Benjamin I. Page

Page and Jacobs argue that there is, in fact, no "class war" brewing in America--that in fact a philosophically conservative American public, in a natural fidelity to fundamental American values of hard work, independence, basic fairness, and equality of opportunity, broadly favors some pragmatically "liberal" government policies. Those policies include public education, progressive taxation, food stamps, and other economic support programs that make it possible for the poor to maintain themselves and those born into poor families to have a genuine opportunity to achieve better lives. Merely saying, "you can do it if you work hard enough," is not enough. For our egalitarian values to mean anything, they have to be backed up by access to the tools that a talented and determined young person can really use to achieve success.

This won't be a welcome message to everyone. We have some politicians who are deeply invested in the idea that the rich resent taxation, and that the middle class resent any money spent on the poor. Page and Jacobs questioned that, and decided to dig into the question in the most pragmatic possible way: looking at, and analyzing, polls on social and economic issues conducted over the last seventy years, plus a new, large-scale, comprehensive poll, on the same questions, using the same wording. What they found is startling: We are not divided on party lines, or economic lines, or social class lines, or geographic lines. In both major parties, all economic classes, and every region of the country, Americans favor both individualism and self-reliance, as well as public intervention to make the "playing field" fair enough to give everyone a real opportunity for success if they work at it. Across economic, geographic, and ideological lines, most Americans support a higher minimum wage, improved public education, wider access to health insurance coverage, and the use of tax dollars to fund these programs. Why? Because you don't have a realistic, fair shot at success, no matter how hard you're willing to work, if you can't get a decent education, or if you can't get medical care when you're sick, or if working full-time at a minimum wage job doesn't provide you the security and stability to save, get more education or training, and take that next step up the ladder.

Recommended.

I received a free electronic copy of this book from the publisher.… (más)

This book feels a lot like a missed opportunity: it could have done so much more, and be a rebuttal to Murray's Coming Apart: The State Of White America, 1960-2010 , but sadly, it does not.
In a nutshell, the central argument the authros make is: it is not true that Americans are against taxes: they are happy to pay them if they go to deserving causes, which include education projects as well as helping out those hard working people who have lost their job through no fault of their own. This is based on evindence coming from various surveys plus one commissioned by the authors.
The two main shortcomings for me are first of all, as several people have already noted, the books is quite repetitive. Secondly, they could have done much more in presenting the data - these are almost always presented disaggregated by the categories "All americans, Republicans, High income", with no further "shading", e.g. controlling for the type of occupation, or geographical location, numb er of children and so on. It could be because this would have generated a sparsely populated table (after all, their original survey only includes just over 600 individuals), but still it would have been good to know. For instance, when the authors state that

Only 30 percent of Republicans and 30 percent of the affluent support “decreased” taxes in general

, we do not know how much these two categories overlap, so that it could in principle be that no Republicans are affluent, so that there is a 60% support for decreased taxes.

In addition, if the evidence is so strong, they should have let it speak more, whereas in various places the exposition feels not at all objective (e.g. when a 4% changes from modest to many, as in "the modest 35 percent who said they favored abolishing the estate tax" and "many Americans (39 percent) realize that lower-income people pay more of their earnings in payroll taxes"). Or similarly, not really probing the isues, as for instance when they claim that Republicans do not represent their voters: so why do voters keep voting them?

In short, I am glad I read this book as it was somewhat informative, but I am glad this was one of the monthly freebies from the University of Chicago Press.… (más)

Dans le contexte d'une polarisation croissante de la vie politique aux États-Unis, cet ouvrage arrive comme un fort utile retour au réel. Exploitant plus d'un demi-siècle de sondages d'opinion ainsi qu'une enquête inédite de leur cru, les auteurs démontrent l'existence d'un fossé entre les termes du débat politiques et les positions des citoyens américains.

La thèse essentielle des auteurs est qu'une solide majorité des américains est à la fois conservatrice, c'est-à-dire attachée aux libertés individuelles, pensant qu'un certain niveau d'inégalité est nécessaire au bon fonctionnement de la société et sceptiques sur l'intervention publique, et pragmatiquement libérale (au sens américain), c'est-à-dire très favorable et prête à financer les coûteux programme permettant une réelle égalité des chances.

Ils démontrent ainsi que si le concept de lutte des classes est inopérant dans les représentations des américains, ceux-ci sont en revanche à la fois informés et sensible au niveau d'inégalité de revenu et de richesse dans le pays. Alors qu'ils expriment un support massif dans l'idée que l'inégalité des revenus est la conséquence logique de l'inégalité des efforts et des talents, ils estiment tout aussi massivement, y compris les Républicains, que le niveau actuel d'inégalité est tel qu'il décourage plus qu'il n'encourage et devient de ce fait une négation du rêve américain.

Le même type de position à deux faces se retrouve dans le domaine de la taxation, de l'éducation ou de la sécurité sociale : à la fois un attachement de principe à la responsabilité individuelle et un recours pragmatique à la progressivité de l'impôt, au service public d'éducation et à l'intervention de l'État pour assurer l'égalité des chances, en particulier en direction des plus défavorisés.

Les auteurs expliquent l'écart entre leurs résultats et le débat public américain par le poids disproportionné joué par les franges extrémistes (tant chez les Démocrates que chez les Républicains) dans la désignation des candidats, tant au niveau local que national ou fédéral. La primaire républicaine pour les élections présidentielles de 2012 semble leur donner amplement raison.

Si l'adhésion fondamentale du public américain à la liberté individuelle n'est naturellement pas transposable au cas français, cet ouvrage pousse en revanche à s'interroger sur l'existence en France d'un divorce de ce type entre les représentations du débat politique et la position de la majorité des citoyens. La polarisation du débat sur des questions mineures, comme l'immigration ou les délocalisation, plutôt que sur des questions majeures, comme la croissance ou l'éducation, constitue un élément assez probant en ce sens.… (más)