VERY instructive book. Learned a lot about the undercurrents of this US vs China story. As well as other historic facts i was not aware of ( )

The main strength of this book is that it reminded the world of Thucydides Trap and made many commentators pause to think how a rising power and a possible declining one could interact. While past examples are explained to show how war can come to pass in such an environment and also how they can be avoided, I think this was an essay topic expanded into a book. The points may have been better made if they were more brief. ( )

My reaction to many popular nonfiction books is to wish that the author had made them longer and more detailed. This one, in contrast, I think was too long; it would have been perfect as a longform article in a highbrow magazine — as, in fact, it did originate. The parts of the book based on geopolitics and strategic decision-making — Allison's area of expertise — were fascinating, as was his general concept of the "Thucydides Trap," where a rising power and an established hegemon are pushed toward war by the very facts of their situation. As a history buff, though, I found his treatment of history to be quite shallow; even worse was the business-school-style cultural reductionism he engaged with vis-a-vis China. This is a book that is far more likely to quote Henry Kissinger or Lee Kuan Yew than deep historical or ethnographic analyses, which is fine as long as it stays in their lanes.

Behind the headline argument — that the U.S. and China are in a Thucydides Trap and need to learn from history to escape being pushed into a devastating war — the book doubles as a thorough argument for the so-called "realist" school of international relations, and against more explicitly ideologically driven schools (such as championed by Walter Russell Mead in his book [b:Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World|87505|Special Providence American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World|Walter Russell Mead|https://images.gr-assets.com/books/1348337366s/87505.jpg|84470], including schools he branded "Wilsonian" — championing democracy promotion abroad — or "Hamiltonian" — making the world safe for American commerce). Allison doesn't really engage deeply with alternative schools of thought on this matter, but consistently and occasionally explicitly relies on realism and the idea that nations should conduct foreign policy only in terms of their national interests. ( )

Graham Allison’s book, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap?, discusses China's rise into the US political mainstream. After explaining the Thucydides Trap – the friction created when a rising power challenges an established power, the author presents twelve historical examples that resulted in war, and four in which war was avoided. Allison proceeds to focus on the examples he considers to be the most instructive, namely the Peloponnesian War, World War I, and the Cold War.

Allison also relays insights from the late Lee Kuan Yew in making his case that Beijing's goal is the restoration of China as a regional hegemon. He argues against the idea that China will become a 'responsible stakeholder' in the international system in which the US remains the arbiter. China seeks the expulsion of the US from Asia, and is rapidly accumulating capabilities to achieve this goal.

He translates an unfiltered Chinese view for his local audience, analogising it to America's expansion in the Western Hemisphere under President Teddy Roosevelt. Going by Allison's ledger, the factors favouring war between the US and China are ominous: two powers with narratives of their own 'exceptionalism', China's sense of past humiliation and present restoration, incompatible cultures and political systems, and a series of entangling flashpoints and alliances. On the positive side, Allison argues, is an interdependent trade relationship and stable nuclear deterrence. Allison also labels North Korea as a 'Cuban missile crisis in slow motion'.

Ironically, the weakness of Allison's book is not his warning that the US and China are at risk of falling into the Thucydides Trap – a case he makes conclusively – but rather his explanations for why war remains avoidable. First, Allison makes the common error that nuclear dynamics between the US and China work the same way as it did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Nuclear deterrence rests not just on capability (ensuring a retaliatory strike), but also credibility. During the Cold War, the fall of Western Europe to the Soviet Union posed such an existential threat to the US that a nuclear war could credibly be initiated to prevent it. In Asia, however, the US will not commence a full nuclear exchange with China and there is no way to convince Beijing otherwise. As such, current nuclear dynamics in Asia makes major war more likely, as mapped out in my review of the RAND study of a US-China war, a study also cited by Allison.

Finally, while carefully articulating China’s perception of the rivalry, it is surprising just how US-centric Allison’s ideas are for how conflict might be avoided. Allison suggests curtailing America’s commitment to Taiwan in exchange for concessions in the South and East China seas, or abandoning Prompt Global Strike in exchange for Beijing limiting its conventional expansion. However it seems unlikely China will agree to any of this. Why should it? Time is on Beijing's side. These kinds of deals only worked during the Cold War because each side recognised the other’s core interests while the balance of power between the US and the Soviet Union remained relatively stable. In the case of China and the US, the power shift is rapid and profound, and while Allison clearly understands this he fails to see the implications of his own conclusions. Rather than horse-trading over Taiwan and the South China Sea, Beijing might suggest the US leave Asia entirely in exchange for permanent recognition of Washington’s annexation of Hawaii!

Despite these shortcomings, this reader found Allison’s book good reading both for the overview that it provides. In Destined for War, Allison calls Obama’s Asia pivot 'using an extra strength aspirin to treat cancer'. This author suggests stronger methods. ( )

An excellent overview of what happens when one state declines and another rises. It's books like these that made me wish I would have stuck with Political Science in college. ( )