This historical study treats the development of the Army’s first doctrine for the post-Cold War. Raised to new prominence in the modernization and reform of the United States Army of the 1970s-1980s, Army operational doctrine was rendered obsolescent in the early 1990s by the Cold War’s end and by the advanced military-technological capabilities demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War. The new doctrine formulated under General Frederick Franks, Commanding General of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, sprang from the assumptions of a new strategic era. In the process of rethinking war fighting, a new dynamics of battle emerged, and a new operational doctrine was formulated. This study is intended to present a critical documented record of that important event in late-20th century American Army history. Treated are: its historical antecedents, strategic context, study and formulation, finished results, propagation, and the mechanics of the effort. This monograph is additionally intended to provide, in its ideational detail, a case-study of the intellectual and institutional processes involved, for use by future doctrine planners.