Of all of the wars fought in Europe between 1815 and 1914, none was more important in terms of its impact than the Franco-Prussian War. The culmination of Otto von Bismarck's strategy for unifying the German states into a single country, it saw the displacement of France as the dominant Continental power and the formation of a new nation that would dominate events in Europe for the next three-quarters of a century.

Such an epochal conflict is well deserving of study, yet for Geoffrey Wawro to write this book is in some respects an act of bravery. For decades Michael Howard's [b:The Franco-Prussian War|25863|The Franco-Prussian War The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871|Michael Eliot Howard|https://images.gr-assets.com/books/1348574883s/25863.jpg|26583] has been the go-to source for readers seeking an English-language history of the conflict, and little has changed since its publication in 1961 to undermine its value. Yet Wawro's book is a worthy addition to the literature on the war, thanks to the directness of his analysis and the clarity of his prose. He provides readers with a superb introduction to the conflict, starting with an analysis of its political background and the strengths and weaknesses of the two armies before detailing the major campaigns of the war. From his analysis emerges a tale of two powers, one rotted yet still possessing formidable strengths, the other dynamic but suffering from its own set of flaws. Wawro makes it clear that while the Prussians enjoyed several advantages the outcome was far from ordained, with the flaws of French leadership being a decisive factor in its defeat.

Wawro's book illuminates the depth of France's humiliation in their defeat. In doing so, he helps to underscore the long-term significance of the war, as France would emerge from it determined to undo its loss. Though this may not have made the conflict that took place four decades later inevitable, the seeds for it were clearly sown in 1870-1. To understand why is just one reason why this book is necessary reading for every student of modern European history, as well as anyone seeking an accessible overview of this pivotal clash of powers. ( )

This is a non-fic about one of the ‘forgotten wars’ of the 19th century, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. While it is mainly a military history, there are a lot of vignettes and more general history.

The pre-history: on one side Prussia with Bismarck, growing world power, winner of 1866 war with Austria. On the other – France, which holds to its Napoleonic past (from, the structure of army to his nephew as the current emperor) and assumes that it is able to press others to do what France wants. Bismarck fires up French by a series of provocations (which France is eager to follow) to declare the war on Prussia (thus losing potential favorable international opinion).

France’s army was smaller and older, with professional solders, mostly uneducated. It has two wunderwaffen – Chassepot rifle, which shot further and more precise then Prussian needle rifle; and Mitrailleuse – early modern machine gun, which doesn’t swivel, so its volleys were more spectacular than effective sweeping fire. Prussian had their wunderwaffen as well Krupp’s steel tube guns with a great range. Their army was larger, conscripted and more educated, which is a great boon in the industrial era.

The armies also had quite almost opposite approaches to the war: Germans attacked again and again, each attempt quickly gaining support of the neighboring units, fallen officers quickly replaced but educated NCOs; French based everything on their old glory, long-range rifle and static defense, the latter pulverized by Krupp’s guns. Another problem is a constant bickering among French high command, were everyone wanted honors but not the responsibility, so they march their troops to exhaustion only to leave them under enemy fire.

To a large extent this war, more than any other led to the WWI as we know it – French elan tactics, fight for Alsace and Lorraine, raise of Germany with resulting fear of it, assumption that a future war should be short, so its ok to throw millions of solders into this meatgrinder, and so on.

A great history book for everyone interested in the period.
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Read it twice! ( )

Read it twice! ( )

This is a well written military history of the most significant war in late 19th century Europe. The war led to the unification of Germany in a ceremony in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. The balance of power established in 1815 was irrevocably changed by Prussia's creation of a German Empire.
In 1870 the Prussians were enjoying the fruits of their victory over Austria in 1866. Napoleon III had been in power since 1848 and he no longer inspired enthusiasm in the hearts of the French people. Count Otto von Bismarck was at the height of his powers. A meeting between the Kaiser and the French ambassador was described in a document known as the Ems Dispatch. Bismarck's editing of the document and a poor translation made the content very offensive offensive to the French. Napoleon III over reacted and ordered mobilization. Napoleon's actions helped to isolate France and deprive her of allies in the war.
After setting forth the causes of the war the author does an informative sketch of the two armies at the beginning of the war. The French army was an all volunteer army professional army of 400,000 men. The Prussians had an army of almost one million men based upon conscription and the use of reserves on the front line. The French rifle was superior in all respects but this was balanced out by the superiority of the Prussian artillery. The Prussian artillery was breech loading while the French was muzzle loading. When the fighting started the Prussian artillery ruled the battlefield foreshadowing the tactics of World War I.
The critical difference between the two armies was their leadership. The Prussian General Staff had great planning capabilities and had developed superior tactics. The French relied on the Napoleonic system of Marshals, great generals who controlled whole armies. In 1870 their generals fought defensively and were enveloped by the Prussians.
The author's use of primary sources provides insight into two major factors that led to France's complete defeat. The rank and file of the French Army had no desire to fight. The French soldier had little confidence in their generals and was not motivated to make sacrifices for victory. The Prussians and soldiers from other German states were young and confident. They had been trained to follow orders and to think on the battlefield.
The morale of the French generals was no better than the rank and file. They were defeatist and steeped in defensive tactics. The Prussians were supremely confident after their victory over Austria in 1866.
The great battle of Sedan where the French army was defeated and Napoleon III captured effectively ended the war. The great victories of the Prussian armies fueled German militarism which contributed to World War I. These victories were as much the product of the incompetence of French leadership as the efficiency of the Prussian armies.
I was interested to learn that Phil Sheridan was an observer of the war for the United States. The author's quotes from Sheridan and the British observer provide some interesting insights into the conduct of the war.
The author picked out a very interesting quotation from a German officer's diary, " every battle is a skein of personal crises only loosely joined by a plan of operations." He is reminding the reader that there is a temptation in looking back on something as helter skelter as a military battle in 1870 to see patterns and order that was not there in the event.
I had started this book about five years ago and couldn't get through it. It seems that all of my reading about the American Civil War has changed my attitudes about military history. It is a good book but not excellent and I would limit my recommendation of the book to those interested in military history. ( )