Trevor Wilson (1) (1928–2022)

It’s hard to stay decent while trying to pick out nouns and adjectives appropriate to describe the Somme. It more of a campaign than a battle, starting with a bang in July 1916 and ending with a whimper that November. This is something of a debunking book; the conventional wisdom is that stolid British soldiers carrying 66 pound packs went over the top in dressed lines and were cut down in rows by German machine gun fire. The authors contend that many of the attacking units used novel and imaginative infantry tactics, including Lewis gun teams and “bomber” squads, and made as much use as possible of cover, but no imaginable infantry tactics could have worked. The fatal flaw (according to Prior and Wilson) was artillery preparation; the British high command, hoping for a breakthrough with the cavalry corps pouring through “to the green fields beyond”, devoted almost all their artillery to attempts to cut lanes in barbed wire and practically none to counter battery work. The untouched German artillery ignored the front lines and concentrated on approaches and assembly areas (helped by the fact that they held local high ground and therefore had superior observation); as a result some units had 70% casualties before they even reached the front line trenches. It’s contended that this is the origin of the “rows of dead soldiers carrying packs” myth; these were not troops “going over the top” but in the rear on approach marches. The German machine guns may have contributed even so, since they sometimes used them as “indirect fire” weapons.

It didn’t get much better with time, as British generals Haig and Rawlinson learned practically nothing from their mistakes. A few new tactics were introduced: first the barrage in “lifts”, then the “creeping” barrage, then the “bite and hold” tactic (adopted more by default than deliberate planning), but the Germans used new tactics, too: moving their machine teams to shell holes rather than trenches. There were plenty of these to go around; it’s estimated that one shell of 75mm or greater for every square yard of the front. This caused a least one event vaguely similar to astronomers interpreting random Martian craters as “canals”; British aerial photographs misinterpreted a line of water-filled shell holes as a road, resulting in a British artillery team attempting to use it and drowning their mules.

So the bloody carnage just went on and on. Some British units lost 300% casualties (i.e. the entire unit was replaced three times during the battle). Total British killed were about 150000, with another 100000 hurt too badly to fight again. The British always overestimated German casualties, figuring them at 1.25M (!); the actual German casualties were probably about 200000. One of the telling statistics is that of the British casualties, 71 were cavalry.


One flaw in the book is little information about the German side. Analysis on the British side goes all the way from cabinet meetings down to stirring accounts of small unit actions, but there’s nothing for the Germans other than descriptions of defensive positions. The authors also don’t discuss any general history of the war (what happened to get the armies there and what happened afterward) but it’s already a pretty long book.

I wonder if there’s anybody left? If you lied about your age joined the army at 16, you would be 106 now. If you were there and still around all honor you; if not, all honor to your memory, whether you wore khaki or feldgrau.… (más)

The unspoken question raised by the title of Prior and Wilson’s Passchendaele: the Untold Story is “Why would you want to tell it?” This is yet another First World War account of lions lead by donkeys, although calling Douglas Haig and Hubert Gough donkeys is kind of insulting to donkeys. Australian historians Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson are apparently making a career out of deconstructing World War One battles, especially ones where Australian unit participated; I’ve read their The Somme and have Gallipoli in the waiting stack.

The battle was preceded by what Prior and Wilson call a “false dawn”: Messines Ridge. This was more or less a victory, mostly accomplished by detonating a million pounds of ammonal in 21 mines under the German lines. (Nineteen of the mines went off. Mine 20 detonated in 1955, reportedly by a lightning strike. Mine 21 is still waiting). Even Messines Ridge didn’t go all that well; the initial advance was a cakewalk with an estimated 10000 German defenders dying in the explosions but counterattacks quickly brought things to a standstill.


At any rate, Passchendaele (aka Third Ypres) was back to the same old tried and failed tactics: British artillery would destroy the German wire, British infantry would bravely advance and seize the German trenches, and then British cavalry would sweep through the gap to the green fields beyond, all the way to the coast, surround the German army, and win the war. Of course, what happened was more of the same too; the preparatory artillery fire let the Germans know what was coming, the wire may have been cut but in the process the landscape was turned into an impassable morass; the artillery spent so much time cutting wire that they failed to suppress enemy batteries and machine guns, because the Germans had mastered getting them out from under incoming shells; British infantry bravely advanced and just as bravely died, without getting within seizing distance of any trenches; and the cavalry sat in the rear. It could have been First Ypres or Second Ypres or the Somme all over again. The British generals sat even farther in the rear complaining about the poor behavior of their troops; Haig noted that the Irish 16th and 36th divisions “went forward but failed to keep what they had won… The men are Irish and apparently did not like the enemy’s shelling.” The 36th Division had been in the front line for 13 days before the attack; fatigue parties required 1000 men per day to bring forward supplies; and they had 50% (!) casualties during the attack, with the leading battalion of the 36th having two offices and three other ranks surviving out of 330. One of the truly amazing things about the British army (and I apologize for including Irish, Scots, Welsh, Manx, Newfoundlanders, Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders as “British”) is that with this kind of treatment they never mutinied like the French, Italians, Russians and eventually Germans did. I’m also a little surprised the Douglas Haig’s statue is still standing in Whitehall.


Worth reading for the heroic and tragic individual stories interspersed through the narrative, and for the narrative itself. The more I read about WWI history the more amazed I am. We’ll be in the centennial years fairly soon; I think every last veteran has now answered the Last Post.… (más)

By 1917 and the third battle of Ypres, the philosophy of the general staffs had evolved to one of mutual slaughter. In early 1915, it was still assumed that rapid advance by large forces of cavalry to clear the way for infantry would overwhelm the opposition. Two years later, trench warfare had scuttled that view. It was replaced by one that maintained that the population of the Allies was higher than that of the foes, so the process of sending large forces at the Germans must inevitably end in victory. “The quicker the rate of mutual destruction, the military statisticians argued, the sooner the war would be over.”

Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson dissect the battle for Passchendaele, also known as the Third Battle of Ypres in a very scholarly fashion, with charts and tables , not to mention salient (J) details. Passchendaele, itself, was a hill or ridge that became the target for a massive attack out of the British salient at Ypres. A salient is like an exposed pimple on the front line. They are difficult to hold because of their exposed flanks and awkward to use as jump offs for strategic advances. The “breakthrough” that British general Gough hoped for of 5,000 _ 7,000 yards colored his planning. Had he planned an advance of less, say 1,500 _ 2,000 yards, more artillery could have been brought to bear on the impressive German fortifications that had been recently strengthened. Logistics again became crucial as the British did not have enough shells to provide both an intense shelling at one point and continuous bombardment over the twenty miles of front that would be engaged in the assault. The use of tanks, while more extensive than previous was not sanguine, as the terrain, best described as marshy and wooded, the precisely the kind of ground they were least suited for.

And then it had the audacity to rain. All August. There were, in fact, only three days during the month when it did not rain. The lucky ones died quickly. “Bringing the wounded down from the front line today. [wrote Sergeant McKay:] Conditions terrible. The ground between Weltje and where the infantry are is simply a quagmire, and shell holes filled with water. Every place is in full view of the enemy who are on the ridge. There is neither the appearance of a road or path and it requires six moen to every stretcher, two of those being constantly employed helping the others out of the holes; the mud in some cases is up to our waists. A couple of journeys. . . and the strongest men are ready to collapse.” The mud also made it extremely difficult for the artillery to move with the men in order to support their movement with a rolling barrage that cut wire and destroyed enemy fortifications.

One would have suspected that conditions such as these might have caused the brass to call off the attack. No such luck. The euphemistic charge continued.

… (más)

Questo e un libro molto interessante per coloro che sono appassionati di storia del 900 e di storia militare. Il libro e una cronaca della battaglia della Somme (dal nome dell'omonimo fiume presso cui si e combattuta). L'esigenza di combattere una grande battaglia sul fronte occidentale era stata proposta nella conferenza interalleata a Chantilly nel dicembre 1915. Qui si era deciso, di comune accordo con i rappresentanti degli stati alleati di Francia, Gran Bretagna, Russia e Italia di lanciare offensive simultanee su tutti i fronti di guerra per la primavera del 1916. Gran Bretagna e Francia decisero di lanciare una offensiva congiunta sulla rivacdestra e sinistra del fiume Somme. Con l'inizio dell'anno 1916 vennero quindi preparati dei piani di guerra che prevedevano una partecipazione di grossi contingenti inglesi e francesi con l'aspettativa di ottenere grossi risultati in fatto di conquista di territorio tenuto dai tedeschi. Tuttavia ben presto il contingente che avrebbe dovuto fornire l'esercito francese, per una serie di ragioni, non ultima l'emergenza sorta con l'attacco tedesco a Verdun, venne drasticamente ridotto fino a raggiungere una proporzione insignificante. L'alto comando inglese, nonostante questo, decise di portare avanti l'offensiva prevista, pur essendo consapevole che tutto lo sforzo sarebbe ricaduto sulle proprie spalle. Non solo: decise anche di aggiungere ulteriori, improbabili, obiettivi per l'imminente battaglia. A capo del corpo di spedizione britannico era allora il generale sir Douglas Haig. L'intero sforzo dell'operazione sarebbe stato sostenuto dalla IV Armata comandata dal generale sir Henry Rawlinson. La battaglia ebbe inizio dopo vari rinvii il 01 luglio 1916. Da subito cominciarono a sorgere le prime difficoltà. Solo il primo giorno di combattimento gli inglesi lamentarono circa 60.000 vittime senza aver conquistato nemmeno un metro di territorio. La battaglia duro' dal 01 luglio al 18 novembre 1916. I risultati furono molto modesti rispetto al tremendo numero delle vittime dell'esercito inglese, 432.000, di cui 152.000 morti. La battaglia che Haig aveva sognato di combattere per dare una svolta decisiva alla guerra aveva miseramente fallito lo scopo. L'esercito tedesco aveva tenuto e non solo, era anche stato in grado di trasferire un congruo numero di divisioni sul fronte orientale e eliminare la Romania dalla guerra. Le ragioni del fallimento dell'offensiva sulla Somme sono da ricercare nella mancanza di un piano adeguato allo scopo e in una non chiara visione degli obiettivi prefissati, con continui cambi all'ultimo momento e un inadeguato uso dell'artiglieria anche se di questa gli inglesi ne avevano in abbondanza, infatti per tutta la durata della battaglia, vennero sparati circa 9.000.000 di colpi artiglieria di vario calibro. In questa battaglia, per la prima volta, nel settembre 1916, venne usato il carro armato anche se la sua comparsa non servì a modificare significativamente l'andamento della battaglia. Il libro dunque e' un ottimo documento su una delle più grandi battaglie della storia militare. E di facile lettura e molto ben documentato. Si potrebbe lamentare che vengano forniti troppi dettagli sui movimenti delle unità dellesercito inglese ma questo si rende comunque necessario se si vuole capire come si svolsero i fatti.… (más)