This is a comprehensive book, which as its title indicates, covers the armoured elements of the Allied campaign in Normandy for the three months of June, July and August 1944. There are fourteen chapters, detailing the main elements of the campaign in a chronological order. The last chapter is a summary of the armoured campaign.

The book is exceptionally well researched, drawing on primary sources from the U.K., U.S.A., and Canada, and a wide variety of secondary sources. It is detailed in its description of events, and contains analysis of the tanks used by the Allies and the German forces in this theatre. The author also analyses the role and performance of the senior Allied and German commanders, and the differing command structures each operated. There are several maps incorporated into the text, and a group of eighteen pages of photographs in the centre of the book.

The conclusions of this book fit firmly into the revisionist’s camp in terms of the view of the weakness of Allied tanks, the superiority of Axis tanks, the poor performance of key Allied commanders, and the German chain of command that included HITLER. There is analysis of the losses in terms of types of tanks, and the reasons for these losses. In terms of a military strategic and operational level review of this element of the campaign, this book is very good indeed. By its nature, it focuses on the armoured element, but of course, this did not occur in isolation. To have a full understanding of the factors that came together in the summer of 1944 in Normandy, it is necessary to have knowledge of the design and production of armoured vehicles in Germany, the U.K. and U.S.A., and the differing ideas about the deployment of tanks in warfare. By this date, the blitzkrieg of 1939 to 1941 was history. The sheer size of the manufacturing capacity in the U.S.A. was now a major factor, hence the prevalence of the Sherman in Allied units. The Germans may have had ‘better’ tanks in terms of one on one combat, but they were prone to breakdown, and the shortage of fuel was a significant problem. The role of the infantry and air power has to be taken into account as well.

The book deserves praise, and is an important addition to the already extensive library on the Second World War. It delivers on its stated aim, and whether the reader agrees with the conclusions or not, it is well worth reading to obtain an objective view of this campaign. ( )

This is a very substantial book, packed with lots of action reports and maps, and with some analysis at the front and back of the book. The analysis includes painfully detailed attempts to accurately count losses in the different armoured units throughout the campaign. There is a significant effort to resolve some of the many controversies with factual corrections.
This book isn't the final word on understanding the armoured campaign in Normandy, but it may be a very valuable source for the writer who eventually achieves that.