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Other People's Houses: How Decades of Bailouts, Captive Regulators, and Toxic Bankers Made Home Mortgages a Thrilling Business (2014)

por Jennifer Taub

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The clearest explanation yet of how the financial crisis of 2008 developed and why it could happen again In the wake of the financial meltdown in 2008, many claimed that it had been inevitable, that no one saw it coming, and that subprime borrowers were to blame. This accessible, thoroughly researched book is Jennifer Taub's response to such unfounded claims. Drawing on wide-ranging experience as a corporate lawyer, investment firm counsel, and scholar of business law and financial market regulation, Taub chronicles how government officials helped bankers inflate the toxic-mortgage-backed housing bubble, then after the bubble burst ignored the plight of millions of homeowners suddenly facing foreclosure.   Focusing new light on the similarities between the savings and loan debacle of the 1980s and the financial crisis in 2008, Taub reveals that in both cases the same reckless banks, operating under different names, received government bailouts, while the same lax regulators overlooked fraud and abuse. Furthermore, in 2013 the situation is essentially unchanged. The author asserts that the 2008 crisis was not just similar to the S&L scandal, it was a severe relapse of the same underlying disease. And despite modest regulatory reforms, the disease remains uncured: top banks remain too big to manage, too big to regulate, and too big to fail.… (más)
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Another history of the financial crisis, emphasizing the continuity of 2008 with the S&L crisis of the 1980s, which was never truly fixed: it was sweetheart bailouts and captured regulators all along, with even the details often repeating—as well as the people and institutions. Taub starts with one particular mortgage whose foreclosure eventually made it all the way to the Supreme Court, which held that banks couldn’t be forced to write down a first residential mortgage to its actual value. This prevented bankruptcy from being a way that people could save their homes when an economic shock hit; first residences receive special treatment compared to most other debts that can be reduced through bankruptcy. Like similar rules about student loan debt, this is all about helping wealthy banks and their bonus-slurping employees regardless of the consequences for ordinary Americans. As it turns out, this particular mortgage—like many mortgages—traveled through several fraud-ridden banks whose stories Taub tells along the way. She chronicles how every single entity involved received a bailout, sometimes more than once—everybody but the (former) homeowners. ( )
  rivkat | Jun 18, 2014 |
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The clearest explanation yet of how the financial crisis of 2008 developed and why it could happen again In the wake of the financial meltdown in 2008, many claimed that it had been inevitable, that no one saw it coming, and that subprime borrowers were to blame. This accessible, thoroughly researched book is Jennifer Taub's response to such unfounded claims. Drawing on wide-ranging experience as a corporate lawyer, investment firm counsel, and scholar of business law and financial market regulation, Taub chronicles how government officials helped bankers inflate the toxic-mortgage-backed housing bubble, then after the bubble burst ignored the plight of millions of homeowners suddenly facing foreclosure.   Focusing new light on the similarities between the savings and loan debacle of the 1980s and the financial crisis in 2008, Taub reveals that in both cases the same reckless banks, operating under different names, received government bailouts, while the same lax regulators overlooked fraud and abuse. Furthermore, in 2013 the situation is essentially unchanged. The author asserts that the 2008 crisis was not just similar to the S&L scandal, it was a severe relapse of the same underlying disease. And despite modest regulatory reforms, the disease remains uncured: top banks remain too big to manage, too big to regulate, and too big to fail.

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