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Cargando... Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy, 1861-1862 (1998)por Joseph L. Harsh
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"Confederate Tide Rising is one of the most significant evaluations of Civil War strategy to be published in the past fifty years. It contributes critically to our understanding of the war, and it will influence the course of Civil War scholarship for decades to comes. I cannot overemphasize the importance of this book."--Richard J. Sommers, U.S. Army Military History Institute In this reexamination of Confederate war aims, Joseph L. Harsh analyzes the military policy and grand strategy adopted by Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis in the first two years of the Civil War. Recent critics of Lee have depicted him as a general of tactical brilliance, but one who lacked strategic vision. He has been accused of squandering meager military resources in vain pursuit of decisive victories during his first year in field command. Critics of Davis claim he went too far in adopting a "perimeter" policy which attempted to defend every square mile of Southern territory, scattering Confederate resources too thinly. Harsh argues, to the contrary, that Davis and Lee's policies allowed the Confederacy to survive longer than it otherwise could have and were the policies best designed to win Southern independence. No se han encontrado descripciones de biblioteca. |
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 Google Books — Cargando...GénerosSistema Decimal Melvil (DDC)973.73013History and Geography North America United States Administration of Abraham Lincoln, 1861-1865 Civil War Operations StrategyClasificación de la Biblioteca del CongresoValoraciónPromedio: (4.46)
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Harsh has a lot of good things to say about Jefferson Davis and his working relationship with Lee. He disputes the claim that Lee was parochial in strategic outlook (ignoring the Western Theater). His central thesis, contrary to those who accuse Lee of losing too much blood through offensive tactics, is that Lee constantly sought turning movements resulting in "easy fighting and heavy victories". Lee understood that the only way for the South to win was to achieve demoralizing victories that would drain the North's support for the war.
In this context, Jackson and Stuart are seen by Harsh as often disrupting Lee's strategy with overly aggressive moves that drew him into battles prior to the conclusions of his maneuvers. For example, Jackson's lashing out at Reno's troops on the Warrenton Pike, most often portrayed by historians as a masterful move to draw Pope into an assault, was actually regretted by Lee, who wanted instead to draw Pope into the Shenandoah Valley, further from Washington, where a defeat could be more complete. Stuart, in particular comes off as a non-serious soldier, who shot up Pope's retreating wagon train for a laugh without even realizing he thereby foolishly forewarned Pope of the Confederate presence on the flank, then went off to make merry all night at a civilian friend's home.
Poor judgment by Lee is also made clear, for example, sending all of his cavalry with Jackson for the Thoroughfare Gap turning movement, leaving Longstreet with a slower approach in following Jackson. Then when Lee stopped short of the Gap for little reason, it could have been disastrous when a Union Corps blocked the Gap the next day. Just to point out that Harsh is by no means a Lee hagiographer.
This HB edition is 208 pages of text including Appendices, a smooth read even though the discussions are complex. The print is very small, however, if that is an issue for you.
An excellent insight into the calculations and command method of Lee during this time period. (