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Cargando... German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870–1916 (2005)por Robert T. Foley
All Things Germany (125) Cargando...
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Pertenece a las seriesCambridge Military Histories (2005) Premios
Referencias a esta obra en fuentes externas. Wikipedia en inglés (22)Almost 90 years since its conclusion, the battle of Verdun is still little understood. German Strategy and the Path to Verdun is a detailed examination of this seminal battle based on research conducted in archives long thought lost. Material returned to Germany from the former Soviet Union has allowed for a reinterpretation of Erich von Falkenhayn's overall strategy for the war and of the development of German operational and tactical concepts to fit this new strategy of attrition. By taking a long view of the development of German military ideas from the end of the Franco-German War in 1871, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun also gives much-needed context to Falkenhayn's ideas and the course of one of the greatest battles of attrition the world has ever known. No se han encontrado descripciones de biblioteca. |
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These general trends are not exactly news, but what informs this book is access to archival material once thought permanently lost, so one now has a better sense of the process by which policy was generated.
Also, one has a better sense of the situation in which Falkenhayn operated, in which he tried to drag a German officer corps towards new truths, only to be undercut by both his distinct lack of respect for his foreign opposition and his poor skills of persuasion.
If I mark down this book for anything it's that the author really can't connect the pre-war strategic debate to the choices that Falkenhayn made, but that is probably the unfortunate result of Falkenhayn's over-secretive nature; he would be the last man to admit the influence of another on his thinking. ( )