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Thomas C. Schelling (1921–2016)

Autor de La estrategia del conflicto

14+ Obras 1,515 Miembros 8 Reseñas 1 Preferidas

Sobre El Autor

Thomas Crombie Schelling was born in Oakland, California on April 14, 1921. He received a bachelor's degree in economics from the University of California, Berkeley in 1944. After working as an analyst for the federal Bureau of the Budget, he attended Harvard University. He spent two years in mostrar más Denmark and France as an economist for the Economic Cooperation Administration. In 1950, he joined the White House staff of the foreign policy adviser to President Harry S. Truman. In 1951, he received his doctorate from Harvard and published his first book, National Income Behavior: An Introduction to Algebraic Analysis. He taught economics at Yale University, Harvard University, and the University of Maryland's Department of Economics and School of Public Policy before retiring in 2003. He wrote several books during his lifetime including International Economics, The Strategy of Conflict, Strategy and Arms Control written with Morton H. Halperin, Arms and Influence, Micromotives and Macrobehavior, Choice and Consequence, and Strategies of Commitment. In 2005, he and Robert J. Aumann received the Nobel Prize in economic science for "having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis." He died on December 13, 2016 at the age of 95. (Bowker Author Biography) mostrar menos
Créditos de la imagen: Photo by user Hessam Armandehi / Wikimedia Commons.

Series

Obras de Thomas C. Schelling

Obras relacionadas

Power and Struggle (1973) — Introducción — 156 copias
Methods of Nonviolent Action (1973) — Introducción — 128 copias
The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action (1974) — Introducción — 119 copias
Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (1962) — Prólogo — 114 copias
The Politics of Nonviolent Action [3-volume set] (1973) — Introducción — 99 copias
On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (1965) — Introducción — 61 copias
Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (1998) — Contribuidor — 51 copias
Global Problems, Smart Solutions: Costs and Benefits (2013) — Contribuidor — 3 copias

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Reseñas

there are some interesting situations where seemingly simple individual behaviors aggregate to surprising and potentially disappointing collective results: hockey players given an individual choice will opt for no helmet, making themselves collectively worse off and begging for league-mandated helmets; homeowners with a slight preference to live near people who look like themselves will induce stark segregation that shocks their own consciences. if these examples are familiar it is because this book introduced them.

the style of reasoning used in this book is now so familiar that it was briefly a meme: you could say schelling was the original "it's time for some game theory" guy. but that would be unfair, i think: the meme is mocking a top-down, overly theoretic way of forcing the facts into speculative theories. in this book schelling is sensitive to the facts of concrete situations, working in a bottom-up fashion that starts with humdrum examples taken from life, adding more detailed observations to the model until he brings it to the breaking point.

one pleasure of the book is seeing a systematic thinker at work: when schelling is done modeling a situation, he begins turning the parameter dials to see what other interesting outcomes he can get in theory and considering what concrete situations they might describe. when he's exhausted those possibilities, he lays the various models out and organizes them into logical schema. even there he does not stop, but instead ponders the nature of these schema, their limitations, their general properties: where do these simple accounting identities come from? what are the limits of their application? what kinds are there for closed and open systems? why do they seem obvious only after we have used them for a time?

schelling has a unique mind and i may need to dip into his other books.
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Denunciada
leeinaustin | 4 reseñas más. | May 17, 2021 |
A weak 4 but this is a classic. His Nobel speech afterword really ties a lot together and hammers home the importance of nuclear weapons as a tool of influence, rather than an actual weapon to be used. Some weird moments of pro-peaceful nuclear energy advocacy?
 
Denunciada
goliathonline | Jul 7, 2020 |

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Obras
14
También por
8
Miembros
1,515
Popularidad
#16,979
Valoración
4.0
Reseñas
8
ISBNs
44
Idiomas
5
Favorito
1

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