Sobre El Autor
Obras de Heidi M. Ravven
Etiquetado
Conocimiento común
- Género
- female
Miembros
Reseñas
The self beyond itself : an alternative history of… por Heidi M. Ravven
One of a handful of important books that have changed my thinking for the better in the past 5-10 years. Brings together many major but hitherto separate threads of the post-war explosion of research into human nature, and why decent people are capable of inhuman acts. Offers strongly-grounded insights suggesting what we need to do to achieve the kinds of societies we desire.
If you are one of the flat-earthers who still thinks that humans have free will, body and mind are distinct and the way to raise a child to be moral is have them memorize the Ten Commandments, then reading this book will challenge you to relinquish those beliefs.
I do have a few minor criticisms however. The author leaves the reader with the impression that Augustine(354-430) introduced the concept of free-will into Christianity. It is true that Christianity first introduced free-will into Western thought, however, as Kyle Harper points out in From Shame to Sin, 'Justin Martyr(100-165) has the signal distinction of being the first philosopher on record to make unambiguous us of the term "free-will". The author can be forgiven perhaps because the only early Christian philosopher most will ever read is no doubt Augustine.
The other criticism I have is that the author also leaves the reader with the impression that the theory of anti-Cartesian embodied cognition is something new that contemporary neuroscience is uncovering and modern philosophy is catching up. However, it is actually the other way around. This is a major theme in Continental Philosophy in the work of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and more recently in Vincent Descombes’ book The Mind’s Provisions: A Critique of Cognitivism. M.C. Dillon claims in his book Merleau-Ponty's Ontology that Merleau-Ponty developed the first real alternative to ontological dualism seen in Western philosophy. Two American philosophers Herbert Dreyfus ( eg. 'Why computers must have bodies to be intelligent.' Review of Metaphysics 21/1(September, 1967), 13-32 and What Computers Can't Do. ), and Samuel Todes, Body and World, explored this idea four decades ago. Todes' book was based on his 1963 Harvard dissertation which was chosen to be published in book form by Harvard in 2001 because it is considered one of the most important philosophy dissertations done at Harvard and is considered an important contribution to the field of embodied cognitive science a subject the author spills much ink on without noting this philosophical groundwork.
In the end the author who presents a compelling case for why free-will is an illusion, lacks the courage to say straight out that we don't have moral responsibility. I see no way to avoid this conclusion. A good book drawing out the implications of not having free-will is Against Moral Responsibility, by Bruce Waller.Those who object and think the denial of free-will implies that we are locked into fixed behaviorial patterns do not take into account the role of learning in modifying behavior.
The bibliography could be beefed up a bit, but does at least provide a starting point if you want to delve further into the ideas and science she presents.
Anyway, these are minor criticisms of an otherwise fine book.… (más)
I do have a few minor criticisms however. The author leaves the reader with the impression that Augustine(354-430) introduced the concept of free-will into Christianity. It is true that Christianity first introduced free-will into Western thought, however, as Kyle Harper points out in From Shame to Sin, 'Justin Martyr(100-165) has the signal distinction of being the first philosopher on record to make unambiguous us of the term "free-will". The author can be forgiven perhaps because the only early Christian philosopher most will ever read is no doubt Augustine.
The other criticism I have is that the author also leaves the reader with the impression that the theory of anti-Cartesian embodied cognition is something new that contemporary neuroscience is uncovering and modern philosophy is catching up. However, it is actually the other way around. This is a major theme in Continental Philosophy in the work of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and more recently in Vincent Descombes’ book The Mind’s Provisions: A Critique of Cognitivism. M.C. Dillon claims in his book Merleau-Ponty's Ontology that Merleau-Ponty developed the first real alternative to ontological dualism seen in Western philosophy. Two American philosophers Herbert Dreyfus ( eg. 'Why computers must have bodies to be intelligent.' Review of Metaphysics 21/1(September, 1967), 13-32 and What Computers Can't Do. ), and Samuel Todes, Body and World, explored this idea four decades ago. Todes' book was based on his 1963 Harvard dissertation which was chosen to be published in book form by Harvard in 2001 because it is considered one of the most important philosophy dissertations done at Harvard and is considered an important contribution to the field of embodied cognitive science a subject the author spills much ink on without noting this philosophical groundwork.
In the end the author who presents a compelling case for why free-will is an illusion, lacks the courage to say straight out that we don't have moral responsibility. I see no way to avoid this conclusion. A good book drawing out the implications of not having free-will is Against Moral Responsibility, by Bruce Waller.Those who object and think the denial of free-will implies that we are locked into fixed behaviorial patterns do not take into account the role of learning in modifying behavior.
The bibliography could be beefed up a bit, but does at least provide a starting point if you want to delve further into the ideas and science she presents.
Anyway, these are minor criticisms of an otherwise fine book.… (más)
Listas
Estadísticas
- Obras
- 2
- Miembros
- 59
- Popularidad
- #280,813
- Valoración
- 4.7
- Reseñas
- 2
- ISBNs
- 6