Stephen Macedo
Autor de Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved
Sobre El Autor
Stephen Macedo is the Laurence S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics at Princeton University
Créditos de la imagen: Prof. Stephen Joseph Macedo (photo courtesy of Princeton University)
Obras de Stephen Macedo
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Etiquetado
Conocimiento común
- Fecha de nacimiento
- 1957
- Género
- male
- Educación
- College of William and Mary (BA)
London School of Economics (MSc)
Oxford University, Balliol College (MLitt|Politics|1985)
Princeton University (PhD|Politics|1987) - Ocupaciones
- Professor of Politics, Princeton University
Director, Center for Human Values, Princeton University - Organizaciones
- American Political Science Association
- Premios y honores
- Berger Memorial Prize in the Philosophy of Law (1997)
- Biografía breve
- Stephen Macedo writes and teaches on political theory, ethics, American constitutionalism, and public policy, with an emphasis on liberalism, justice, and the roles of schools, civil society, and public policy in promoting citizenship. He served as founding director of Princeton's program in Law and Public Affairs (1991-2001). He recently served as founding editor of the American Political Science Association and chair of its first standing committee on Civic Education and Engagement. Macedo has taught at Harvard University and at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. He earned his B.A. at the College of William and Mary, masters degrees at the London School of Economics and Oxford University, and his M.A. and Ph.D at Princeton University. [adapted from Primates and Philosophers (2006)]
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Estadísticas
- Obras
- 15
- También por
- 1
- Miembros
- 559
- Popularidad
- #44,693
- Valoración
- 3.4
- Reseñas
- 8
- ISBNs
- 53
- Idiomas
- 7
The editors observe that all five share the understanding that Emphasis mine. Some of the counterarguments call out de Wall for anthropomorphizing his studies (more on that), but he has long observed enough behavior that he justifies well his "scientific anthropomorphism" (as distinguished from the Peter Rabbit-ish writings.) (their emphasis) Important distinction. There is no anthropomorphism in that. Humans want to project "ought" and it is the duty of the impartial scientific observer to maintain a distance.
So, to frame the argument, de Wall says Our evolution didn't spontaneously pop out a "moral" product. I don't know how anyone can deny that some animals have empathy and either it developed independently (which has happened for multiple many features) or has passed down from some earlier species. de Wall argues that Veneer Theory "lacks any sort of explanation of how we moved from being amoral animals to moral beings. The theory is at odds with the evidence for emotional processing as driving force behind moral judgment." de Waal: Extreme? perhaps, but it bears thought. He notes this on morality: This is lost on so many people! Racism, xenomisia, nationalism...hello! This makes sense, no? de Waal: Still. the fringe elements supported and promoted by the current US administration seem to have a closer connection to the cousins...
Journalist (and sociobiologist/evolutionary psychologist) Robert Wright picks at de Waal's use of anthropomorphic language in his writings and arguments. He says His beef with de Waal seems to be that "It isn’t always clear from the behavioral evidence alone which kind of anthropomorphic language is in order." and that de Waal seems to prefer cognitive anthropomorphism. de Waal does tend to impart a more human reasoning to explain some of his (many) observations of simian behavior, the cognitive anthropomorphism, but then he does have decades of behaviors observed!
Philosopher Christine Korsgaard sides with de Waal in arguing against Veneer Theory in her essay: She then looks at de Waal's consideration of intent as he establishes the primacy of the bases for the evolution of our morality. She has a point - interpretation is necessary, as we cannot (yet) know what animals are thinking, so care must be taken to normalize that interpretation.
Peter Singer, philosopher, in his response essay "Morality, Reason, and the Rights of Animals" points out I didn't pull much from his counter, but I thought that worth sharing. In de Waal's response to the responses, he asks I submit that Daniel Kahneman answers that. Our emotional brain reacts first, much as we rational beings hate to admit it, and that emotional brain developed much earlier than the human primate overlay.
Okay, I veneered the second half of the book (first half, too, really, but...) I need to read more de Waal, but my confirmation bias thinks he's right, whether he uses the appropriate descriptive language or attributions.… (más)