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Purchase of this book includes free trial access to www.million-books.com where you can read more than a million books for free. This is an OCR edition with typos. Excerpt from book: Chap. VI.?Of Arguments against Genus, etc., as applicable to the Subversion of Definition. 1. whatever is Nevertheless we must not forget that every against genus, thing which is referred to property, genus, and acciStiis4 accident will also he adapted to definitions, for subversive of by showing that a thing is not present with that afSersai1 alone which is untler definition, as in the case of method is not property, or that what is given in the definition is forthisreason . J ti, it,1, A i to be looked for. not genus, or that some one of those things stated JVhi?1Y in the definition is not present, which may also subverted if ., V, shown not pre- he said in accident, f we shall have subverted the th1i1ngaione definition; so that, on account of the reason given t So as to ub- before, all those things which have been enumerated will after a certain manner be definitive. Nevertheless we must not on this account look for one method universal in all things, as neither is it easy to discover this, and if it were discovered it would be altogether obscure and useless to the proposed treatise. But a pecu- l Of defin., liar method being delivered as to each of the de- prop., genus, fined genera t singly, the discussion of the pro and accident. ... T r i i i- i position vill be easy from those things which are 2. Necessity of appropriate to each. Wherefore, as we have be- division. fore said, we must make a rough division, but of the rest we must join those which are especially dismissed by appropriate to each, ]j denominating them botli the same me- definitive and generic. What, however, have tion, ietc.c 1' been set forth have almost been adapted to each1 Chap. VII.?In how many ways Same (to ravrov) is predicated.' i. onethinsis We mu...… (más)
Purchase of this book includes free trial access to www.million-books.com where you can read more than a million books for free. This is an OCR edition with typos. Excerpt from book: Chap. VI.?Of Arguments against Genus, etc., as applicable to the Subversion of Definition. 1. whatever is Nevertheless we must not forget that every against genus, thing which is referred to property, genus, and acciStiis4 accident will also he adapted to definitions, for subversive of by showing that a thing is not present with that afSersai1 alone which is untler definition, as in the case of method is not property, or that what is given in the definition is forthisreason . J ti, it,1, A i to be looked for. not genus, or that some one of those things stated JVhi?1Y in the definition is not present, which may also subverted if ., V, shown not pre- he said in accident, f we shall have subverted the th1i1ngaione definition; so that, on account of the reason given t So as to ub- before, all those things which have been enumerated will after a certain manner be definitive. Nevertheless we must not on this account look for one method universal in all things, as neither is it easy to discover this, and if it were discovered it would be altogether obscure and useless to the proposed treatise. But a pecu- l Of defin., liar method being delivered as to each of the de- prop., genus, fined genera t singly, the discussion of the pro and accident. ... T r i i i- i position vill be easy from those things which are 2. Necessity of appropriate to each. Wherefore, as we have be- division. fore said, we must make a rough division, but of the rest we must join those which are especially dismissed by appropriate to each, ]j denominating them botli the same me- definitive and generic. What, however, have tion, ietc.c 1' been set forth have almost been adapted to each1 Chap. VII.?In how many ways Same (to ravrov) is predicated.' i. onethinsis We mu...