Christopher L. Kolakowski

At the beginning "Last Stand On Bataan" threatened to be statistics, maps, and names that would soon run together. I should note I have been diagnosed as having ADD and have some problems with such things. But, it soon became a story about the people, on both sides, who fought in this battle. A very satisfying lesson about a major event in the history of WWII and the people who fought in it. A very insightful understanding of how people react to being battle and the many ways different people react to these situations.… (más)

We're the Battling Bastards of Bataan
No mama, no papa, no Uncle Sam
No aunts, no uncles, no nephews, no nieces,
No pills, no planes, no artillery pieces.
... And nobody gives a damn.
-- Frank Hewlett [142]

Kolakowski's is a detailed account of the defense of the Philippines, from the circumstances prior to attack on Pearl Harbor through the defense of first the Bataan Peninsula and then Corregidor. The Bataan Death March is addressed but briefly, as that was not an action included in the defense so much as a consequence for those involved in it. Details are provided at the level of battles and skirmishes, but emphasis also is given to personalities of those involved, both for those defending and those attacking. Kolakowski references US Army maps throughout, immensely helpful despite the occasional poor reprints. (Many b&w photographs also accompany the text and maps.) Overall, it appears a conventional account, distinctive for its thoroughness and its sensitivity to both Filipino and Japanese combatants, each of whom is sometimes dismissed or vilified in jingoistic U.S. accounts of the war.

If I have reservations, it's for an insufficient understanding of the strategic importance of the Philippines to the Allied efforts, and to Japanese military planners, something only addressed (incompletely) near the end of the book. Similarly, there is a nagging sense the summing up adheres too closely to the propaganda of the time: we fought, were outnumbered and faced a dishonorable enemy, but our efforts were a noble sacrifice which helped win the war. This is stated, but not argued, and falls uncomfortably at the end of the story as though reaching for a suitably proud note on which to conclude the piece. But these are quibbles, the account as a whole is a fine achievement and provides a solid understanding from which to read other, more critical accounts.

The fall of the Philippines ranks as one of the worst defeats in U.S. military history, and King's capitulation on April 9 [1942] is far and away the largest of its kind in American history. But the valiant defense of the Philippines was not in vain: the USAFFE/USFIP troops had held out for five months, disrupted the Japanese timetable of conquest, and denied the enemy use of the key base at Manila Bay. Their stand inspired the Allied world, and would do so until the final victory over the Axis in 1945. Most importantly, through their victories in early February the Bataan defenders had shown that the Japanese could be beaten. Lessons and intelligence about weapons and tactics, both American and Japanese, learned during the campaign would influence U.S. training, equipment, and preparations for battle in future Pacific operations. [180]

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It is curiously bloodless, for treating a topic of such carnage. I don't mean it wasn't written well or engagingly; merely that I know the siege of Bataan was extremely violent and primal, and that thousands died, but that doesn't translate emotionally here. This is typical of a certain type of battle narrative, I think. I didn't actually notice until near the end, when it occurred to me I might have been much more viscerally affected by a book on Bataan.

Impressively, Kolakowski accounts for the movements and action of the 26th Cavalry, the last U.S. mounted regiment to serve in combat. These actions are woven throughout the narrative, and not relegated to a sidebar or aside, demonstrating both the contribution of the unit (even after losing their horses), and illustrating the level of detail Kolakowski trades in. [181]

More than once thought of the Siege of Malta, the Knights' objective not so much winning outright as outlasting the foe. There's an argument to be made that a similar thing happened on Luzon and Bataan, with "outlast" being here the ability to withstand the Imperial Army's invasion longer than was planned for, taking up time and distracting infantry divisions that were needed elsewhere, and "victory" being the eventual defeat of the Imperial Army in the Pacific, not a successful resistance of the invasion. So, Corregidor plays Fort Elmo ... but only if one takes an extremely long view of the battle, and acknowledges most of the outlasting would take place in POW camps. (Kolakowski himself alludes not to Malta but Thermopylae and the Alamo [2].)

Worth reading about the resistance following surrender: "In the end, the Philippine underground would number some 250,000 people and comprise the largest anti-Axis resistance in the Pacific, and second-largest in the world, behind only the Polish Home Army." [180]… (más)