Russell Frank Weigley (1930–2004)

As a foundational text for understanding not only American strategy, but basic concepts of national strategy itself, this book is unsurpassed. It’s one of the few I can truly call “epic.”

Beginning with George Washington’s “strategy of attrition” during the Revolutionary War, Weigley traces the scope of American strategic thought up to the closing days of the Vietnam War. Structurally, American strategy falls into several phases. Washington eventually gives way to Halleck, who is then replaced by Ulysses Grant. Grant’s approach to war – “a strategy of annihilation” – then serves as the United States’ guiding principle until well into the twentieth century.

As was the case in most arenas, nukes changed everything. The beginning of the Cold War was a return to Marshall and MacArthur’s styles from World War II, but that emphasis on conventional war didn’t last long. Deterrence soon became the word of the day, and the strategic legacies that the army had inherited from Washington, Greene, Grant, and a host of other thinkers fell completely by the wayside.

The modern U.S. Navy is, of course, born out of the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahanian naval thought went relatively unchanged until after World War II, but the dominance of battleships remained alive and well until relatively late in the war. The Air Force gets a similar ‘father figure’ in Billy Mitchell, and the struggle to become an independent branch of the armed services bears particular resonance now, with that very independence being questioned. The turf war between the navy and air force in the early days of the Cold War is very well-documented, with the emphasis on strategic bombers versus carrier aviation shown to be more important than a mere interservice spat.

Weigley’s writing is accessible in that rarest of ways – intelligible yet sophisticated. At times he explains fairly complex concepts, but manages to avoid getting too caught up in minutiae while still covering all the important details. Thinkers in every echelon of the military get a fair hearing, from the usual generals and Joint Chiefs down to the occasional major or even captain (Boyd: curiously absent). And while the overall relevance of The American Way of War is unquestionable, the rather abrupt stopping-point of 1973 is somewhat jarring, and one wishes that Weigley had continued to examine the evolution of American strategy.

For career strategists, The American Way of War might seem oversimplified, but for everyone else, it’s a perfect introduction to not just American doctrine, but national strategy as a concept. And perhaps most important, Weigley demonstrates just where we’ve come from, and how far we have – or haven’t – come since Washington and Valley Forge.… (más)

Quirky is as quirky does.

This book definitely has its oddities -- as when the author insists on identifying generals as being generals U.S.A. or U.S.V., i.e. as generals in the regular army or the "volunteer" army that would disband when the Civil War was over. There is some logic to making this point -- but Weigley never really explains how the whole U.S.A./U.S.V. system worked. (And it's worth understanding, since it explains, e.g., how George Custer could be a Civil War general but, a decade later, would die as an army colonel).

One of the other quirks is made explicit in the title: this is a military and political history. A great deal of time is devoted to the home-front shenanigans of the various parties and politicians. This would be a very good idea -- but, somehow, it doesn't come off very well. Knowing that there were a lot of governors who opposed Lincoln is important, but we never get a real feeling for why. The book doesn't explain enough about pre-war politics to really let us understand how they evolved during the war. As a result, the political sections tend to weigh the book down -- and, of course, they don't leave as much room for the military history, which generally moves much more quickly.

I don't mean to be entirely critical. There is good material here that doesn't show up in some of the more "standard" histories such as those by Catton and McPherson. But the flip side is, if you're reading a one-volume history, odds are that you don't want all the details. You want a good, easy-to-read, accurate, interesting history. By that standard, this volume falls rather short.… (más)