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Cargando... Soviet Operational Deception: The Red Cloakpor Richard N. Armstrong
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Inscríbete en LibraryThing para averiguar si este libro te gustará. Actualmente no hay Conversaciones sobre este libro. Shows through several examples how the Soviets developed deception techniques on a large scale during WWII. This book turned out to be pretty good reading in light of what the Russians recently did in Georgia (2008). They appear to have completely deceived the Georgians as to their strength and capabilities otherwise the Georgians would never have tried to take their province back. sin reseñas | añadir una reseña
The U.S. Army believes that deception is a vital part of military operations. Field Manual 100-5, Operations, acknowledges that the Soviet Army mastered operational deception in World War II. While its success is widely recognized, there are few published Western assessments of Soviet operational deception. Soviet Operational Deception: The Red Cloak, by Lieutenant Colonel Richard N. Armstrong. examines the role of operational deception in the Red Army's World War II victories. This Combat Studies Institute special study focuses on operational level deception planning, allocation of resources, and deception measures used during battle in the Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944. Lieutenant Colonel Armstrong's insightful study demonstrates the clear connection between the wise use of deception and Soviet battlefield success. Richard M. Swain Colonel, Field Artillery Director, Combat Studies Institute No se han encontrado descripciones de biblioteca. |
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The U.S. Army believes that deception is a vital part of military operations. Field Manual 100-5, Operations, acknowledges that the Soviet Army mastered operational deception in World War II. While its success is widely recognized, there are few published Western assessments of Soviet operational deception. Soviet Operational Deception: The Red Cloak, by Lieutenant Colonel Richard N. Armstrong. examines the role of operational deception in the Red Army's World War II victories. This Combat Studies Institute special study focuses on operational level deception planning, allocation of resources, and deception measures used during battle in the Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944. Lieutenant Colonel Armstrong's insightful study demonstrates the clear connection between the wise use of deception and Soviet battlefield success. Richard M. Swain Colonel, Field Artillery Director, Combat Studies Institute