Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (1948–2012)

Tucker looks at how the United States made policy on China in the 1950's. Her argument is that Eisenhower and Dulles followed policies that they did not agree with because the political costs of crossing the China Lobby would distract from their priorities in Europe. As a result, they maintained a hard line against China even though both the President and Secretary of State thought the policies were ultimately self-defeating.

Eisenhower wanted to run his own defense policy and was very engaged with Dulles on foreign policy. Both believed that Europe was the key to the Cold War and were frustrated that China kept taking so much of their time. Both believed that engaging the Chinese was important, both for moderating Chinese behavior and for bolstering the economies of the still-reconstructing Japan and Britain. But the power of the China Lobby, which was mostly made up of the right wing of the President's Republican Party, made a more moderate policy impractical.

A second problem was the actions of the PRC, which was repeatedly provocative. The two Taiwan Straits crises and the negotiations in Paris after Diem Bien Phu aggravated anti-Chinese feelings. The crackdown on rightists and the GLF also made the CCP look brutal. This combined with the raging McCarthyism of the 1950's to make compromise over recognition of the PRC much more difficult.

Tucker argues that Eisenhower and Dulles displayed a bit of cowardice in publicly maintaining a policy that they believed was counter-productive. They had the political clout to confront the China Lobby, but like their acquiescence to McCarthy's attacks on their allies, they did not want to pay the political price and so reinforced the flawed policies.

This is an excellent book. It is very well researched and is superbly written. I found it a completely convincing explanation for the contradictions of the Eisenhower Administration over China.… (más)