Sadly abit dry, to be expected though since its simply the direct translation of the Soviet High Commands write up of their participation and the break down of support structures during the Soviet Afghan War.

Will stick to authored books on the subject from here on out, high command reports are not my reading style in the slightest. ( )

Ironies abound with this book. There is the irony that the intervention was called a war of "fraternal socialism," when active fraternization was discouraged. There is the irony that the army that did as much as any to invent operational war found its whole range of standard operating procedures largely irrelevant. There is the irony that while the Russians had no shortage of relevant history to draw upon they refused to exploit it. Finally, at a time when there is no shortage of guerrilla fighting in the former Soviet Union, this book wound up being first published in the West due to a lack of money. Not that the Russians are alone in suffering from such ironies, but that's a different review.

As for what you actually get for the investment of time, you'll learn a great deal about the nuts-and-bolts conduct of the war from the Soviet perspective. Also useful is the commentary provided by the editors, particularly when they poke holes in the blind spots the Russians suffer from to this day about the whole adventure. Be warned though, this is a rather dry business. ( )