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This volume is a study of the evolution of American strategy before and during the first year of American participation in World War II. It is the story of planning by the War Department during that early and significant period in which the foundations of the strategy for the conduct of the war were established. The authors not only present the problems of the Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army and of his principal plans and operations officers, but also emphasize joint and combined problems-the reconciliation of the Army views on strategy with those of the Navy and the integration of American and British views and their adjustment to the military policies of other associated powers, notably the Soviet Union. It may seem to the reader that controversy and differences of opinion are stressed and that agreement and co-operative endeavor are slighted. Since planners are occupied with unsettled problems, their work necessarily involves differences of opinion. It is only when all sides of an issue are forcefully presented and the various solutions thereof closely scrutinized that the final plan has any validity. The reader must bear in mind that the differences related herein are those among comrades in arms who in the end always made the adjustments required of the members of a team engaged in a common enterprise. The execution of strategic decisions-the end result of debates, negotiations, and compromises set forth in the book-is narrated in the combat volumes of this series. Mr. Maurice Matloff and Mr. Edwin M. Snell collaborated in writing this volume. Mr. Snell was formerly an instructor in English at Harvard University and Mr. Matloff an instructor in History at Brooklyn College. Mr. Snell served in the Army and Mr. Matloff in the Army Air Forces during World War II. Both joined the Operations Division historical project of the War Department General Staff in 1946. Mr. Matloff is now the Chief, Strategic Plans Section, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.… (más)
Información procedente del conocimiento común inglés.Edita para encontrar en tu idioma.
... to Those Who Served
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Información procedente del conocimiento común inglés.Edita para encontrar en tu idioma.
During the years between the end of World War I and the beginning of World War II there were always a few officers at work in Washington on the war plans of the Army and Navy. It was the duty of these officers to study situations that could suddenly arise in which the federal government might resort to the use of armed force, and to propose the courses of action that the services should be ready to take. From time to time the War or Navy Department approved one of these studies as a war plan to guide the special plans and preparations of their staffs and operating commands. Several war plans were prepared jointly and approved by both departments for the common use of the Army and Navy.
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Últimas palabras
Información procedente del conocimiento común inglés.Edita para encontrar en tu idioma.
The strategic planners had to face up to the problems of preparing for maximum offensive effort in the global conflict. The effect of the Casablanca Conference was to drive home to the Army planners what had already begun to be apparent to them in the closing weeks of 1942: The new stage of the coalition war demanded new planning processes, techniques, quantitative calculations, and ideas. On the basis of the bare beginnings made in these directions in late 1942, the Army strategic planners would have to start anew in 1943 to plan for victory.
This volume is a study of the evolution of American strategy before and during the first year of American participation in World War II. It is the story of planning by the War Department during that early and significant period in which the foundations of the strategy for the conduct of the war were established. The authors not only present the problems of the Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army and of his principal plans and operations officers, but also emphasize joint and combined problems-the reconciliation of the Army views on strategy with those of the Navy and the integration of American and British views and their adjustment to the military policies of other associated powers, notably the Soviet Union. It may seem to the reader that controversy and differences of opinion are stressed and that agreement and co-operative endeavor are slighted. Since planners are occupied with unsettled problems, their work necessarily involves differences of opinion. It is only when all sides of an issue are forcefully presented and the various solutions thereof closely scrutinized that the final plan has any validity. The reader must bear in mind that the differences related herein are those among comrades in arms who in the end always made the adjustments required of the members of a team engaged in a common enterprise. The execution of strategic decisions-the end result of debates, negotiations, and compromises set forth in the book-is narrated in the combat volumes of this series. Mr. Maurice Matloff and Mr. Edwin M. Snell collaborated in writing this volume. Mr. Snell was formerly an instructor in English at Harvard University and Mr. Matloff an instructor in History at Brooklyn College. Mr. Snell served in the Army and Mr. Matloff in the Army Air Forces during World War II. Both joined the Operations Division historical project of the War Department General Staff in 1946. Mr. Matloff is now the Chief, Strategic Plans Section, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.
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