The Seven Days campaign is Robert E. Lee's most audacious gamble. At the gates of Richmond in June 1862, in a desperate measure of a Napoleonic manoeuvre sur les derrières, Lee caught the "little Napoleon" off-guard, cut his supply lines and drove McClellan to the James River in a number of costly frontal attacks. McClellan, like Napoleon's old enemy, the Austrians, was more concerned with securing his supply line than defeating the opposing army. Paralyzed by visions of non-existent Confederate numerical superiority, McClellan never counterattacked despite excellent opportunities.

The Seven Days campaign is interesting for the strains this Blitzkrieg put on the generals. Many broke down - on both sides. Jackson, already exhausted from the Valley campaign, was mentally knocked out. His passiveness allowed the Federals to escape encirclement. Inexperienced and undersized staffs, as well as the necessity to ride along meant major sleep deprivation. The seven days gave general exhaustion a new meaning. Having most of his casualties concentrated in one corps (V), McClellan could have counterattacked with the others until reinforcements arrived. Instead, he focused on resupplying and rebuilding his cherished army, as well as writing to Washington. A study of the Seven Days is thus not only a battle study but an analysis of one man and his fears.

It is surprising that the Seven Days campaign receives such scant attention. In fact, this book is the only major study I know of since the publication of Clifford Dowdey's summary work The Seven Days in 1963. Brian Burton seems to have done the necessary research. The book will, however, not become a classic as it suffers from two major flaws: bad writing and insufficient insight.

The first flaw is the author's shockingly bad writing. A sample (p.48): "(CS Capt.) Frank Huger got his two guns within eight hundred yards of (US Lt.) Henderson's section before opening up. The Union guns ran out of ammunition and got more before the rebels opened fire, but soon after the gun battle started it ended with Henderson pulling out. Captain Huger kept banging away for a while, hurting the 2nd Rhode Island quite a bit but other regiments very little. The Confederates finally stopped about sundown." Although the writer notes "the freelance copy editor made valuable substantive suggestions", these were either not followed or covered only part of the book. The published book reads like a first draft (despite its sixteen year gestation). A little more effort could have done wonders.

The second flaw is a weakness in understanding military problems and capturing the essence of a situation. I guess the author has never served in the military. The writer is unable to present the actions in discrete narrative chunks which results in such no-nos as shifting time back and forth and losing the big picture. The Seven Days battles are fairly simple: They involve limited number of units, division-sized engagements and conventional tactics, mostly uncoordinated regimental and brigade charges against defensive positions. In an effort to ape the human involvement school of history writing, the writer throws in vignettes breaking the narrative flow further. A better writer positions these stories either at the beginning or the end of a narrative chunk.

The book is not without its merits. A dedicated reader can distill much about the battles. The height maps are also excellent. Most maps do not give a good representation of the timing of the actions (use shading). Indicating brigade leaders of regiments and using more conventional arrows would also have been helpful. A good map (see the West Point Military atlas) should tell its story without a text.

The book remains the most extensive tactical treatment of the campaign. The definitive work remains to be written. ( )