Diana Tietjens Meyers

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Meyers, methinks, has a hard task in front of her. She is arguing for a relational autonomy, but one that preserves the independence of the agent to choose the groups to which s/he will belong. In other words she wants a notion of autonomy that is quite individuated from her relational autonomy (but which is still relational). Amartya Sen has made similar (and I think more coherent) arguments to the same effect, while noting that there are some groups we cannot help but belong to by dint of our birth/sex/social status, etc.

In other words what is really need in this book is a better understanding of ways in which systemic injustice disables people from making choices about their own (group) identities, but instead Meyers prefers to focus on the ways in which individuals can still operate autonomously, even under systems of oppression.

She goes really astray, in my opinion, which she tries to make a distinction between the inauthentic and the authentic self. Naturally she would like to promote the flourishing of the authentic self. But I thought we learned our lesson from Heidegger and don't make these kinds of mistakes anymore? THERE IS NO AUTHENTIC SELF. (In the wake of postmodernism this is yet still a stranger claim). In any case, its unclear to me how--even if we could come up with some thin notion of an authentic self--how ANYONE under a patriarchal system of oppression could even be said to have that kind of "authentic" self. It is trite but true that an oppressed individual may still make at least SOME decisions for her/himself (where to use your WIC money for example). This hardly constitutes an exercise of some authentic self.… (más)