G. John Ikenberry

This book is not only a great edited volume on US foreign policy, but it’s also a great primer on International Relations theory and its uses. Indeed, some of the chapters are essential excerpts from classics of IR theory. The value of this book is that you can see American foreign policy filtered through the many varied lenses of IR theory.

The editor, John Ikenberry, chooses to frame this collection of essays on American foreign policy around the theme of the overabundance of theory and the corresponding overdetermination these many plausible descriptions of US foreign policy imply (p. vii). Part of this “problem” of overabundance is located in explanations that lie along different levels of analysis: the individual, the nation-state, and the international system. As Ikenberry notes, Kenneth Waltz and other structural realists put great stock in the idea that structural elements of the international system—anarchy, the resort to self-help, and the balance of power—are essential for determining what states can and cannot do to survive within the international system. Other authors, noting the limits of neorealism, point out that while structural elements of the international system can limit state actions, they do not explain what states do within this restricted realm of action. From this limitation of structural realism, one can see some of the rationales for approaches that stress domestic variables and the role of decision-makers.

Holsti's article on models of IR and Foreign Policy deals with the gap between social scientists and diplomatic historians, and how each can be a corrective for the excesses of the other. In examining the tensions between these two groups, the author briefly describes the roles of classical realism, structural realism, complex interdependence, Marxist and World System theories, and decision-making models of foreign policy and IR. In looking at the last mode of analysis, decision-making analysis, Holsti brings up some very useful concepts--the idea of information pathologies in complex organizations (p. 26), bounded rationality (p. 29), and the differences in crisis and non-crisis decision-making (crisis situations usually get pushed up the policy-making flow chart, while non-crisis moments are dealt by low level bureaucrats who tend to muddle through) (p. 27). In all, there is a lot for the young social scientist to learn in this chapter.

The excerpt from Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics briefly describes his theory of structural realism based on the strong causal influence of elements in the "third image" or international system. As this excerpt explains, while the international system does not determine foreign policy, it does contain it; ergo, an understanding of the structural elements of the international system is a necessary but not sufficient condition for understanding foreign policy. In describing the persistence of structural anarchy, self help, and the importance or relative gain, Waltz also demonstrates the fundamental difference between domestic and international politics and how the security dilemma undermines cooperation and economic specialization among states.

Andrew Bacevich’s essay on the role of open markets in American foreign policy describes how economic prosperity—characterized by luxuriant consumer lifestyles—is an imperative for political survival in US politics. Bacevich convincingly matches the loss of a coherent national identity, brought on by victories of the cultural revolution, with the move toward a national goal of economic growth through trade. His essay works on two propositions: one, that economic growth is an imperative, and two, that domestic markets are insufficient to sustain the necessary level of growth. As Bacevich writes, “unlimited accumulation had long since become the lubricant that kept the system functioning” (p. 168), and politicians have been able to ignore other salient domestic problems through a reduction of the citizen to a consumer (p. 168). Many of the ideas in this essay will challenge you think. Even if you don’t agree with Bacevich’s ideas, you’ll leave with a deeper understanding of the role of economic growth in the US’s foreign policy.

Samuel Huntington’s essay on the tension between American values and institutions, describes how the values of freedom, equality, and democracy cause friction with institutions meant to carry out foreign policy and security. The periodic backlashes that occur when civil society reacts against government can be seen in three reactions by foreign observers: 1) amazement at the US propensity for self-castigation 2) respect for taking its ideals so seriously and 3) concern over the ability of the US to meet its foreign policy commitments (p. 228).

The Mastanduno essay looks how the US system of checks and balances, as a purposefully inferior form of government, limits the US ability to carry out foreign policy. One key observation the author makes is how deep changes in the US bureaucracy after each election leave it at a disadvantage with the “permanent governments” of countries like Japan (p. 254).

Samuel Huntington’s article on power in the global system argues that the current era can best be described not as unipolar but as a strange hybrid system made up of one superpower and several major powers (p. 541). As evidence that the US needs the cooperation of other states to tackle global and regional problems, Huntington cites the dwindling tools for tackling problems alone, including some of the stumbling blocks to unilateral military action (p. 543); in addition, Huntington points to a lack of domestic support for an increased pursuit of hegemony.

Ikenberry’s article on the Bush Doctrine notes how US moves toward unilateralism and disregard for multilateralism will eventually lead to imperial overreach; he also notes how the “long tail” of US military burdens (peacekeeping and state-building) will eventually deplete their resources (p. 573). Instead Ikenberry advocates relying on traditional American strategies balance of power realism and liberal multilateralism (p. 575).

At a little over 600 pages, readers will find a lot of diversity in the essays in this volume and a great introduction to International Relations Theory. I had to read the book in a week for a seminar class, but obviously the book is best taken in slowly -- one essay at a time -- with some read more than once.… (más)

In After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, G. John Ikenberry sets out for himself the task of explaining why the international order constructed by the United States following the end of World War II has lasted as long as it has. Given standard international relations theory--at least of the Realist kind--the durability of this international order is puzzling because the great power against which it was ostensibly constructed to balance--the Soviet Union--ceased to exist at the end of 1991. Yet, at the time this book was published, and in the years since then, there had been little indication that the world's states were preparing to, or even thinking about, allying to balance against the power of the U.S., which is what standard Realist theory says should happen.

Ikenberry's answer to this puzzle is institutionalization. That is to say that Ikenberry contends that the international order created by the U.S. in the aftermath of World War II is of such a nature that the lesser powers of the world do not feel the need to balance against the U.S. because they believe that the institutional restraints put into the international order by the U.S. are strong enough to keep the U.S. itself from using its overwhelming power advantage in such a way as to perpetually keep them subservient to its interests.

While it is an interesting theory, there are two problems that I have with After Victory. First, Ikenberry provides little evidence that his theory is in fact the reason why the post-World War II order has been so durable. In actuality, After Victory is more about how such international orders are formed than it is about why they are so durable. Second, Ikenberry does not provide any effective refutation of the Realist answer to the conundrum of why no balancing has occurred against the U.S.: that the other states in the world are so far behind the U.S. in relative power that they see no realistic way of combining against it without first provoking its ire before any effective anti-American coalition can be formed.

That being said, Ikenberry's theory is one with which I am inclined to be sympathetic. The decade of the 2000s has provided a welter of instances in which the international order should have broken down but did not. The U.S. still holds a large power advantage over the rest of the world, but it is shrinking by the year with still no signs of any impending formation of an anti-American coalition. The only one that is even close to becoming serious is a combination between Russia and China, but that has been more playacting than serious. Neither Russia nor China has shown any interest, as of yet, in trying to upset the world's liberally-oriented international order.

And even if a combination against the U.S. were to form, that does not necessarily negate Ikenberry's theory. It would only negate it if the contenders were bent on rewriting the rules, like the Soviet Union was. In all likelihood, whichever state or states succeeds the U.S. as top dog will hold on to only a slightly modified version of the current international order for the same reason that the U.S. has held on to it for so long: ruling by consent of the governed is a lot cheaper than ruling by force.… (más)