent reading for anyone interested in the history - and future - of peace and war. No se han encontrado descripciones de biblioteca. |
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 Google Books — Cargando...GénerosSistema Decimal Melvil (DDC)327.73047Social sciences Political Science International Relations North America United States U.S.-European Relations U.S.-Russian RelationsClasificación de la Biblioteca del CongresoValoraciónPromedio: (3.42)
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The bulk of Alperovitz's book is concerned with debates over the strategy of achieving a post-war order of peace and stability for Europe. The key to understanding the American approach to the Soviets in the final months of WWI is, according to the author, the progress on the atomic bomb. Henry Stimpson, Truman's Secretary of War, argued that in addition to the Soviet need for American money to rebuild after the war the Soviets were vulnerable to atomic intimidation. Truman accepted his argument that a confrontation with Stalin over the post-war order in Europe would best occur once the successful atomic test had occurred. As a result, Truman delayed the Potsdam conference until pressure from Churchill made further delay impossible. When Truman learned at the Potsdam Conference of the successful atomic test at Alamogordo, he took a very hard line with Stalin. As a result Potsdam saw no compromise reached over the Baltics or the post-war reparations issue.
Perhaps more contentiously revisionist is Alperovitz's argument that considerations in the Pacific war were consistently subordinated to the requirements for an American-style order in post-war Europe. Alperovitz consistently presents the argument that Truman dropped the atomic bombs on Japan to prevent Russian involvement in the Pacific. Taken to its most extreme, the tendency is to question whether Truman didn't actually drop the atomic bombs on Japan to intimidate the Soviets. Largely due to this tendency to extreme and speculative conclusions, Alperovitz's work was not warmly received by the academic community and few scholars accepted his conclusions in later years, even among the revisionists of the New Left. It would be interesting to study the popular reaction to the book, since this may reveal a different response. (