Saw this on a PBS book review. Wow, what a good book for Public Relations, in the most extreme sense of the topic.

Well-written, excellent read. ( )

Excellent coverage of the fundamentals of counterinsurgency, from IPB to conducting operations to applications of force multipliers. ( )

Excellent coverage of the fundamentals of counterinsurgency, from IPB to conducting operations to applications of force multipliers. ( )

Sarah Sewall writes an excellent introduction to this volume based on the ground-braking effort of General Petraeus et.al. who re-wrote the book on counter-insurgency. This manual formed the backbone to the largely successful surge in Iraq and is a complete re-casting of military doctrine. At times the prose reads more like an academic treatise, which is not always a good thing, but it is comprehensive, academically defensible, and is an indication that the military is learned, adaptable, and resilient.

The manual solicited input from a wide variety of sources, including non-military personnel and is an impressive triumph of learning from past mistakes and the application of sound principles based on historical lessons from other, and even non-American military successes. The notes from history are an interesting sidelight that illustrate important counterinsurgency principles.

I had to find out why the military turned Iraq around from 2006-2008 and the manual demonstrates the painful and bloody lessons learned in Iraq.

Obama, the apologist American, seems to have learned little from the volume. The only phrase he lifts from the work, in his statement on Afghanistan, is the destroy and disrupt Al Qaeda point. Other than that, he seems to have ignored the lessons of Iraq.

Update: 12 July 2010
The Obama regime is attempting to strike Islamist or references to Islam from an understanding of terrorism. However, the two, whether we like it or not, are intertwined and Petraeus, et. al. noted the connection in this ground-breaking 2006 Counterinsurgency Manual. The role of Islam in terrorism is rightfully understand as a key component for the counterinsurgency effort. Petraeus notes at numerous times (I-22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 50, 73, 76, 78, and 87) in the Manual how Islam plays a significant role. For example, the Indonesian Dar `ul Islam is an example which can almost "single-handedly drive an insurgency" (I-73; yet, religion is not the sole factor in terrorism as Petraeus points out that many IRA members "were not devout members" (I-78) [of Catholicsm]. Petraeus does not single out Islam or Muslims as the enemy; he is more simply pointing out the reality that religion often plays a critical role in mobilizing and enlivening a populace. There is nothing inaccurate about the historical reality of a common religious inspiration for violence. Petraeus even-handedly and deftly noted a commonly present aspect of religion: violence.