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If you were to talk to those who experienced the Iraq War from the inside, the word you might hear most often is "surreal."Don Eberly, a senior official at USAID during the lead-up to the war, was recruited to serve on a post-war civil administration team, and his two years of service spanned all phases of the operation.He was, in fact, the first American civilian to make his way into Baghdad city hall after the occupation. From that up-close perspective Eberly describes what happened in an Iraq completely battered and broken--politically, physically, and psychologically.His ground-level account reveals how the flawed approach adopted by senior officials at the Pentagon--captured in the mantra "brief stay, light touch"--resulted in severe troop shortages and an inadequate plan for post-war stabilization.An insider's account of what really goes on in a war zone, Liberate and Leave provides a personal tour of the weeks and months before and after the "liberation"--the secret planning process with all its complexities and doubts; attempts to set up a new government amidst lawlessness and looting; painfully vexing policy decisions set against dramatic discoveries of Saddam's torture chambers and obscenely lavish personal palaces.A searing indictment of a military command utterly out of touch with practical reality, this book, written in a clear, accessible style, offers much-needed insight into how the ways of war and the ways of the world inevitably intersect--and diverge--in our day.… (más)
The Coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003 remains in itself one of the most controversial foreign policy decisions of George W Bush’s tenure as President of the United States. Much has been made in the media concerning the military strategy and the reasons behind the invasion and whether these were justified. Don Eberly, the Senior Advisor to the Office for Iraqi Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, for two years experienced at first hand the problems facing the Iraqi people and those whose intention it had been to liberate and provide the fundamental freedoms that had been denied them for over 30 years.
But would it be that straightforward? Had the right questions been asked beforehand?
Some six years on from the invasion of Iraq, we now know the answer to that question and Eberly has no doubt as to where mistakes were made. He is scathingly critical of the US Department of Defence’s apparent lack of understanding of Iraq’s history, people, religion and culture, who advocated a “brief stay, light touch” approach – instructing Eberly and his colleagues that no long term solutions would be required:
“There was an ingrained tendency to simply hope that the necessary processes and systems to do these tasks would somehow emerge from the locals in Iraq and we’d figure it out when we got there.”
Prior to the invasion, Eberly and the other Senior Advisors spent time in Kuwait City planning as best they could under the circumstances – however, sound intelligence was distinctly lacking:
“Whatever information the intelligence services did have, they didn’t share with us.”
Consequently, many of the plans that were made in the relative comfort of Kuwait City were discarded once the reality of the situation hit, and improvisation became paramount. He likens the task to “assembling the vehicle while driving it” – which is clearly far from ideal. Not only does he claim that intelligence was virtually non-existent, but lessons had not been learned from history – especially the British occupation (as this had now indeed turned into an “occupation”) in the 1920’s.
Britain had attempted – and failed – to create a westernised democracy in Iraq in the first half of the twentieth century. Identical conditions were now being faced by those attempting to do precisely the same thing. Eberly asks the question as to how you can expect to install a westernised democracy into a country that has virtually nothing in common with its occupier. And it is this particularly pertinent question he argues, that received no attention whatsoever from any of the agencies involved in the planning for post-war Iraq. How did the planet’s only superpower, with all its advisors and so called “experts” fail to recognise the lessons of the past?
The Iraqis themselves also come in for criticism from Eberly – not to divert the finger of blame, but to provide at least some balance. His frustration pervades throughout the book – frustration at the lack of security, frustration at the lack of available cash, and in this case it is the frustration that some Iraqis were more concerned with personal gain as opposed to the reconstruction of the nation. Even more telling perhaps is his frustration with some of those in the military:
“According to my army friends, many people were obsessed with credit and career. “Everyone is chasing medals,” one of them said, “Colonels will get bronze stars for service. No one cares about Iraq; they care about their little piece of it.”
Eberly cannot be dismissed as being against the war in the first place – he describes himself to be a “just war proponent” and indeed supported the removal of one of history’s most tyrannical regimes. Nor can he be dismissed as a whinger or a whiner – some of his achievements under the circumstances (including getting the Iraqi National Football Team to the Athens Olympics in 2004) are nothing short of remarkable. Unlike many key policy and decision makers, he evidently understands his subject and presents his arguments with great clarity. His thoughts make for fascinating and accessible reading, and whilst he will no doubt come under criticism from those who are not painted in a favourable light, it is important that books like this are written. The massive cost involved, the lives that have been lost, and the future of the Iraqi nation demand it. ( )
If you were to talk to those who experienced the Iraq War from the inside, the word you might hear most often is "surreal."Don Eberly, a senior official at USAID during the lead-up to the war, was recruited to serve on a post-war civil administration team, and his two years of service spanned all phases of the operation.He was, in fact, the first American civilian to make his way into Baghdad city hall after the occupation. From that up-close perspective Eberly describes what happened in an Iraq completely battered and broken--politically, physically, and psychologically.His ground-level account reveals how the flawed approach adopted by senior officials at the Pentagon--captured in the mantra "brief stay, light touch"--resulted in severe troop shortages and an inadequate plan for post-war stabilization.An insider's account of what really goes on in a war zone, Liberate and Leave provides a personal tour of the weeks and months before and after the "liberation"--the secret planning process with all its complexities and doubts; attempts to set up a new government amidst lawlessness and looting; painfully vexing policy decisions set against dramatic discoveries of Saddam's torture chambers and obscenely lavish personal palaces.A searing indictment of a military command utterly out of touch with practical reality, this book, written in a clear, accessible style, offers much-needed insight into how the ways of war and the ways of the world inevitably intersect--and diverge--in our day.
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(3.75)
1
But would it be that straightforward? Had the right questions been asked beforehand?
Some six years on from the invasion of Iraq, we now know the answer to that question and Eberly has no doubt as to where mistakes were made. He is scathingly critical of the US Department of Defence’s apparent lack of understanding of Iraq’s history, people, religion and culture, who advocated a “brief stay, light touch” approach – instructing Eberly and his colleagues that no long term solutions would be required:
“There was an ingrained tendency to simply hope that the necessary processes and systems to do these tasks would somehow emerge from the locals in Iraq and we’d figure it out when we got there.”
Prior to the invasion, Eberly and the other Senior Advisors spent time in Kuwait City planning as best they could under the circumstances – however, sound intelligence was distinctly lacking:
“Whatever information the intelligence services did have, they didn’t share with us.”
Consequently, many of the plans that were made in the relative comfort of Kuwait City were discarded once the reality of the situation hit, and improvisation became paramount. He likens the task to “assembling the vehicle while driving it” – which is clearly far from ideal. Not only does he claim that intelligence was virtually non-existent, but lessons had not been learned from history – especially the British occupation (as this had now indeed turned into an “occupation”) in the 1920’s.
Britain had attempted – and failed – to create a westernised democracy in Iraq in the first half of the twentieth century. Identical conditions were now being faced by those attempting to do precisely the same thing. Eberly asks the question as to how you can expect to install a westernised democracy into a country that has virtually nothing in common with its occupier. And it is this particularly pertinent question he argues, that received no attention whatsoever from any of the agencies involved in the planning for post-war Iraq. How did the planet’s only superpower, with all its advisors and so called “experts” fail to recognise the lessons of the past?
The Iraqis themselves also come in for criticism from Eberly – not to divert the finger of blame, but to provide at least some balance. His frustration pervades throughout the book – frustration at the lack of security, frustration at the lack of available cash, and in this case it is the frustration that some Iraqis were more concerned with personal gain as opposed to the reconstruction of the nation. Even more telling perhaps is his frustration with some of those in the military:
“According to my army friends, many people were obsessed with credit and career. “Everyone is chasing medals,” one of them said, “Colonels will get bronze stars for service. No one cares about Iraq; they care about their little piece of it.”
Eberly cannot be dismissed as being against the war in the first place – he describes himself to be a “just war proponent” and indeed supported the removal of one of history’s most tyrannical regimes. Nor can he be dismissed as a whinger or a whiner – some of his achievements under the circumstances (including getting the Iraqi National Football Team to the Athens Olympics in 2004) are nothing short of remarkable. Unlike many key policy and decision makers, he evidently understands his subject and presents his arguments with great clarity. His thoughts make for fascinating and accessible reading, and whilst he will no doubt come under criticism from those who are not painted in a favourable light, it is important that books like this are written. The massive cost involved, the lives that have been lost, and the future of the Iraqi nation demand it. (